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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study, is to investigate the dynamics of reforms (i.e. why and 
how) in the delivery of public services and management controls in an Irish local 
authority, paying particular attention to the role of a newly appointed CEO and 
austerity measures.  
The case study method is adopted. Several complementary socio-political 
theoretical lenses are adopted to give greater emphasis to agency and structure 
including concepts such as institutional entrepreneurship, institutional 
contradictions, institutional change, organisational change and power. Such 
theoretical pluralism illuminates the complex nature of public service reforms in 
an Irish local authority, as it sought to realise services efficiency targets in times 
of austerity.  
This study makes important contributions to research on public service deliveries 
and management controls. As far as its author is aware, this study is the first of 
its kind to detail the unfolding journey of reform in the delivery of services and 
management controls in an Irish local authority that faced the significant 
challenges of austerity. Hence, for this reason alone the research contributes 
significantly towards the development of new knowledge in this important area.  
Furthermore, an in-depth process-oriented account of a purposeful institutional 
entrepreneur, utilising management accounting information, power and 
communication, in reforming the delivery of public services and management 
controls, is provided. Also revealed is how external factors, such as the 2008 
financial crisis and subsequent central government funding cuts, enabled rather 
than constrained, institutional entrepreneurship. In addition, the case findings  
informed, how in conditions of austerity, the fundamentals of budgetary control 
became easier to enforce.  
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SYNONYMS 
Public sector synonymous with public service1 
Local authority synonymous with council 
Councillors synonymous with elected representatives  
Irish local government synonymous with Irish local authority 
Council workers synonymous with municipal/local authority workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 The difference between the terms public sector and public service is to do with both ‘ownership 
and operation’. Historically, there was an “assumption that the public sector comprised of 
organisations providing services to the public that were publicly funded, owned and operated” 
(Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008, p.132). In today’s world there is no longer a need for direct 
government ownership and the terms are often used interchangeably (Broadbent and Guthrie, 
2008). The Irish central government uses the term public service. This thesis also adopts the term 
public service despite public sector being the term mostly used in the literature review findings in 
chapter two. Broadbent and Guthrie (2008, p.138) argue that “public service accounting research 
should be concerned with the delivery of public services rather than ownership and organisational 
structure of the public sector” and this research is focussed on the former.  
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
How many Irish people does it take to fill in a pothole? And NO this is 
not a joke. 
In my case, it’s eight as witnessed moments ago. 
Two people to hold the signs, one in a JCB digger, one in the council 
lorry and four to put the tarmac into the hole. 
Is there any wonder why this country has no money, surely, this 
madness has to stop. 
First reply: 
How much in wages does it take to employ eight people to fill in 
potholes? This job could have been done by two or three people, but 
let’s keep employing people to hold up a sign all day. Money well 
spent. 
Second reply: 
No council workers breast-feeding their shovels then? 
Source: Politics.ie, March 2011 
This opening extract reflects a general Irish citizen perception of council workers, 
as being inefficient and old-fashioned in delivering and managing their services. 
During the last two decades, public service organisations globally have “been 
criticised for being insufficiently effective and efficient” (van Helden et al., 2010, 
p.83). Irish council workers have indeed been the object of numerous criticisms 
like the one above. A question which arises, therefore, is how does a settled and 
staid Irish local authority, change (or not) its delivery of public services and 
management controls in an attempt to improve efficiency2?  
                                            
2 It is important to note that this thesis is not concerned with measuring/evaluating whether actual 
service efficiencies were achieved or not, rather its focus is on the dynamic and complex 
processes of service-delivery and management control reform (why and how). 
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Management control in this thesis is viewed in its broad sense. It is concerned 
with a manager’s ability to monitor and focus “worker behaviour, output and/or 
the minds of employees” on its organisation’s objectives via technical (i.e. formal) 
and, socio-ideological (i.e. informal) controls (Alvesson and Karreman, 2004, 
p.424). In essence, management control is about ensuring that someone does 
what they are supposed to do (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010), i.e. influencing 
individuals’ behaviours (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015). Management 
accounting is intertwined in this influencing process providing managers with the 
information they need to plan and control their services. Essentially, management 
control from a management accounting perspective means planning and 
controlling service operations and is seen in this research via budgets and a BSC 
(i.e. financial management). This will be further developed in Chapter Two, 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5.   
 
Prior to the financial crisis, the researcher worked as an accountant in an Irish 
local authority. Knowing of the appointment of a new Chief Executive (CEO) in a 
similar Irish local authority and supplemented by early reading of some literature 
on austerity and New Public Management (NPM), an interest in investigating how 
powerful actors and austerity policies might (or not) impact the existing service-
delivery structures and management control practices in Irish local governments 
developed. Thus, the main purpose of this thesis became: 
To investigate the dynamics of reforms (i.e. why and how) in the 
delivery of public services and management controls in an Irish local 
authority, paying particular attention to the role of a newly appointed 
CEO and austerity measures.  
The empirical part of this thesis consists of an in-depth case study in an Irish local 
authority, which is anonymised for confidentiality reasons, and hereafter is 
referred to as Gladiator. During the period 2007-2012, local authorities self-
generated revenues (e.g. business rates, water rates) across Ireland fell by 8% 
and were matched by an 8% reduction in revenue expenditures (Turley and 
Flannery, 2013). Furthermore, in 2009, central government also slashed its 
funding to Irish local authorities by 24% (Department of Finance, 2009), and the 
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2009 McCarthy3 report recommended cutting 17,300 public service jobs. As far 
as the researcher is aware, this is the first study of the management control 
practices of an Irish local authority during a time of severe budget constraints. 
Indeed, little is known presently about the effect of austerity4 measures on 
management controls in organisations generally (Bracci et al., 2015; van der Kolk 
et al., 2015, p.934; Makrygiannakis and Jack, 2016). Notably, management 
accounting research has given “little or no guidance on the modes of 
organisational response to economic crises” (Hopwood, 2009, p.800) and 
according to Bracci et al., (2015, p.894) “is all the more true in the context of 
public sector organisations”. Management accounting is defined by Chartered 
Global Management Accountants (2014, p.2) as “the sourcing, analysis, 
communication and use of decision-relevant financial and non-financial 
information to generate and preserve value for organisations”. This will be further 
developed in Chapter Two, Section 2.2.3. Furthermore, “very few studies look at 
individuals acting as institutional entrepreneurs5” (Sharma et al., 2014, p.194) to 
bring about public service reforms. 
Having outlined the importance of this research and the main purpose, the next 
two sections provide some background and context to local government in 
Ireland. Section 1.4 presents the research questions. Section 1.5 outlines the 
adopted research approach including a brief introduction to various theoretical 
lenses used; Section 1.6 summarises how this thesis is organised. 
1.2 Irish local authority background 
The Minister for Housing, Planning and Local Government has responsibility for 
all County and City Councils (referred to as local authorities) in Ireland and is 
responsible to central government for their performance. The core remit of the 
                                            
3 A report commissioned by central government to find cuts in public expenditures. See Section 
5.3.3 for further details. 
4 Austerity’s sole aim is to reduce government debts and budget deficits (Lodge and Hood, 2012; 
Konzelmann, 2014; van der Kolk et al., 2015). They mainly result in service level and service 
quality reductions (Pollitt, 2010; van der Kolk, et al., 2015). See Chapter Two, Section 2.2.2 for 
more detail. 
5 Institutional entrepreneur (see Chapter Three, Section 3.5) refers to the “activities of actors who 
have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create 
new institutions to transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004, p.657).  
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County Councils and City Councils is to supply housing, planning permissions 
and roads. Policing and education do not fall under the County Council and City 
Council remit, but instead are the responsibility of central government. Each 
County/City Council is headed by a CEO, who prior to June 2014 was called a 
county or city manager (Citizens Information, 2018). The Irish CEO’s role is 
usually different to their counterparts in local governments abroad, as the role 
affords them with important independent decision-making powers (Boyle, 2014). 
The process of recruitment for County/City CEOs reflects this independence from 
party politics and local influences. That is, such recruitment is a national public 
competition, with a standard contract period of seven years, which may be 
extended to ten years (Boyle, 2014). As Boyle (2014, p.9), adds, “The manager 
works with, and for, an elected council” though international standards restrict the 
range of functions of Irish local governments and the “financial independence of 
councils is very limited”. 
The Local Government (Ireland) Act in 1898 ‘established the county as the 
principal administrative unit and the elected county council as the means of 
administering local government’ (Forde, 2005, p.137). After independence in 
1922, the Irish local government system was redesigned so that is was neither 
British nor Victorian (Roche, 1982). The post-1922 local administration 
programme began to establish city and county management, which has been 
depicted as one of Ireland’s major reforms in the area of government (Boyle et 
al.,, 2003). The idea of professional management was first introduced in Cork City 
with the passing of the Cork City Management Act in 1929. Dublin city followed 
in 1930, and the ‘management’ concept continued to spread reaching Limerick 
city in 1934 and Waterford city in 1939 (Haslam, 2001; Boyle et al., 2003). The 
management principles eventually extended to their respective counties with the 
passing of The County Management Act, 1940 (Haslam, 2001; Boyle et al., 
2003). 
Sheehy (2003, p.134) explains how the County Management Act (1940) 
“recognises two categories of function: reserved and executive”. A reserved 
function is the responsibility of the elected council members, while an executive 
function is any function not regarded as a reserved function and is the 
responsibility of the local authority manager (Sheehy, 2003). Reserved functions 
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fall into five main categories: finance, legislation, political affairs, policy decisions 
and control of the executive branch (Sheehy, 2003, p.134). On the other hand, 
executive functions cover day-to-day decisions based on existing policy and fall 
under the remit of the manager (Asquith and O’Halpin, 1998). Examples of 
executive functions are “the appointment and control of staff, granting of planning 
permission and letting of houses” (Boyle et al., 2003, p.27).  
Irish local government can be distinguished from local authorities in other 
countries by its strong focus on management’s role, in addition to the limited 
range of functions undertaken (Boyle et al., 2003). By comparison, many local 
authorities in other OECD countries have responsibility for a broader range of 
services such as primary and secondary education, health services and social 
welfare (Callanan, 2003). According to Dollard (2003), Irish local government 
expenditure as a proportion of total public expenditure is low compared to other 
European countries. This is due to the limited range of Irish local government 
services provided. In addition, Irish local government has limited powers to raise 
taxes since the abolition of domestic rates in 1978 (Boyle et al., 2003).  
Having presented a brief but necessary background of Irish local government, the 
next section provides a specific overview of the context existing at and over the 
time of the current research since “[c]reating meaning is always context-bound, 
and a narrative requires a plot to make it into a meaningful whole” (Johansson 
and Baldvinsdottir, 2003, p. 222).   
1.3 The Irish financial crisis 
Ireland’s financial crisis, which started in 2008, has been attributed to two key 
factors. First, there was a revenue weakness in the Irish central government’s 
income stream, due to its heavy reliance on income tax from property 
development (Cohen et al., 2015). Second and most significantly, was the 
undercapitalisation of Irish banks, which eventually resulted in the Irish central 
government rescuing several of them from financial collapse (Cohen et al., 2015). 
Thus from 2008, Ireland was experiencing a shift from a banking crisis to an Irish 
sovereign debt crisis (Cohen et al., 2015).  
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Since the publication of the OECD (2008) report on Irish public services, the 
landscape has drastically changed. In October 2008, the (then) Minister of 
Finance presented the 2009 budget two months early with the following opening 
statement:  
We find ourselves in one of the most difficult and uncertain times in 
living memory. We face the most challenging fiscal and economic 
position in a generation. The budget sets out a plan to deal with this 
most unfavourable set of circumstances (Department of Finance, 
2008). 
The 2009 budget sought to achieve both savings and extra revenues of €2 billion 
in a full year (Drudy and Collins, 2011). Savings were targeted via measures such 
as limiting child benefit, reducing public sector staff numbers, decreasing the 
number of state bodies and agencies, and deferring plans for decentralization 
(Drudy and Collins, 2011). Whereas, new revenue streams were targeted via 
VAT, deposit interest retention tax, capital gains tax, motor tax, petrol duties and 
taxes on betting. In addition, new taxes, such as local property tax, income levy 
and air travel tax were also introduced (Drudy and Collins, 2011). 
In February 2009, Ireland’s public sector staff were subject to a further income 
cut when a new pension-levy was enforced. This yielded the Irish central 
government €2.1 billion in a full year. In the same year, planned public sector pay 
increases were postponed, yielding a saving of around €1 billion for the Irish 
central government (Drudy and Collins, 2011). Additionally, in April 2009, a 
supplementary budget was introduced, which doubled the income and health levy 
taxes, as well as making reductions in social welfare payments (Drudy and 
Collins, 2011, p.346). The 2010 budget imposed further spending cuts in various 
government departments, with a total of €1 billion reduction in public sector 
salaries and professional fees (Drudy and Collins, 2011).  
That same year, the National Recovery Plan noted that:  
the level of GDP was some 11 per cent below, and GNP some 15 per 
cent below, their respective levels of 2007 in real terms. Employment 
had fallen by about 13 per cent from its peak of 2007 while the 
unemployment rate had risen from 4.6 per cent to 13.5 per cent [….] 
downturn of this size is without precedent in Ireland’s recorded 
economic history and has few modern parallels at an international 
level (Boyle, 2014, p.6).  
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Since Ireland was (and is) a member of the Eurozone it could not remedy the Irish 
financial crisis through monetary policy, as interest rates, exchange rates and 
money supply are all controlled by the European Central Bank (ECB) (Cohen et 
al., 2015). Consequently, on 28 November 2010, the Irish central government 
agreed to a ‘Programme of Financial Support’ for Ireland from the European 
Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), amounting to €85 billion 
(Robbins and Lapsley, 2014). This financial support was provided by member 
states of the European Union through a variety of sources, including the 
European Financial Stability Fund, the European Financial Stability Mechanism; 
bilateral loans from the UK, Sweden and Denmark, and funding from the IMF’s 
‘Extended Fund Facility’ (Boyle, 2014). This also marked the start of the troika’s6 
quarterly visits to Ireland, to monitor its compliance with various conditions set 
out in the Programme Documents (the Memorandum of Understanding, the 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and the Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding). The main objective of these troika visits was to 
ensure that Ireland was addressing its financial sector weaknesses, stabilising its 
public finances, and getting people back to work.  
1.4 Research questions 
Grounded in reading of extant literature, and drawing on the researcher’s prior 
work experience, the following research questions were established for this 
study: 
RQ1: Why did an Irish local authority (Gladiator) reform its delivery of 
public services and management controls?  
RQ2: How did an institutional entrepreneur handle reforms in 
Gladiator’s delivery of public services and management controls, 
particularly in the context of a forthcoming period of austerity? 
These questions amplify a complex and interwoven relationship between 
exogenous and endogenous shocks7 in processes of public services reforms at 
Gladiator. For example, a newly appointed CEO (i.e. an endogenous jolt and 
                                            
6 The troika is comprised of the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and 
European Central Bank. It is colloquially described as the “bailout”. 
7 Shock is akin to a jolt, or a disturbance that triggers some kind of organisational reform. 
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institutional entrepreneur) and the financial crisis and central government 
austerity measures (i.e. exogenous jolts) triggered changes in given assumptions 
about service-delivery in Gladiator. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, Gladiator 
was a cash-rich organisation providing jobs for life. Its main objective was to meet 
the service demands of its councillors and the public, as quickly as possible, and 
at any cost. Budget control was not priority. However, with the arrival of a new 
CEO in 2007, and then the 2008 economic downturn, staff behaviour around 
services efficiencies and budget control began to change. Continuous 
communication from senior management to staff served to elevate the 
seriousness of the financial crisis, and began to alter settled assumptions 
concerning, for example, a job for life and service-delivery as fast as possible and 
at any cost. Services were centralised in an attempt to increase efficiencies in 
service-delivery, and budgets8 became more formally enforced, and were no 
longer viewed as wish lists. In addition, a balanced scorecard (BSC) was 
established to assist management control of the housing service (see Chapter 
Six).  
1.5 Research approach 
This study adopts a qualitative, case-research approach, to examine the role of 
extra-(i.e. financial crisis and austerity measures) and intra-(i.e. new CEO) 
organisational factors prior to and when an Irish local authority is forced (or not) 
to reform its services delivery. It is an appropriate approach when a researcher’s 
objective is to explain why and how something happens (Yin, 2009). The use of 
a single case study enables an in-depth analysis of why and how important 
agents recalibrate the use of management controls in the context of an Irish local 
authority’s altering services delivery. Most of the research data was collected via 
interviews with people in the local authority, or its wider stakeholders, and/or 
through reading internal and publicly available documents. 
The following comprises a mixed theoretical approach. The premise for such 
combination is an assumption that no single theory can have a “monopoly on 
explanations of accounting and organizational practices, since each theory has 
                                            
8 Budgets were Gladiators financial management controls. 
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its own virtue and collectively, thus adding (not replacing) to or understanding of 
practice and individuals in their social, economic and cultural context” (Hoque et 
al., 2015, p.1171). So, in an effort to overcome the individual limitations of each 
theory drawn upon in this thesis, several (complementary) theoretical frameworks 
are blended together, as depicted in Figure 1.1 below.  
 
Figure 1.1 Theoretical framework: a blending of different but 
complementary approaches 
*NIS theory insights mainly drawn from DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991) and 
Scott (2014). 
At the outset of this research, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) theorisation of 
management accounting change and concepts in ‘New Institutional Sociology’ 
(NIS) theory were adopted as a theoretical basis from which to try to tackle the 
research questions. Burns and Scapens (2000) has (e.g. Soin et al., 2002; Dillard 
et al.,, 2004; Hassan, 2005; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Lukka, 2007; Yazdifar, 
2013; Alsharari et al., 2015) proved a useful framework for multiple scholars who 
have explored change and/or stability in management accounting practices. It is 
essentially a theoretical lens which views management accounting practices as 
grounded in normative rules and which, over time, can take on the characteristics 
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of routines, and even become taken-for-granted or unquestioned institutions (see 
Chapter Three for more detail). It takes its main influence from ‘old’ institutional 
economics and Giddens’ structuration theory. But, the Burns and Scapens (2000) 
framework also places emphasis on unpacking management accounting 
practices as unfolding processes over time. This is an important aspect for the 
present thesis, because such methodological roots complement the aim here to 
understand why and how the delivery of public services and management 
controls in Gladiator were reformed, particularly in the context of a forthcoming 
period of austerity.  
NIS theory on the other hand, posits that organisations change their formal 
structures (e.g. organisational practices) in order to “conform to societal rules or 
to obtain legitimacy from the external environment” (Alsharari et al., 2015, p.481). 
External influences might include: government or their agencies, regulation, or 
markets (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Hopper and Major, 2007). It is the external (or 
“macro”) rules which define an “institution” in NIS theory (Alsharari et al., 2015, 
p.481) while in Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework, institutions represent 
“micro” organisational practices that have become taken-for-granted and 
unquestioned. Both Burns and Scapens (2000) and NIS theory reject “static” 
rationality-grounded (economics) theory and stress the importance of power in 
influencing organisational change (Alsharari et al., 2015). Traditional NIS theory 
(e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) is mainly a theory of stability whereas Burns 
and Scapens’ (2000) framework deals with stability (or continuity) and change 
(Sharma et al., 2014; Alsharari et al., 2015).  
However, as the fieldwork for the present study progressed, it became evident 
that the initial (combined) theoretical perspective adopted was insufficient and 
required enrichment. More specifically, the interviews began to reveal an 
important role of a particular change agent, namely the new CEO, in Gladiator. 
Consequently, the decision was taken to also draw insight from the work on 
institutional entrepreneurship to help illuminate these aspects of change agency. 
Agency is conceptualised here as a multidimensional concept as opposed to 
unidimensional where: “an actor’s engagement with the social world that, through 
the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, can both reproduce and 
transform an environment’s structures” (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009, p.46). An 
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institutional entrepreneurship theoretical approach is primarily concerned with 
exploring the actions of people (i.e. agents) who “have power” (Jack, 2016, p.54). 
If someone initiates change and proactively drives its implementation, then they 
are assumed to be an institutional entrepreneur (Battilana et al., 2009). 
Gladiator’s new CEO meets these conditions as will be articulated in the case 
study (later). This said, while agency is an important part of this thesis, it is not 
the whole story. As outlined earlier, external jolts such as the 2008 financial crisis 
and other external pressures such as government austerity measures were also 
key elements of the reform process. Thus, this study does not intend to represent 
the new CEO as an exceptional ‘heroic’ individual, but rather as an institutional 
entrepreneur who plays an important role in the complex processes of reforms in 
Gladiator (Hardy and Maguire, 2008, p.212). 
Moreover, since the new CEO and the global financial crisis were frequently cited 
in interviews as being key influences on the unfolding reform, it was decided to 
introduce Laughlin’s (1991) model of an organisation. This model enabled the 
tracing of austerity measures in Gladiator, stressing the importance of context 
when examining organisational change, plus how similar jolts can have different 
impacts on different organisations.  
Again, as the research moved on, additional theoretical insights were taken from 
Seo and Creed’s (2002) work. Seo and Creed (2002) complement earlier NIS 
theory by highlighting organisational contradictions which helps to explain “when, 
how and why institutionally embedded agents might come to question, and 
subsequently attempt to change, their and others’ taken-for-granted ways and 
beliefs” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.728). Praxis, the doing of change is 
another important concept used within Seo and Creed’s (2002) theoretical 
framework and is used later to bring understanding to the activities of Gladiator’s 
new CEO.  
Finally, a growing understanding of the key role played by the new CEO 
encouraged the researcher to seek some theorisation of power and politics.  
Thus, this thesis also draws insight from Hardy’s (1996) framework of power, 
highlighting how the mobilisation of power and politics can bring about strategic 
change in organisations. 
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So, in summary, this thesis adopts a rich (and complementary) mixture of 
theoretical influences. Jick (1979) defined such theoretical pluralism9 as the 
“combination of several strategies in the study of the same phenomena” (Hoque 
et al., 2013, p.1172). Had the research instead adopted a single theory, it would 
be at risk of omitting interesting issues in the case study setting (Jacobs, 2012; 
Modell, 2013; Hoque et al., 2013). Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p.823) also 
concurred with a multi-theoretical approach, claiming that “events in the field may 
best be explained with reference to multiple theories” while Hoque et al., (2013, 
p. 1175) added that “the messiness of organisations in-of-itself lends itself to 
inquiry by multiple theories”. This said, some authors still heed caution at 
pluralistic tendencies in theorisation, stressing a harmful potential to undermine 
the philosophical underpinnings of a piece of research (Hansen, 2011, Burns, 
2014). This current research bears this potential in mind (see Chapter Three for 
more discussion). 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis comprises seven additional chapters, each of which are briefly 
introduced here. Chapter Two, next, by way of providing necessary background 
and context, presents a literature review. This literature review particularly 
focuses on the nature of NPM10 policies and how austerity and management 
controls can become interwoven in a NPM agenda. Following on from this, the 
meaning of organisational change is discussed and a critical examination of the 
two main dominant approaches to organisational change, namely: (1) the 
planned approach; and, (2) the processual approach are presented. This chapter 
also defines what management control means in this thesis and presents a 
literature–based discussion of the various roles of management controls in public 
sector organisations. Finally, the role of communication and management 
accounting information in reform processes is briefly examined.  
                                            
9 Often also referred to as “theoretical triangulation” (Hoque et al., 2015, p.1153). 
10 NPM ideas strive to maintain service levels and service quality through more efficient and 
business like processes (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; van der Kolk et al., 2015). They are an 
approach to managing public sector organisations (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008) through the 
adoption of private sector management techniques (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2005; van 
Helden, 2005) of which management control is intertwined. 
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Chapter Three covers the theoretical underpinnings of the study, which, as 
explained above, comprises a mixture of theories. Theoretical pluralism was 
adopted because “no single theory satisfactorily embraced all facets” (Hopper 
and Major, 2007, p.4). So, the chapter introduces several strands of theory, 
namely NIS (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2014), as well as, works of 
Burns and Scapens (2000), Seo and Creed (2002) and Battilana et al., (2009).  
Laughlin’s (1991) theorisation of organisational change and Hardy’s (1996) 
theoretical framework outlining the role of power and political mobilisation 
complete the array of theoretical approaches, which this thesis draws from.  
Next, Chapter Four explains the research design underpinning this study, mostly 
discussing its perspective. This chapter also explains the adopted interpretivist-
processual approach, and the qualitative case study research method used. This 
included semi-structured interviews, observation, and analysis of internal and 
publicly available documents. 
The empirical findings of the Gladiator case study are presented in Chapters Five 
and Six. It starts with a discussion of the (historic) context of the case organisation 
prior to the changes in practices. The new CEO is conceptualised as an 
institutional entrepreneur (Battilana et al., 2009) and his control initiating and 
implementing of public service-delivery reform is explored. Management control 
practices, including budgets, are also examined in some detail from both an 
overall organisational perspective and then in Chapter Six from a specific housing 
service context. In Chapter Six, a newly established BSC to assist management 
of the Housing function is detailed, as well as possible housing staff resistance 
(or not) to Gladiator’s management control and service-delivery reforms. 
Chapter Seven draws on NPM, organisational change and management control 
literatures discussed in Chapter Two, as well as the theoretical approach as 
described in Chapter Three, to explain why and how the reforms unravelled as 
they did in Gladiator. Then, is a focus on the complex interaction between 
structures and actions, and emphasis on the entrepreneurship of Gladiator’s new 
CEO in the context of worsening government austerity policies. 
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Finally, Chapter Eight brings the thesis to its conclusion, and reflects on the main 
findings in relation to the initial research questions namely: (1) why did Gladiator 
reform its delivery of public services and management controls? and, (2) How did 
an institutional entrepreneur handle reforms in Gladiator’s delivery of public 
services and management controls, particularly in the context of a forthcoming 
period of austerity? This concluding chapter also summarises the main 
contributions of this thesis, especially Figure 8.1 which puts forward a framework 
for analysing organisational reforms and which can be used to interpret the 
process of service-delivery and management control reforms in public service 
organisations, which face austerity pressures. It also considers this thesis’s 
limitations, and puts forward some suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter One, “the public sector has been criticised during the last 
two decades for being insufficiently effective and efficient” (van Helden et al., 
2010, p.83) and “little is known yet about the effects of austerity measures on the 
management control in the organisations affected” (van der Kolk et al., 2015, 
p.934). As was described in Chapter One, management control in this thesis is 
viewed in its broad sense. It is concerned with a manager’s ability to monitor and 
focus “worker behaviour, output and/or the minds of employees” on its 
organisation’s objectives via technical (i.e. formal) and, socio-ideological (i.e. 
informal) controls (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.424). In essence, 
management control is about ensuring that someone does what they are 
supposed to do (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010), i.e. influencing individuals’ 
behaviours (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015). Management accounting is 
intertwined in this influencing process providing managers with the information 
they need to plan and control their services (see Chapter Two, Sections 2.4 and 
2.5 for more detail). Essentially, management control from a management 
accounting perspective means planning and controlling service operations and in 
Gladiator is mainly achieved via budgets and a BSC. 
Indeed, the financial crisis context offers an interesting area for enriching our 
understanding of public sector management accounting practices such as cost 
control, budgeting and performance management (van der Stede, 2001; Bracci 
et al., 2015). Thus, as explained in the previous chapter, the objective of this 
thesis is to:  
Investigate the dynamics of reforms (i.e. why and how) in the delivery 
of public services and management controls in an Irish local authority, 
paying particular attention to the role of a newly appointed CEO and 
austerity measures.  
In the case study (see Chapters Five and Six) how managers influenced staff 
behaviour by drawing on technical controls (e.g. rules, procedures, standards, 
budgets and performance management systems), socio-ideological controls (e.g. 
norms, beliefs and values), and austerity rhetoric will be discussed. In so doing, 
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the distinction between “the existence and the use of controls” (Langfield-Smith, 
1997, p.226) will also be illuminated. Furthermore, in order to achieve the 
objective of this thesis, the delivery of public services and management controls 
will constitute the primary units of analysis. Of which, the intention is to shed light 
on why and how existing beliefs, norms, and practices, which underpin the 
delivery of public services and management controls, came to be questioned and 
subsequently experienced change.  
However, for now, in the context of a case study set in a volatile and difficult public 
sector and given the objectives of the thesis, it would seem reasonable to begin 
the literature review with some consideration of NPM (see Section 2.2). The 
essence of the NPM phenomenon is adoption of private sector type philosophies 
and tools (including management controls) to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness in public sector organisations (ter Bogt, 2008(a), ter Bogt, 2008(b)). 
NPM is in several ways quite functionalist, under-pinned by neoliberalist ideology 
(Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016). Hence, in this sense, it hardly aligns to the more 
processual methodology being adopted in this thesis (see Chapter Four). 
Nevertheless, putting these differences to one side for a moment, the NPM 
literature should still be reviewed. NPM, for several decades had huge influence 
on how public service organisations were managed. It is particularly this influence 
and its consequences, which concerns this research, not the application or nature 
of NPM per se. Indeed, a good understanding of the NPM literature is background 
knowledge for unravelling the complexities of public service reforms, and more 
specifically the delivery of public services and management controls at Gladiator.  
So, in order to support the research objective outlined at the start, this chapter is 
organised as follows, Section 2.2 sets the context by presenting an overview of 
NPM, covering its origins, main features and critiques. It presents its links to 
austerity reforms and management accounting and control, and then moves on 
to discuss NPM from an Irish perspective. Following on from this, Section 2.3 
discusses organisational change; both its approach and meaning are examined. 
In terms of the researcher’s objective and own interpretive perspective, (see 
Chapter Four) a processual approach to change is warranted. Sections 2.4 and 
2.5 explore management control in general, and specifically in terms of its 
meaning for public sector management control and this thesis. Finally, Section 
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2.6 discusses the reforming role of communication and management accounting 
information. Thus, by presenting this past literature, gaps are identified in current 
knowledge relating to the complexity and dynamics of reforms in the delivery of 
public services and management controls, thus illuminating the ways in which the 
present research may actually contribute to the literature.  
2.2 New Public Management – its origins and main features 
NPM origins probably date back to Weber’s (1968) work on ‘bureaucracy’ but its 
elevation to the management (and control) literatures can to a large extent be 
credited to the seminal works of Christopher Hood (Hood, 1991; 1995). While 
there is no one agreed global driver for NPM reforms, often cited reasons are 
economic recessions; political and citizen volatility; party politics and English 
speaking countries11 (Hood, 1991; Hood, 1995). NPM symbolised an 
international trend around the mid- to late-twentieth century of government 
administration reforms striving to address public sector perception of being “too 
large and cumbersome, organised on the wrong principles, and in need of 
reinvention and institutional renewal” (Humphrey et al., 2005, p.1). Thus, it strove 
to reform “the processes by which public sector organisations work” (Lapsley and 
Oldfield, 2001, p.523).  
Traditional public administration was about “compliance with the administrative 
rules and procedures that govern the commitment and authorisation of public 
sector funds” (Moll and Humphrey, 2007, p.299), while NPM was about holding 
individual managers accountable12 for their actions and their responsiveness to 
political principles. NPM brought ‘economic rationality’ and business-like 
management styles and tools to the fore of public sector organisations (ter Bogt 
et al., 2010; van der Kolk et al., 2015; Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016; Hyndman 
and Liguori, 2016). In so doing, aiming to rectify the many failings of existing 
financial and management practices in the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011; Humphrey and Miller, 2012) and generate new practices of ‘good 
                                            
11 English speaking countries, i.e. “some commentators implied that NPM was mainly an Anglo-
American phenomenon of the Regan/Thatcher era” (Hood, 1995, p.99). 
12 Being accountable means public entities taking responsibility for their actions, openly reporting 
on what they do, providing specific information when asked, welcoming scrutiny, and being 
responsive when challenged (p.3) (www.oag.govt.nz/2016/accountability/docs/accountability.pdf) 
32 
management’ (Richards, 1987, p.25). Consequently, creating “a government that 
works better and costs less” (Pollitt, 2000, p.183), or an “entrepreneurial 
government” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), ”importing the best practices from 
private life into government” (Hood and Jackson, 1994, p.472). Thus, in place of 
old-style bureaucracy which stressed authority and rigidity in government, the 
NPM approach entailed more focus on economic efficiency and effectiveness 
(Lapsley, 2008; ter Bogt, 2008(a)(b); ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012; van der Kolk 
et al., 2015; Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016), premised largely on the adoption of 
private sector type management tools and techniques (van Helden, 2005). 
NPM is built on an ideology of clear and pre-set mission and goals, where 
accountability systems are constructed around those goals (Hood, 1995; James, 
2006), in an attempt to improve cost efficiency (Bracci et al., 2015; Robbins et al., 
2015) and become more “consumer responsive” (Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016, 
p.401). NPM should not be viewed as a “static set of ideas at a point in time but 
rather as a trajectory of continuity and change (Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016, 
p.387). The main components of NPM are depicted in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 The main components of NPM 
 Components of NPM 
1. Unbundling the public sector into corporatised units organised by 
products 
2. More contract-based competitive provision, with internal markets and 
term contracts 
3. Stress on private sector management styles 
4. More stress on discipline and frugality in resource use 
5. Visible hands-on top management 
6. Explicit formal measurable standards and measurement of performance 
and success 
7. Greater emphasis on output controls 
 Source: Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016, p.386. 
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A particular feature that is evident from Table 2.1 is an absence of such 
components as partnerships, networking and governance. According to Pollitt 
(2007), such additional components surfaced later, to counteract perceived 
weaknesses of the original wave of NPM. Nevertheless, the policy claims of NPM 
ideology to bring about efficiency and value-for-money has been “consistently 
questioned and challenged” (Bracci et al., 2015, p.897). This steers the next 
section to review its criticisms. 
2.2.1 Critics of NPM 
Critics have argued that NPM has failed to deliver on its claim to assist in reducing 
service-delivery costs (Hood, 1991; ter Bogt, 2008(b)). They claim instead that it 
is often a vehicle for elite managers to progress their personal managerial 
careers, frequently involving corruption rather than the provision of cheaper and 
better public sectors for all (Hood, 1991; see also Mongkol, 2011). There have 
also been questions over how universal the benefits of NPM are, and that 
“different administrative values have different implications for fundamental 
aspects of administrative design – implications which go beyond altering the 
‘settings’ of the systems” (Hood, 1991, p.9). This kind of argument is bolstered 
by the fact that no two authors have recorded the exact same features for NPM 
when listing its attributes, which has resulted in a somewhat ‘mystical in essence’ 
NPM phenomenon (Hood and Peters, 2004), and a growing belief that no single 
definition for NPM actually exists (Robbins et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Alford and 
Hughes (2008) counter-argued this by claiming that such critics of NPM had little 
practical management experience, which makes their criticisms less acceptable.  
Furthermore, some critics have also simply questioned the newness in NPM 
(Dunleavy et al., 2006, Quinn and Warren, 2017). NPM has been around now for 
a few decades, so new reforms are actually rarely new, but often reflect quite 
traditional business-like management techniques (Hood, 1995; Humphrey et al., 
2005) such as the use of financial and non-financial performance indicators, 
delegated budgets and cost improvement programs (Robbins and Lapsley, 
2005). Some commentators have stressed how significantly different the 
operating environments, goals, and structures are between public sector and 
private sector respectively (Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). Moreover, Butterfield 
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et al., (2004), have argued that traditional business management techniques will 
always be difficult to introduce into the public sector because “[…] the level of 
change required to implement the reform is too complex” (den Heyer, 2011, 
p.421). In essence, this means that NPM “is like the emperor’s new clothes in the 
well-known Hans Christian Andersen story - all hype and no substance” age-old 
issues and problems in public management remain (Hood, 1991, p.9). Similarly, 
Dunleavy and Hood (1994, p.10) argued that “if NPM is now everything maybe it 
is nothing – certainly not a distinctive way of managing organisations”.  
Finally, despite these criticisms, the present researcher supports the argument 
that NPM at least offers a new way to think about and understand public sector 
management issues (Gow and Dufour, 2000). Humphrey and Miller (2012, p.313) 
argued that it is “important to not be overly prescriptive as to what comprises and 
is represented by new public management”. They claim that NPM should be 
examined and observed in its specific context, particularly with regard to what is 
actually practised under public management. Accordingly, this idea is adopted in 
Chapters Five and Six of this thesis. It will be interesting to contrast these thesis 
findings with Hyndman and Lapsley (2016, p.388) United Kingdom (UK) findings 
where the financial crisis brought an intensification of NPM in public services. In 
addition, as this thesis wants to investigate the dynamics of reforms in an Irish 
local authority’s delivery of public services and management controls, particularly 
in the context of a period of austerity, it is fitting to next examine the link between 
NPM and austerity reforms.  
2.2.2 Links between NPM and austerity reforms 
Although economic recessions were cited (above) as a possible driver of NPM 
reform, they can also be a driver of austerity-type practices. In the context of the 
present research objective, it seems appropriate therefore to consider the 
connection (if any) between NPM and austerity. In particular, it would seem 
pertinent to question whether economic crises incite support for NPM-type 
practices or indeed, whether some alternative notion of public service provision 
can emerge. 
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Austerity measures are not new, “the notion that individuals and societies benefit 
from limiting their consumption is almost as old as humanity” (Schui, 2014, p.1). 
Austerity has a primary purpose, namely, to reduce government’s debt and 
budget deficits (Lodge and Hood, 2012; van der Kolk et al., 2015). This, in turn, 
usually results in reductions of service levels and service quality (Pollitt, 2010; 
van der Kolk et al., 2015). In contrast, a NPM approach sets out to maintain 
service levels and quality, but through more efficiency and being more business-
like (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; van der Kolk et al., 2015). In this vein, Olson et 
al., (2001, p.515) warned that public sector organisations, which rely heavily on 
NPM management control measures, are in danger of being caught in an 
‘evaluatory trap’:  
At the extreme, it is possible to envisage that successful public sector 
organisations, managed in accordance with leading private sector 
management principles, will increasingly charge for their services and 
become effectively ‘private’. Other, less glowing but still attractive 
candidates, will be sold off, taken over or subsumed by private sector 
organizations. The remaining ‘uncomfortable’, ‘unsuccessful’ and 
‘unmanageable’ public sectors will be left to provide a ‘public’ that 
cannot afford, or does not want, to pay for, any alternative form of 
provision. We believe that the above-mentioned scenarios of New 
Public Financial Management (NPFM) procedures are suggestive of 
the public sector being trapped by a residing, but misplaced, belief in 
the long-term capacity of NPFM to deliver improved service 
efficiency/effectiveness. Faced with rising costs of monitoring and 
evaluation, more frequent and visible service charges and a growing 
loss of identity, the public sector arena looks to be set on a spiral 
decline delivering fewer and fewer services. It is effectively caught in 
an ‘evaluatory trap’. 
Interestingly, service level and quality reductions were carried out at greater rates 
during the 2008 financial crises compared to previous recessions, signalling the 
adoption of extreme austerity to balance government finances (MaCartney, 2011; 
Bracci et al., 2015). Sapir et al., (2014) concluded that financial aspects of 
austerity took precedence over the non-financial aspects such as equity, fairness 
and social impacts.  
Austerity reforms focus “on reducing the size of the state and the services it 
delivers, but through some differing means and with different accountability 
requirements than under NPM” (Bracci et al., 2015, p.885). Table 2.2 provides a 
broad outline of differences in accountability relationships under both NPM and 
austerity. 
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Table 2.2 Changing accountability: from NPM to austerity  
Accountability Under NPM Under austerity 
Of whom Public managers, public 
organisations, 
departments, citizens, 
users, audit institutions 
A nation’s public sector 
as a whole 
To whom Citizens, users, audit 
institutions 
Supranational 
institutions, other public 
sector entities 
For what Inputs, outputs, 
outcomes 
Expenditure, deficit and 
debt 
Measurement and 
assessment bases 
Budgets, performance 
reports, value-for-
money/value-added, 
market competition 
Fiscal rules, financial 
cuts, constraints and 
controls 
Represented role of 
accounting 
Holding managers and 
politicians accountable 
for both financial and 
non-financial results 
Supporting decision 
making in a 
market/competition 
environment 
Reducing expenditure, 
deficit and debt all with a 
purely financial focus 
Governing inter-
institutional and/or 
intergovernmental 
relationships 
Source: Bracci et al., 2015, p.885. 
Table 2.2 conveys how under austerity, accountability lies at a supranational 
level. For example, central governments are accountable to supranational 
organisations such as the troika. The Irish central government signed up to a 
Programme of Financial Support as it came under pressure from the troika to cut 
costs and reform public sector delivery (Robbins and Lapsley, 2014; Cohen et 
al., 2015). This also resonates with Boyle’s (2014, p.39) findings, which 
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concluded that senior executives in Irish local government viewed their 
experiences of financial crisis reforms as being more about “cost cutting than 
service improvements”. This is what the everyday Irish citizen, mainly through 
(traditional) media reports, became familiar with during the 2008 financial crisis 
period. On the other hand, NPM accountability resides at the national level, with 
accountability of public managers, public organisations and departments towards 
Irish citizens, users and audit institutions. Thus, when analysing accountability 
under NPM, one can look at specific components of the whole public sector (for 
example, local government, health and so on) being akin to a micro-level of 
accountability analysis. However, under austerity accountability, the unit of focus 
is a whole country’s public sector (essentially everything falling under the 
umbrella term of public sector) making it more a macro-level of accountability 
analysis. Pollitt (2010, p.25) questions, “will the new reforms required under 
austerity be more of the same – more NPM? Or will they be something else (and 
if so, what)?”. Again, in light of the present research objective, the case study 
findings in Chapters Five and Six present how austerity measures impacted 
reforms in an Irish local authority, illuminating whether they were more of the 
same - more NPM. 
The next section examines how NPM and management accounting and control 
are intertwined. Management accounting in its broad sense is about control 
(Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010); hence, management accounting practices are 
part of the management control function. Section 2.3 later outlines what 
management control means in the context of this research.  
2.2.3 Links between NPM, management accounting and management 
control 
NPM has been criticised for being “merely a bundle of techniques, without any 
theory” (den Heyer, 2011; Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016, p.388). However, this 
criticism seems unjust. Hood (1991) identified two opposing theoretical 
viewpoints upon which NPM ideas are shaped – one perspective coming from 
new institutional economics (NIE) with the other coming from the scientific 
management movement. van Helden (2005, p.103) concurs with Hood’s 
foundation of NPM, his research revealing NPM was viewed as a second level 
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theory drawing from both “economics (marketization, entrepreneurship) and 
organisation theory (divisionalisation, results control)”.  
Management accounting is viewed as being a universal and unitary practice, 
separate from the location and time in which it operates (Wickramasinghe and 
Alawattage, 2007). Management accounting is part of management control by 
providing information for management planning and control. Such a portrayal is 
also grounded in the neo-classical economic theory of the firm (see Jones and 
Pendlebury, 2000). Management accounting’s theoretical roots protray how NPM 
is intertwined with management accounting and control, both drawing from neo-
classical economic theory. Additionally, a key tenet of NPM is management 
control and performance management (Fryer et al., 2009; Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2013) which again illuminates management accounting and control 
being central to NPM (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). 
Management accounting has a specific set of functions that are based on specific 
techniques, which are drawn from both practice and theory. The expectation is 
that these techniques, when adopted, will produce the same outcomes whenever 
and wherever they are implemented (Wickramasinghe and Alawattage, 2007). 
Thus, whether the techniques are implemented in private or in public sector 
organisations, the results should be consistent. However, due to the difficulty in 
establishing objectives and measuring outcomes within the public sector, 
differences in management accounting between the two sectors may arise (Seal, 
1999; Jones and Pendlebury, 2000). Jones and Pendlebury (2000) (see Figure 
2.1) define management accounting from a public sector perspective “as an 
activity that provides managers with the accounting information they need to carry 
out planning and control functions” (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, p.22). This 
definition of management accounting within the public sector is adopted in this 
research. Within local authorities, management accounting has tended to be 
input-oriented, focusing on budget preparation (Seal, 1999). 
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Figure 2.1 The managerial planning and control processes of public sector 
organisations 
Source: Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, p. 22. 
The seven NPM components listed in Table 2.1 have “profound implications for 
how public sector accounting is conceived, in the sense of what records are kept, 
how they are used, what is costed and measured” (Hood, 1995, p.98). Jones and 
Pendlebury (2000, p.10) believe that public sector accounting “comes into its own 
when ‘units of output’ are not identifiable”. Business accounting techniques are 
suitable when there are physically identifiable units of output, and in that instance, 
public and private sector accounting are the same. NPM places an emphasis on 
planning, budgeting and service-delivery (Goddard, 2005; Hyndman and Liguori, 
2016; Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016) thus giving “primacy to accounting practices 
and processes” (Kurunmaki et al., 2011, p.1). It accentuates “accountability and 
efficiency through the use of explicit quantitative performance measures and 
external audits” (ter Bogt and Scapens, 2012, p.454). This is in contrast to old 
public management, which was a process of self-management by professionals 
driven by implicit qualitative performance indicators (ter Bogt and Scapens, 
2012). However, advocates of NPM such as Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p.117) 
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claim that accounting systems were the cause of old public management’s 
demise: 
Few people outside government pay attention to budget systems. But 
budgets control everything an agency does. They are onerous and 
omnipresent, useless and demeaning. They suck enormous quantities 
of time away from real work. They trap managers in yesterday’s 
priorities, which quickly become tomorrow’s waste. 
Nevertheless, despite their scathing attack on management accounting Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992, p. 146) still continued to use calculations in their efforts to 
transform public sector organisations, as in their words “what gets measured gets 
done”. This corresponds with the OECD’s view “in today’s increasingly complex 
society, performance and control are essential for successful government” 
(OECD, 2005). In terms of this study’s research objective, it is necessary to ask 
how can public service managers handle performance and control in today’s 
complex environment. 
2.2.4 Links between NPM and management styles 
There are two opposing styles of managerialism from which organizations can 
choose, either ‘let managers manage philosophy’ (OECD, 1995; Schick, 1996; 
Kettl, 1997) or ‘make managers manage philosophy’ (Kettl, 1997). NPM 
emphasises visible ‘free to manage’ hands-on management control from the top 
(Hood, 1991, p.4). These philosophies expect top management to control their 
organisation with the aid of management accounting techniques, while also 
achieving staff accountability for their activities and results (Brunsson and Sahlin-
Andersson, 2000). The ‘let managers manage’ philosophy builds on the 
Japanese continuous improvement philosophy where organisations are 
continuously seeking to improve their quality of service to their customers (Kettl, 
1997). This is an empowering philosophy allowing managers to be flexible in their 
management practices (Kettl, 1997) rather than act “as civil servants following 
and implementing central directives” (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2000, 
p.727). In contrast, the ‘make managers manage’ philosophy sets goals and 
targets for managers to achieve and be measured against. This philosophy aims 
to motivate managers to manage better and achieve efficiencies through more 
extensive cost accounting systems (Kettl, 1997). It allows managers discretion in 
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solving administrative problems but the solutions are shaped by market 
incentives (Kettl, 1997).   
The ‘let managers manage’ philosophy was mainly adopted in Australia and 
Sweden while ‘make the managers manage’ was primarily adopted by the UK 
and New Zealand. According to Lapsley (2008, p.79), the role of the general 
manager can be seen as significant to “the effective deployment of NPM ideas”. 
This is evident from research carried out by Lapsley and Pallot (2000) where they 
found in a case study it took time to integrate accounting with management 
decisions. Nevertheless, it was achieved due to the persistence of a new chief 
executive. It also contended that the new executive, following the retirement of 
the old bureaucratic style accountants, was able to instil a new philosophy of 
customer service into the organization. Thus, highlighting the important role of 
individuals in effecting public sector reforms.  
However, whichever management philosophy is adopted, either ‘let the manager 
manage’ or ‘make the manager manage’, it is important to recognise that ‘there 
is often a significant under-estimate of the degree of change required to get 
people to work differently, and the effort required to make that change stick’ 
(Exley, 1987, p.46). Often, it is too easy to “lose sight of the fact that public 
managers are human, with human frailties” (Exley, 1987, p.92) and their level of 
management buy-in to NPM tools and techniques impacts the success of NPM 
implementations (den Heyer, 2011). The case study findings in Chapters Five 
and Six bring to life the complex and dynamic role of managers (enforced by a 
new CEO), in handling service-delivery and management control reforms in an 
Irish local authority, particularly during a period of austerity. The next section 
specifically focuses on NPM from an Irish local authority perspective. 
2.2.5 NPM from an Irish local authority perspective 
December 1996 saw the publication of Better Local Government – A Programme 
for Change (BLG) by the Irish central government. The aim of BLG was to 
enhance local democracy, serve the customer better, develop efficiency and 
provide proper resources for local authorities (Keogan, 2003, p.88). According to 
Boyle et al., (2003, p.29), BLG should be viewed from the perspective of public 
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sector modernisation initiatives, thus bringing Ireland into line with NPM 
developments which had happened some years earlier in countries like New 
Zealand, Canada and UK. The origin of BLG was a civil and public sector reform 
programme, the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) (Keogan, 2003, p.88). 
Despite BLG being a programme for better local government, it had very ‘little 
input from the local authorities’ (Keogan, 2003, p.88). Instead, the Irish central 
government’s civil servants whose aim was to get public sector organisations to 
focus on key strategic issues drove it (Boyle, 2000). In March 1996, the then 
Minister for the Environment asked Irish local authorities to: examine what issues 
were likely to impact on their operations over the coming years; identify customer 
needs; critically evaluate their organisation and set up objectives and a system 
to monitor their progress (Boyle, 2000). Just nine months later, in December 
1996, BLG was introduced and strove to “ensure that money was well spent and 
that staff were properly managed, motivated, involved and trained to deliver cost-
effective services” (Boyle et al., 2003, p.22). BLG suggested that Irish local 
authorities were now freed to provide public services via the market mechanism. 
However, tight central government control limited what local government could 
achieve in the delivery of public services. NPM contradictions are not unique to 
Ireland - Agyemang and Broadbent, (2015), reported similar issues in the UK.  
Subsequent to BLG, the 1998 Local Government Act was passed which provided 
for a new funding regime (Boyle et al., 2003). The new local government fund 
was financed from two sources, an exchequer contribution and the proceeds of 
motor taxation (Boyle et al., 2003). These funds were solely for the purposes of 
local government. In 2000, the Department of the Environment published 
Modernising Government – The Challenge for Local Government. This document 
reviewed local government reform to date. The Programme for Prosperity and 
Fairness (PPF), “the fifth national agreement between the government and social 
partners on key pay, economic and social issues” was also published in 2000 
(Boyle et al., 2003, p.31). Under PPF, Irish local authorities agreed to develop 
and implement a performance management system that would ensure the 
preparation of corporate and business plans (Boyle et al., 2003). These can be 
regarded as elements akin to NPM-like projects. Similar findings were reported 
in the UK and the Netherlands by Hood, (1995) and ter Bogt et al., (2015) 
respectively. Subsequently, the Local Government Act 2001 was passed. It 
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provided for a formalised strategic management process where a corporate plan 
was to be prepared for the life of the elected council, that being five years. This 
represented a significant milestone for local government in Ireland as it endorsed 
the aforementioned changes that were underway (Boyle et al., 2003).  
In 2008, the OECD published a landmark report on Irish public sectors. It reported 
that Ireland had delivered public services relatively well in comparison to other 
OECD countries (Boyle, 2014). However, it did need to improve integration and 
coordination of public services in addition to an increasing focus on performance 
and value for money across local government. Thus, delivery of public services 
and management control change was needed, which begs the question: what is 
organisational change?  
2.3 Organisational change 
van de Ven and Poole (1995, p.510) argue, “explaining how and why 
organisations change has been a central and enduring quest of scholars in 
management and many other disciplines”. However, defining change is complex 
(Pettigrew, 1995; Quattrone and Hopper, 2001; Yazdifar et al., 2012). For 
example, Macintosh and Quattrone (2010, p.209) present organisational change 
as occurring when organisations “transform their structure and operations; or 
management control systems “change” when a new information system, such as 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system, is implemented; or cost accounting 
systems “change” when cost allocation bases are redefined from direct labour 
hours to activities”. This definition can be seen diagrammatically as in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Modernist constitution: a schematization of the concept of 
change  
Source: Quattrone, and Hopper, 2001, p.408. 
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However, Figure 2.2 depicts change as happening in a mainly stable environment 
and actions happening in a linear process. It displays how an entity (be it an 
individual, an organisation or a state of mind) when passing from state “A” to state 
“B” is transformed (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010). Actions are depicted to 
“follow one another in an orderly manner and are linked to results by clear cause-
and-effect relationships” (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010, p.209). This 
perspective of change presumes that actors view the world as external, that is, 
that they can see “technology, accounting, organisations, markets and institutions 
as if they were tangible things” (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010, p.14). Little 
resistance to change is presented in Figure 2.2 as actors willingly adapt. Figure 
2.2’s concept of change is only suitable for organisational change where 
objectives, processes and viewpoints are clearly identifiable. In essence, what 
Macintosh and Quattrone (2010) have described is the planned approach to 
change (see By, 2005 and Yazdifar et al., 2012) which originates from the work 
of Lewin (1958). 
2.3.1 Planned approach 
Lewin’s change model comprised of three steps: “unfreezing the present level, 
moving to the new level and refreezing this new level” (By, 2005, p.37). This 
managerialist approach is concerned with the design of particular “techniques for 
managers to engineer change or employs contingency theories to which change 
methods are dependent of contextual variables” (Doolin, 2003, p.753). However, 
the planned approach is not without its criticisms.  
Firstly, it is criticised for its emphasis on incremental and small-scale change as 
opposed to radical and transformational change (Dunphy and Stace, 1993; 
Burnes, 2004). Secondly, the planned approach assumes “an organisation exists 
in different states at different times and that planned movement can occur from 
one state to another” (Cummings and Huse, 1989, p.51). However, writers argue 
that organisational change is an on-going “feature of organisational life, both at 
an operational and strategic level” (Burnes, 2004; By, 2005, p.369) rather than a 
set of discrete and self-contained events (Garvin, 1993; Burnes, 2004). Thirdly, 
the approach of planned change implies all parties involved are willing and 
interested to change, therefore ignoring organisational conflict and politics and 
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assuming they can be easily identified and resolved (Burnes, 2004). Fourthly, it 
suggests that only one type of planned change approach is suitable for all 
situations, times and organisations (Yazdifar et al., 2012, p.50). However, crisis 
situations demand different responses (Dunphy and Stace, 1993). Finally, the 
planned approach relies too heavily on the role managers’ play and assumes they 
completely understand their objectives (Burnes, 2004).  
Proponents of the planned change approach would not concur with the 
aforementioned criticisms (Cummings and Huse, 1989). Furthermore, Macintosh 
and Quattrone, (2010, p.214) contend a paradox arises if Figure 2.2 is used to 
define change because it describes “processes of stabilisation” and denies “the 
possibility for change”.  
2.3.2 Processual approach13 
Alternatively, for Dawson (2003, p.26) change is “an ongoing complex dynamic 
process”. Essentially, he views change as processual being different to the 
planned approach. The processual approach builds on the work of Pettigrew 
(1985) and Dawson (1994) which assumes that “social reality is not a steady 
state” (Yazdifar et al., 2012, p.50). Processualists argue the planned approach 
ignores the dynamic and complex nature of the internal and external 
organisation’s environments (Dawson, 1994; Burnes, 2004). They use active 
words for describing change such as “becoming, emerging, developing, 
transforming and decaying” (Pettigrew, 1997, p.338). The past is not ignored and 
change is viewed as a process unfolding through the interplay of context, power, 
politics, and consultation (Yazdifar et al., 2012, p.51). The planned approach 
does not include context, power, politics and culture (Burnes, 2004; Dawson, 
2012). However, the processual approach has been criticised for not giving 
particular attention to the role of the human change agent (Doolin, 2003). An 
argument Dawson (2003, pp.25-26) refutes because he found the “role of change 
agents in orchestrating the change process was identified as a central element in 
                                            
13 The terms “processual approach” and “contextualist approach” are interchangeable. 
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the power and political manoeuvrings of individuals and groups during 
programmes of change”.  
2.3.3 Discursive approach 
Morgan and Sturdy (2000), in an effort to address attention towards the role of 
the change agent, put forward a discursive approach. This approach strives to 
address the centrality of human discourse in the workings of organisations: 
Discourses become the way in which individuals explain themselves, 
their actions and organisations – both to themselves and to others; 
they also underlie the mechanisms of control and coordination, the 
framework for building and maintaining order, that managers construct 
within and across organisations (Morgan and Sturdy, 2000, p.18). 
Discourse “‘rules in’ certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable 
and intelligible way to talk, write or conduct oneself” and also “‘rules out’, limits 
and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic 
or constructing knowledge about it” (Hall, 2001, p.72). Discourse is not a neutral 
device as it can deploy meaning (Bryman, 2008). They “do not just describe 
things, they do things” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p.6) through the way they 
help its inhabitants make sense of the world (Phillips et al., 2004).  
In conclusion, and in line, with Yazdifar et al’s, (2012) contention that it is an 
individual’s own view point which will decide the meaning of change for them, the 
present researcher drawing from a personal interpretive perspective (see 
Chapter Four, Section 4.2.2.1), adopts Yazdifar’s (2013) perspective of change. 
Change is viewed as not only an alternation to Gladiator’s “procedures, but also 
as alternation to the day-to-day practices, procedures, activities, attitudes, roles 
and responsibilities of its members” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.26). Having adopted this 
processual conceptualisation of change, the researcher also draws on Laughlin’s 
(1991) framework (see Chapter Three, Section 3.6) to understand whether 
Gladiator’s change was (1) morphostatic (first order) change or (2) 
morphogenetic (second-order) change. This will be illustrated in Chapter Eight, 
by presenting a contextualist framework (see Figure 8.1) which can be used to 
analyse public service-delivery reforms in an Irish local authority during a period 
of austerity.  
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Thus, this research also joins the supporters of processual change who state 
“that to cope with the complexity of change […], we should promote extensive 
and deep understanding of the role of extra- and intra-organisational factors prior 
to and within the process of implementing a change” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.30). 
Furthermore, discourse is viewed as a strategic resource drawn upon by change 
agents to initiate and implement organisational change (Hardy et al., 2000; 
Doolin, 2003). Having set out: the public service management context via NPM; 
the two main dominant approaches to organisational reform (i.e. planned and 
processual); and, having specifically outlined the conceptualisation of change in 
this thesis, the next section, again driven by the research objective, sets out a 
literature review on management control. 
2.4 Management control defined 
Given the lack of clarity in management control systems (MCS) definitions, Malmi 
and Brown (2008) have called on future research projects to be more explicit 
about the types of controls they address. Thus, as stated at the outset of this 
chapter, management control14 in this study is viewed in its broad sense. It is 
concerned with a manager’s ability to monitor and focus “worker behaviour, 
output and/or the minds of employees” on its organisation’s objectives via 
technical (i.e. formal) and, socio-ideological (i.e. informal) controls (Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2004, p.424). Effectively, management control is about ensuring 
someone does what they are supposed to do. Alternatively, MCS “gather and use 
information to plan, control and monitor the decisions and subsequent actions of 
an organisation” (Burns et al., 2013, p.154). Next, a review of some of the 
literature on management control and management control systems is provided. 
Anthony (1965) can be viewed as the academic forefather of management 
control, as he separated it from strategic planning and operational control (Otley, 
2003). He defined management control as “the process by which managers 
assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organisation’s objectives” (Anthony, 1965, p.2). While his 
                                            
14 Management control in this research is concerned with how a CEO influences his/her senior managers to 
get middle and lower staff levels to do what they are supposed to do. 
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definition does not specifically refer to the individual, he did appreciate the human 
element in management control systems, particularly the social psychology. In 
essence, he wanted to know how control systems affect managers’ actions 
(Otley, 2003; Wickramsinghe and Alawattage, 2007). However, his work has 
been criticised for neglecting the processual aspects of management control such 
as power, judgement and conflicts (Cooper et al., 1981; Wickramsinghe and 
Alawattage, 2007).   
A review of the management control literature reveals that defining management 
control systems has proved problematic. A number of definitions have been 
proposed, some similar, others different (e.g. Anthony, 1965; Flamholtz, Das and 
Tsui, 1985; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Langfield-Smith 1997; Chenall, 2003; 
Otley, 2003; Merchant and van der Stede, 2007; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Ferreira 
and Otley, 2009; Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015). Very broad conceptions of 
MCS were outlined by Merchant and Otley (2007, p.785) who argued that “almost 
everything in the organisation is included as part of the overall control system”, 
including factors such as strategic development, strategic control and learning 
processes. Similarly, Chenall and Moers (2015, p.1) defined MCS as “a set of 
many formal and informal input, process and output controls that are used by 
management to achieve organisational goals; the controls are connected by 
many complementarity relationships”. Correspondingly, Otley and Soin, (2014, 
p.1) defined management control as being “about the process of steering 
organisations through the environments in which they operate, to achieve both 
short-term and longer-term goals”. Other researchers have provided a narrower 
view of MCS. Merchant and van der Stede (2007, p.8) define management 
control as being about employees.  
It is people in the organisation who make things happen. Management 
controls are necessary to guard against the possibilities that people 
will do something the organisation does not want them to do or fail to 
do something they should do… If all employees could always be relied 
on to do what is best for the organisation, there would be no need for 
MCS.  
Other authors move beyond the behavioural controls to include goal congruence. 
Flamholtz et al., (1985, p.289) defined organisational controls as “attempts by the 
organisation to increase the probability that individuals and groups will behave in 
ways that lead to the attainment of organisational goals”.  
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In an expansion of the definition utilised by Otley in his work with Merchant, 
(Merchant and Otley, 2007), when writing with Ferreira, he prefers to use the term 
performance management systems (PMSs) in preference to MCS (Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009, p.264). This is because they view this term as “including all aspects 
of organisational control, including those included under the heading of 
management control systems”. Therefore, Ferreira and Otley (2009, p.264) 
present PMSs as  
the evolving formal and informal mechanisms, processes, systems, 
and networks used by organisations for conveying the key objectives 
and goals elicited by management, for assisting the strategic process 
and ongoing management through analysis, planning, measurement, 
control, rewarding, and broadly managing performance, and for 
supporting and facilitating organisational learning and change. 
Formal controls “include planning systems such as the use of budgets and targets 
to establish expectations and against which to monitor performance” (Agyemang 
and Broadbent, 2015, p.1021). Informal controls “are characterised by the use of 
more free-flowing information and processes with dialogue and communication 
as the main ways of sharing information about activities and performance” 
(Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015, p.1021). Technocratic (i.e. formal) forms of 
control are “rules, procedures or standards describing how to accomplish certain 
tasks” (Tessier and Otley, 2012, p.777). In essence, Taylorism15 which “attempts 
to directly control worker behaviour” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.425). 
While socio-ideological (i.e. informal) forms of control “attempt to control worker 
mindsets” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.425) by “persuading people to adapt 
to certain values, norms and ideas about what is good, important, praiseworthy, 
etc in terms of work and organisational life. Ideologies justify certain principles, 
actions and feelings, and discourage others” (Alvesson, 1987; Czarniawska-
Joerges and Joerges, 1988; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.426). Managers 
may 
attempt to define interpretations and meanings that can become 
widely understood and shared by organisation members so that 
actions are guided by a common definition of the situation. Those with 
power are able to influence the course of organisational development 
through control over valued resources and through use of symbols by 
                                            
15 Taylor was the leading founder of Taylorism, which was about finding economic efficiency in 
work processes especially in labour productivity. 
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which organisation members mediate their experience (Smircich, 
1983, p.161). 
In normal situations, ideological control is based on a “combination of the 
calculations and convictions” of key managers (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, 
p.426).  
Furthermore, some define management control as a ‘system’ while others 
consider it a ‘package’ (Grabner and Moers, 2013). Often, these terms have been 
used interchangeably. However, Grabner and Moers (2013) put forward a 
distinction between the terms. Management control ‘systems’ exist if 
“management control practices are interdependent and the design choices take 
these interdependencies into account” (Grabner and Moers, 2013, p.408). 
Alternatively, a management control package exists where a complete set of 
controls is in place regardless of whether the control practices are interdependent 
and/or “the design choices take interdependencies into account” (Grabner and 
Moers, 2013, p.408). 
In summary, the majority of management control definitions agree and view 
management control as exercising “power (influence) in order to secure sufficient 
resources, and mobilise and orchestrate individual and collective action towards 
(more or less) given ends” (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Speklé, 2001 in Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2004, p.424). Given the public sector context of this research, the next 
section explores public sector management control, also referred to as ‘public 
budgeting’. 
2.5 Public sector management control – ‘public budgeting’ 
Planning and controlling in public sector organisations are collectively known as 
“budgetary control” (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000, p.35), and, are illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. The term ‘public budgeting’ represents public sector organisations 
planning, control and accountability structures (Johansson and Siverbo, 2014). 
Therefore, having reviewed management control definitions and outlined what 
management control means for this research, the next section examines what is 
understood by budgeting and its practice in public sector organisations. This is 
important given its integral part of management control. 
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2.5.1 Public sector budgeting 
Cyert and March (1963) define budgets as both the substance and outcome of 
political bargaining processes which are then used to legitimate and maintain 
systems of power and control in organisations. Similarly, Schick (2009) argues 
budgets “are about the interplay of people and their ideas and goals” while Caiden 
(2010) also contends that people, policies and politics are the primary concerns 
of public sector budgeting. Hence, budgets in public sector organisations are the 
result of political negotiations (Johansson and Siverbo, 2014; Ahrens and Ferry, 
2015). In effect, they are perceived to be legitimisation tools for people’s actions 
and a method of communicating between different levels of government (Seal 
and Ball, 2011; Ahrens and Ferry, 2015) as well as being central to achieving 
accountability (Ahrens, and Ferry, 2015). In summary, budgets have been 
presented as being a socially constructed phenomenon rather than being a 
technically rational function (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Ahrens and Ferry, 
2015). 
However, the genesis of budgeting was as a technically rational function. In its 
essence budgeting is about rules and routines which strive to improve 
management practice and control outcomes (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Caiden, 
2010). In effect, public budgets are used to manage and control the behaviour of 
public servants in delivering and managing public services (Stinchcombe, 2001; 
Ahrens and Ferry, 2015). However, the effectiveness of public budget rules 
depends on the acceptance and commitment of leaders (Caiden, 2010).  
According to Burchell et al., (1980, p.5) what gets “accounted for” shapes 
organisational participants’ view of what is important and constitutes organisation 
reality. This is an interesting insight and will be explored later in Chapters Five 
and Six in the case study findings, to determine the power of budgeting 
communication in affecting public service reform. Thus, budgets, despite being 
technical in nature are very much about people, shaping their views of what is 
important, and what is not.  
Furthermore, the public sector budget setting process is a lengthy, complicated 
and incremental practice (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000; Caiden, 2010). 
Incremental budgeting focuses on the increase between last year’s and this 
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year’s budget. Thus, the past is built into the present representing a cumulative 
effect and protecting government priorities (Jones and Pendlebury, 2000; Caiden, 
2010). This form of budgeting has been criticised for being “irrational” and 
increasing financial constraints have led to its demise (Caiden, 2010). However, 
Schick (2009, p.435) challenges this and argues that all budgeting is 
fundamentally incremental: “A decision to spend money one year usually is a 
decision to spend in future years as well, even when there is no legal requirement 
to do so”. Jones and Pendlebury, (2000) and Seal, (2003), also echoed this 
sentiment.  
Budget reform is an evolving, continuous process, not simply a static one (ter 
Bogt, 2008(a); Caiden, 2010). If a public service organisation is to change its 
budgeting processes, a number of conditions have to be met to ensure successful 
adoption. Simply, changing processes, creating new institutions and issuing new 
rules are unlikely to bring about desired results unless they are also accompanied 
by underlying understandings and cultural changes (Laughlin, 1991; Alvesson 
and Kärreman, 2004; Caiden, 2010). Chapter Eight (see Figure 8.1), later, 
presents a contextualist framework which can be used to explain budget reform 
in an Irish local authority. 
2.5.2 Management control in public sector organisations 
Next, a review of some previous public sector case studies deemed relevant for 
this thesis, based upon the management control criteria, are provided. 
van Helden (2005) conducted a review of the international literature on the role 
of management accounting and control in public sector transformations. It 
revealed that the literature was primarily focused on how technical accounting 
innovations were utilised. The most popular issues explored were budgeting and 
performance management while costing and cost management were less 
popular. This lack of focus on costing may be due to the non-calculation of 
charges for certain public sectors.   
Fryer et al., (2009) carried out a literature review of performance management in 
the public sector. They found that despite performance management systems 
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being in existence for over 25 years, they are still beset with problems. They 
classified these issues into three categories: technical, systems and involvement. 
The technical difficulties related to issues with performance indicators, their 
establishment, interpretation and action. The systems problems involved the 
integration of performance management systems with the existing systems. The 
involvement concerns related to employee issues and emphasised how 
employees must be involved in the creation of the performance system. 
Communication and sharing information about the system was also necessary. 
As Black, Briggs and Keogh, (2001, p.405) outlined: 
A greater understanding of the importance of performance indicators 
and how to use them to achieve objectives is essential at all levels of 
the organisation. 
In order to increase the likelihood of a successful performance management 
system and avoid the three aforementioned potential problems, a new system 
needs set routines and time to become established (van Sluis et al., 2008). 
Managers with an ongoing commitment to the new performance system are also 
required. They need to take a hand on approach and use their leadership skills 
to “motivate people […] to produce more, or better, or more consequential results 
that are valued by citizens” (Behn, 2005, p.64). They must also allow time for the 
system to bed in. Research reveals that if managers’ adopt a hand off approach 
after they have established the system and outlined the rules, performance 
management implementation problems occur (Behn, 2005).  
James (2006) sought to determine the effects of changes in the budgeting 
process in an Australian electricity corporation. Prior to organisational change, 
budgeting was simply viewed as an annual ritual with little impact on the 
organisation. The attitude to the process is summed up nicely in the following 
quote: 
…having achieved all that [the budget process], everyone put it in the 
bottom drawer and went ahead and spent and did what they wanted 
to anyway (James, 2006, p.18). 
A traditional incremental budgeting style was operated which was ineffective in 
achieving management control prior to corporatisation. Post corporatisation a 
zero based budgeting (ZBB) style was implemented, and initially managers 
appeared to have adopted a “new way of thinking and a new approach to 
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budgeting” (p.20). However, it became evident that they were still following 
historic habits and routines such as continuing to pad the budget in a so called 
ZBB environment. Gradually managers became frustrated with the new budget 
process. They felt the targeted reduced costs were unattainable. Their 
frustrations were exasperated by the introduction of transfer pricing whose 
implantation was resisted by the internal institutions. However, following a 
number of attempts to overcome issues with the new budgeting process, it very 
slowly became recognised as efficient. James’ (2006) study demonstrates how 
change will only be effective if it is aligned with the existing settled ways of 
thinking and doing. Therefore, the existing internal values, attitudes and 
meanings of individuals must be aligned with the organisation’s strategy if change 
is to be implemented successfully. There is a need to deinstitutionalise the 
existing mind-sets and institutionalise a new commercial mind-set of efficiency 
and effectiveness. To achieve this successfully, the internal politics and power 
must be supportive of the planned reforms.  
Yang and Modell (2012) conducted research over six years in a Chinese local 
authority. They examined how performance management practices and the 
exercise of power by embedded agents is balanced “between more or less 
institutionalised conceptions of performance while pursuing organisational 
change” (p.101). Their research adds to understanding the process of 
performance management change by revealing the role of the embedded agent 
in bringing about that change. They argue that it is important to acknowledge the 
multi-layers of institutional embeddedness. The local authority’s director was the 
key agent and focus of analysis in their study. They found the director was 
simultaneously embedded in both the moral-based and merit-based conceptions 
of performance in the authority. As a result, the director experienced value 
conflicts due to the problems of trying to keep the authority’s institutionalised 
expectations and internalised values and beliefs aligned. The decoupling of the 
director’s values and beliefs from the authority’s institutionalised expectations 
eventually became obvious and led to her demise. Yang and Modell (2012, p.124) 
call for further research which will “examine which contingencies cause shifts in 
internalised values and beliefs and institutionalised expectations, respectively, to 
arrive at a more fine-grained analysis of how embedded agents may overcome 
institutional barriers to change”. Addressing this, will help further unravel the 
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paradox of embedded agency discussed in Chapter Three. The research 
questions as outlined in Chapter One seek to address this conundrum. An 
institution can exist only if people have particular and related beliefs and mental 
attitudes supporting the institution. Yang and Modell (2012) found that when the 
institutional expectations and beliefs and mental attitudes were not aligned, the 
change agent lost power and reforms stopped.  
van der Kolk et al., (2015) examined management control in four local authority 
departments in the Netherlands in a time of austerity. They found, similar to 
Johansson and Siverbo (2014) that in times of austerity tighter budget control is 
implemented. They witnessed an increased use of management control elements 
that constrain human behaviour, i.e. “processes of auditing, control, regulation, 
assessment, inspection and evaluation” (Diefenbach, 2009, p.899). This 
contrasts with facilitating management controls (e.g participative budgeting) 
where training and education may be used to facilitate employees’ work practices. 
The view of human behaviour as needing to be constrained is an underlying 
thread of NPM. Furthermore, van der Kolk et al., (2015, p.946) found that in times 
of austerity constraining management control elements are overemphasised. 
This lowers employee motivation and should be balanced with facilitating controls 
to mitigate negative consequences. They also found evidence of employee stress 
and job insecurity in an environment of severe budget constraints. 
It’s for the first time in the history of [Bluetown] that such vigorous 
measures are being applied, and that job security is no longer assured 
for everyone. That’s not common for the public sector. It’s a situation 
which leads to a lot of stress on the part of employees (Alderman BI).  
Some of the main attractions cited for taking public sector jobs are job security, 
employee benefits and equitable treatment (Kelman, 2006; Durant et al., 2009; 
Pandey, 2010, van der Kolk et al., 2015). Where these contract characteristics 
are adhered to, findings show greater staff organisational commitment 
behaviours are present (Pandey, 2010). Boyle (2014) found that job security was 
a motivating factor for 89% of staff surveyed in Irish local government. However, 
under cutback management (a response to austerity) which means, “managing 
organisational change toward lower level of resources consumption and 
organisational activity” (Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014, p.102), employee 
motivation was affected by threats to their job security. Pandey (2010) and van 
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der Kolk et al., (2015) concur that violations of the public sector contracts “are 
likely to be taken poorly by current employees ...” (Pandey, 2010, p.567) and it is 
“unclear whether employees with high levels of public sector motivation would 
soldier on in the face of adversity or turn to alternative employers such as private 
non-profits” (p.567). This interesting query will be illuminated in the case study 
findings in Chapters Five and Six.  
Agyemang and Broadbent (2015) reviewed management control systems 
developed by universities to manage research staff. They argue that these 
systems are intertwined in organisational change processes. For them, context 
is a crucial element in the development of control systems, specifically the 
external environment, the organisation itself and actions of people within the 
organisation. They warned that reorientation of organisations can turn into 
colonisation. In essence, they showed how control processes could be developed 
by organisational members that “amplify external disturbances” instead of 
dissipating them (p.1040).  
Ahrens and Ferry (2015) examined the impact of austerity budget cuts on a local 
authority in Newcastle. Budget overspending was not an option for the authority 
due to potential sanctions from central government. Hence, the blame for its 
service cuts lay clearly at central government’s front door. As a response to the 
budget cuts, it co-opted the help of its citizens and stakeholders and, using 
financial and operational information, decided which services to cut and which to 
retain. Available budget funds were clearly communicated and were central to 
achieving service-delivery changes. Grassroots communities were allowed input 
to the management of their public services. Thus, by including budgeting in the 
processes of accountability new ways of working were introduced to grassroots 
groups, stakeholders, and service clients (p.928).  
In summary, the literature reveals that budgetary control and performance 
management practices in public sector organisations remain of interest to 
researchers. They are an instrumental and integral part of the complex public 
service reform process. However, they are not without challenges. Reform in 
management control practices requires time and a change in people’s mind-sets. 
These insights will be reflected upon when analysing Gladiator’s reforms in its 
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delivery of public services and management controls in Chapters Five, Six, Seven 
and Eight. Next, the idea of the role of communication and management 
accounting information in reforms is presented. 
2.6 The role of communication and management accounting information in 
reforms 
RQ2, in Chapter One, asks how did an institutional entrepreneur handle reforms 
in Gladiator’s delivery of public services and management controls, particularly in 
the context of a forthcoming period of austerity. As argued by previous 
researchers, reforms are not just about deciding to change during a period of 
financial austerity, they are also about convincing “publics and public servants 
themselves that they are sensible and relevant things to do” (Pollitt, 2010, p.29). 
This can be handled through communication. “Communication is the 
transmission of verbal and other messages or signals, with the object of providing 
or influencing the premises of judgement and choice” (Chambers, 1986, p.93) 
and is considered a necessary step in executing effective organisational reform 
processes (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007) - as was found in Yazdifar’s (2013, 
p.201) case study where it was described how “CC explained the present 
situation and justified the need for change, and let people talk and discuss what 
they thought was relevant to the improvement of the system”. Thus, we can 
conceive communication to be power in action. Whenever there “is an intention 
with human speech, rhetoric always forms part of communication” (Nørreklit, 
2003, p.592) which is mainly known to be persuasive (Quattrone, 2013). Thus, 
“in communicating reality”, reality is constructed (Hines, 1988, p.251). A 
management control system (i.e. budgets, BSC) can be an effective 
communication tool for any organisation. 
For the purposes of this research, the researcher adopts a broad view of the term 
‘communication’ regarding communication as being comprised of “gestures, 
social interactions that build on speech, discourses, texts and other means” 
(Cornelissen et al., 2015). Good communication “both internal and external, is 
critical to a company’s success…..it is not just about the numbers” (Hitchins and 
Taylor, 2013, p.213). Communication can be ‘factual’, prescriptive’, ‘motivational’, 
‘appraisive’ and ‘advisory’ (Clarke et al., 2013, p.30). For example, the BSC (see 
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Chapter Six, Section 6.5) is viewed as an effective tool for communicating an 
organisation’s strategy (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007). However, the BSC needs 
to be rooted in a language that is understood by all employees. They must be 
able to interpret the performance measures that are designed to reflect the 
organisation’s strategy (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007) and which hold them 
accountable. This involves “translating the overall strategic objectives and 
measures into objectives and measures appropriate for the teams and 
employees who represent key segments of the organisation” (Nørreklit and 
Mitchell, 2007, p.178). Thus, the BSC is a visual aid to “make abstract strategies 
and visions concrete” (Quattrone, 2013, p.99) at executive announcements, plant 
meetings and in videos, brochures, and newsletters (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007, 
p.178). It can provide a top down and bottom up approach to communicating as 
senior management outline the organisations strategy and how it is going to be 
achieved (top down) and lower level staff provide feedback on the strategic 
approach (bottom up). Chapter Six illuminates the power of communication 
through the BSC in effecting reform in housing services. 
Ahrens and Chapman (2007) carried out longitudinal research in a restaurant 
business. They found how management accounting information of a below–
average food margin triggered questioning from its managers as to the reasons 
for its occurrence. This subsequently stimulated discussions amongst its 
managers. Simons (1995) also argued that interactive control systems prompt 
debates among managers when performance results are below standard. Thus, 
the communication of management accounting information has been found to 
play a fundamental role in prompting discussions in areas of poor performance in 
organisations (Hall, 2010).  Furthermore, it is essential when communicating with 
staff that sound argumentation is used to not only persuade but also convince 
why management control reform is necessary (Nørreklitt, 2003). For example, the 
communicator may use text in three different ways to gain the audience’s 
approval: through ethos, pathos or logos (Nørreklit, 2003, p.594). Ethos is 
“concerned with the recipient’s trust in the sender such that the credibility or 
authority appealed to by the sender creates approval. Pathos appeals to the 
recipient’s emotions and mood, while logos appeals to the recipient’s rational 
commitment” (Nørreklit, 2003, pp.594-595). Logos covers everything that 
individuals can establish “through reason and includes both logical and empirical 
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argumentation” (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007, p.188). An academic text is 
expected to appeal to the recipients’ logos and ethos and little, if at all, to their 
pathos (Nørreklit, 2003; Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007). In order for a text to be 
credible, it has to be comprised of sound logos. Nevertheless, pathos will always 
be in existence as long as man-made texts and natural languages are involved 
in the communication processes between individuals (Nørreklit, 2003). Thus, 
clear communication of management accounting information is an essential 
element in affecting service-delivery and management control reform.  
2.7 Concluding remarks 
NPM strives to reform public sector work processes to achieve efficiencies and 
value for money, and management accounting and control are central to NPM 
practices. However, the jury is still out on whether the benefits cited are actually 
achieved and whether private sector management techniques are appropriate for 
public sector organisations. Pollitt (2010) questions whether “the new reforms 
required under austerity will be more of the same – more NPM? Or will they be 
something else (and if so, what?). Again, in light of this study’s research objective 
the case study findings in Chapters Five and Six highlight how austerity measures 
impacted reforms in Gladiator, illuminating whether they were more of the same 
(or not), that being, NPM. 
A review of public sector case studies highlighted some interesting facts about 
reforms. Reform in management control practices requires time and a change in 
people’s mind-sets. Managers need to be motivated, have good leadership 
qualities and adopt hands-on approach to implement successful management 
control reforms. In addition, internal values, beliefs and norms must be aligned 
with the organisation’s strategy and existing institutions for reform to be 
successful. Austerity measures, such as strict budget constraints can cause job 
insecurity and a rise in employees stress levels. Therefore, how can a manager 
convince “publics and public servants themselves that reforms are sensible and 
relevant things to do” (Pollitt, 2010, p.29). The literature also argued the 
importance of communication and its role in communicating management 
accounting information in reform processes. 
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This chapter concludes from the literature that public sector reforms are not static 
and in a linear process, rather they are complex, dynamic and ongoing. 
Therefore, a processual approach to study public service-delivery and 
management control reforms during a period of austerity is warranted. Also, in 
examining public service-delivery and management control reforms, with the aim 
of unravelling the complex processes of change in such processes, the 
importance of the external factors (e.g. financial crisis and central government 
austerity measures), and internal organisational factors (i.e. new CEO) need to 
be investigated (see Chapter Eight, Figure 8.1).   
Next, Chapter Three presents the pluralistic theoretical approach adopted to help 
unpack the complex and dynamic reforms in Gladiator’s delivery of public 
services and management controls during a period of austerity. 
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CHAPTER THREE – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two concluded that public service-delivery reform is a complex and 
dynamic process. Moreover, previous literature has argued that due to its 
inherent complexity, a blending of different theories is required to understand and 
explain its phenomena (Jacobs, 2012; Modell, 2013). As a processual approach 
is adopted in this thesis (see also Chapters Two and Four), to tease out the 
complexity of public service-delivery and management control reforms it is 
complemented with a variety of theoretical perspectives (see Chapter One, 
Figure 1.1) - these being: (1) NIS theory; (2) Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
conceptualisation of management accounting change; (3) Seo and Creed’s 
(2002) framework of institutional contradictions, and (4) Battilana et al’s., (2009) 
model of the process of institutional entrepreneurship, (5) Laughlin’s (1991) 
model of organisational change, and (6) Hardy’s (1996) ideas on power and 
political mobilisation. They are complementary socio-political theoretical lenses 
which Gladiator’s reform process is viewed through. Furthermore, such 
theoretical pluralism, in itself, illuminates the complex nature of public service 
reforms in Gladiator, as it sought to realise services efficiencies improvements 
during a period of austerity.  
This thesis, defines the term institution as “a way of thought or action of some 
prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the 
customs of a people” (Hamilton, 1932, p.84 cited in Burns and Scapens, 2000, 
p.5). This definition primarily hones in on institutions at an intra-organisational 
(micro) level, including the habitual behaviour of individuals and groups. 
However, this definition is vague about the reasons leading to the introduction of 
public service reforms. Thus, this research also incorporates, as part of its public 
service reform explanation, institutions at the more macro level of organisational 
sectors. “That is, institutionalised organisations tend to adopt structures and 
procedures that are valued in their social and cultural environment. They do this 
in order to achieve legitimacy and to secure resources that are essential for their 
survival” (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006, p.96). In Chapters Five and Six it is service-
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delivery as fast as possible and at any cost which is the internal institution under 
the spotlight. NIS theory and the work of Burns and Scapens (2000) and Laughlin 
(1991) provide the language and concepts for unravelling and understanding the 
process of reforms in Gladiator. In addition, the role of a new CEO is critical to 
Gladiator’s reform story and therefore agency is explored. Agency is viewed as a 
multidimensional concept where “an actor’s engagement with the social world 
that, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, can both 
reproduce and transform an environment’s structures” (Battilana and D’Aunno, 
2009, p.46). This concept of agency is more specifically enhanced by also 
drawing on, and coupling it with, institutional entrepreneurship. In addition, Seo 
and Creed’s concept of contradictions and Hardy’s (1996) ideas on power help 
to more fully explain how a powerful CEO at Gladiator mobilised and pushed 
change through in a highly institutionalised environment.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents why 
theoretical pluralism is adopted, Section 3.3 discusses why an institutional 
approach to reform was chosen compared to neo-classical economics. Section 
3.4 and its sub-sections provide background information to NIS, highlighting the 
concept of legitimacy and coercive isomorphism. It outlines criticisms of NIS: 
assuming organisational similarity; organisational conformity to external 
pressures; not addressing the role of individual agency and its simplistic 
treatment of power and politics. Section 3.5 presents institutional 
entrepreneurship and agency while its sub-sections aim to ease the criticisms of 
NIS and subsequently supplement it. Seo and Creed (2002) highlight how 
individuals can bring about change through contradictions and praxis. Battilana 
et al., (2009) present the processual activities institutional entrepreneurs carry 
out to instigate and implement reforms.  
Section 3.6 along with its sub-sections and Section 3.7 and its sub-sections 
present Laughlin’s (1991) model of organisations and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
conceptualisation of management accounting change respectively. Essentially, 
NIS contended that the driving factors of institutionalisation arise from the need 
for social legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hassan, 2005). However, it has 
been argued that it is often the micro-activities of the organisation that propel the 
processes of organisational change (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Burns and 
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Scapens, 2000) which NIS does not examine. Thus, Laughlin (1991) and Burns 
and Scapens (2000) were also adopted to understand and unpack how external 
and internal public service-delivery and management control activities and 
institutions are interrelated in reform processes.  Finally, Section 3.8 and its sub-
section define power and politics and present Hardy’s (1996) ideas on power, 
highlighting how the mobilisation of power and politics can bring about strategic 
change in organisations. Thus, the researcher is adopting a sociological and 
organisational approach to change rather than the traditional neo-classical 
economics perspective (Dambrin et al., 2007). 
3.2 Theoretical pluralistic approach 
The previous sections have presented a theoretical pluralistic approach to this 
research, combining insights from NIS and aligning them with complementary 
ideas from literature studies by Burns and Scapens (2000); Seo and Creed 
(2002); Battilana et al., (2009); and, Hardy (1996). These various perspectives all 
have their common origins in social constructivist thought and interpretive 
epistemology. Laughlin (1991), also drawing from a social constructionist 
ontology, differs in his epistemological stance and adopts a critical 
epistemological stance. Nevertheless, this research blends the previously 
mentioned theories and concepts with Laughlin’s (1991) concepts of an 
organisation as this approach more fully fleshes out the dynamic and complex 
local authority context and setting. In addition, this approach also facilitates 
building on theory from the extant situation, instead of forcing the data to fit the 
theory (Covaleski et al., 1996; Hopper and Hoque, 2006; Yazdifar, 2013; Hoque 
et al., 2015).  
This pluralistic approach facilitates developing a strong understanding of the way 
an Irish public service organisation incorporated history and socio-economic 
pressures into its reform of public service-delivery and management controls 
(Englund and Gerdin, 2008; Hoque et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is not a unique 
approach to research in accounting. Table 3.1 lists a number of previous 
accounting studies, in no specific order, which have incorporated theoretical 
pluralism. 
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If a single framework had been adopted to analyse the case study findings in 
Chapters Five and Six, it is likely the analysis would have lacked detailed 
conceptualisation of the service-delivery and management control reform 
process. Moreover, by drawing on insights from NIS and the combination of 
various frameworks adopted, the researcher addresses some of the limitations of 
each of the frameworks. As Baumann (2005, p.239) suggested “…we should not 
be too obsessed with the idea that there must always be a best theory. What 
matters is that the theories we choose from are good enough”.  
Table 3.1 Evidence of past studies in accounting benefitting from 
theoretical pluralism  
Author(s) Theories/paradigms used 
Covaleski, Evans, Luft and Shields 
(2003) 
Economic, psychological and 
sociological 
Oliver (1991) Institutional sociology and resource 
dependency 
Ansari and Euske (1987) Institutional, technical rational and 
socio-political 
Yazdifar (2013) OIE, NIS and power 
Arena et al., (2010) Neo-institutional sociology and actor 
network 
Abernethy and Chua (1996) Resource dependency and neo-
institutional  
Burns (2000) OIE and power 
Collier (2001) Neo-institutional sociology and power 
Hopper and Major (2007) Institutional theory with economic, 
labour and actor networks 
Wiesel et al., (2011) Critical and institutional 
Agyemang and Broadbent (2015) Middle-range thinking, Habermas, 
Espeland and Sauder’s and Bourdieu 
van der Kolk et al., (2015) Agency and stewardship 
Cohen et al., (2015) Legitimation and resource 
dependency 
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While it is acknowledged that one could counter-argue that this pluralistic 
approach is excessive, these theoretical approaches and concepts provide a 
detailed and holistic way of unravelling reform processes at Gladiator (Hoque et 
al., 2004). Drawing from eclectic sources of theories, facilitates a better 
understanding of the “content, context and process” (Pettigrew, 1987, p.657) of 
public service-delivery and management control reform at Gladiator as it sought 
to realise services efficiency targets in times of austerity. Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2009) concur with this holistic type approach to reform analysis. They contend 
that in order to understand management control changes one needs to 
understand the organisational changes. In order to achieve that, both the societal 
context and the organisational context have to be studied. Thus, this study’s 
theoretical variety offers the reader an opportunity to see how the external 
environmental pressures (i.e. the financial crisis and strict government austerity 
measures) are interwoven with both the micro organisational internal processes 
(i.e. the internal rules, routines and actions at Gladiator) and agency (i.e. 
institutional entrepreneurship) dimensions in driving reform (Yazdifar et al., 
2008). By combining various theories and frameworks the researcher will 
contribute more to public sector reform research than the sum of its parts 
(Covaleski et al., 2003). A belief also echoed by Ahrens and Chapman (2006, 
p.723) who argued, “events in the field may best be explained by reference to 
multiple theories”. Furthermore, the researcher is not alone in her view of the 
benefits of theoretical triangulation as seen in earlier studies by Adler and Chen 
(2011), Jeacle and Carter (2011), Tan and Koonce (2011) and Yazdifar (2013). 
3.3 Why use an institutional approach to reform? 
This thesis does not adopt the conventional theoretical view of management 
control to explain and analyse the change process studied because it is subject 
to the same methodological underpinnings as functionalism. Functionalism 
“combines an objectivist view of the world with a concern for regulation” (Ryan et 
al., 2002, p.41). Functionalism tends to assume “that the social world is 
composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relationships which can 
be identified, studied and measured through approaches derived from the natural 
sciences” (Burrell and Morgan, 1985, p.26).  
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Traditionally, management control was viewed as a technical activity for 
managers to detect ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ (Rathe, 1960). Despite 
Gladiator’s budgets and BSC meeting this technical requirement in Chapters Five 
and Six, this thesis does not examine whether budgets and BSC deliver “the 
benefits claimed for” (Otley, 1999, p.380). Rather, the management control 
emphasis is on how management controls changed, particularly during a period 
of austerity at Gladiator. Despite mainstream accounting being able to predict 
general trends, it cannot explain the processes through which management 
accounting and control practices evolve (Ryan et al., 2002). Mainstream 
management accounting theory (rooted in the neo-classical economic theory16 of 
the firm) “due to its reliance upon key assumptions of ‘equilibrium’ and ‘rationality’, 
“fails to deal with ‘the dynamics of changes over time’ and institutional 
phenomena such as change in accounting practices” (Yazdifar, 2012, p.55). 
Therefore, it was deemed not suitable for the research objective set out in 
Chapter One.  
Therefore, with regard to exploring the process of public service reforms and the 
key roles of power and politics in such reform processes, Yazdifar (2012) 
contends that NIS and OIE are considered especially useful. As this thesis adopts 
a processual view of reform by analysing the inner and outer organisational 
context of Gladiator, and as the “methodological underpinnings of OIE and NIS, 
emphasise a holistic, processual (evolutionary) and historical approach to 
studying organisational change” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.67), they are considered 
appropriate for this research. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that “there are many forms of institutional 
theory in the social sciences (i.e. economics, sociology, political science and law), 
and within the same discipline” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, Yazdifar, 2012, 
p.58). This chapter reviews institutional theory under two appropriate sub 
headings for this research, NIS and OIE. The two aforementioned institutional 
                                            
16 Neoclassical economic theory portrays management accounting as a “provider of information 
for ‘efficient’ management planning and control…” (Burns, 1997, p.1) and, as a ‘mirror of reality’ 
that exists to inform ‘efficient’ business decisions (Yazdifar, 2012, p.55). Budgets and the BSC 
are examples of “technical management control tools to provide factual representations of 
economic realities for rational and optimal decision-making” (Scapens, 1994; Yazdifar, 2012, 
p.53). 
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approaches encompass sociological and economic theory respectively and both 
“approaches share a concern that ‘institutions matter’, although there are 
differences in respective definitions of an institution” (Moll et al., 2006, p.184).  
The term institution can denote different meanings to different people and 
choosing a definition “remains rather arbitrary, as different meanings reflect 
different approaches to institutional theory” (Mäki, 1993, p.3; Di Maggio and 
Powell, 1991, p.1 cited in van der Steen, 2006, p.7). Often it is easier to agree 
what institutional theory is not, rather than what it is (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, 
p.1).  
Institutions are commonly defined as “rules, norms, and beliefs that describe 
reality for the organisation, explaining what is and is not, what can be acted upon 
and what cannot” (Hoffman, 1999, p.351). While there is no universal definition 
of an institution (Hiebl, 2018), within OIE, a common definition and the one 
adopted in this research is “a way of thought or action of some prevalence and 
permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a 
people” (Hamilton, 1932, p.84 cited in Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.5). Thus, 
institutions could be viewed as “performance scripts that provide stable designs 
for chronically repeated activities, deviations from which are counteracted by 
sanctions or are costly in some manner” (Jepperson, 1991, p.145 cited in Garud 
et al.,  2007, p.958).  
The impact an institution has on its practices and behavioural patterns depends 
on how long the institution has been in place (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The 
shorter the history of an institution the more exposed it is to challenges (Barley 
and Tolbert, 1997). It can be difficult to understand how institutions and actions 
affect each other unless they are analytically distinct (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
Therefore, “unless researchers use separate indicators of institutions (which span 
settings and time) and actions (which are localized to a specific setting), they can 
neither argue convincingly that the two map the same principles nor show how 
actions implicate structures broader than those of setting itself” (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997, p.499). Institutions can outlast individuals and may vary very little 
over long periods of time (Mattimoe, 2000, p.133). “Individual habits both 
reinforce and are reinforced by institutions” (Mattimoe, 2000, p.133). Institutions 
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are a key part of this research and in Gladiator, the institution examined is 
service-delivery as fast as possible and at any cost. By studying this settled way 
of thinking and delivering public services, the researcher can unravel the complex 
dynamics of public service reforms. With a view in mind to what an institution is, 
the next section presents NIS. 
3.4 New Institutional Sociology (NIS)  
NIS, sometimes referred to as New Institutionalism or Neo-Institutional Sociology, 
is part of organisational theory and emerged quite rapidly from the mid 1970’s as 
“opposition to rational-actor models, rejecting the assumption of ‘abstract’ 
individuals and optimisation” (Mattimoe, 2000, p.135). Instead, emphasising the 
relationships between an organisation and its environment (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell, (1991, p.8) describe NIS as comprising: 
[…] a rejection of rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as 
independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural 
explanations, and an interest in properties of supraindividual units of 
analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations of direct 
consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives. 
Examples of studies using NIS to study management accounting practices 
include Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988); Brignall and Modell (2000); Collier (2001); 
Modell (2001); Hussain and Hoque, (2002), Tsamenyi et al., (2006), Yazdifar, 
(2013) and Sharma et al., (2014). NIS has its genesis in Old Institutional 
Sociology (OIS). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identified OIS to be more 
concerned with issues such as competing values, power and influence at the local 
community level. On the other hand, the level of analysis in NIS is broadened to 
account for the embeddedness of organisational fields, legitimacy and a focus on 
routines, scripts and schemas (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, Lawrence, 1999; Zhao, 2011).  
According to Moll et al., (2006, p.187) ‘it is the external rules, procedures, myths 
and/or norms’ that define an institution in NIS.  
Institutions comprise regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life (Scott, 2014, p.56). 
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Scott (2014) argues there are three key pillars of institutions, which constrain 
behaviour namely, regulative, normative, cultural-cognitive systems. The 
regulative element is concerned with ‘explicit rule setting, monitoring and 
sanctioning’ (Baker, 2006, p.37). The normative element ‘emphasizes values and 
norms that constrain individuals by dictating what should be accomplished (goals) 
and how it should be accomplished’ (Baker, 2006, p.37). The cultural-cognitive 
element holds the perspective that “internal interpretive processes are shaped by 
external cultural frameworks” (Scott, 2014, p.67). That is,“..what a creature does 
is, in large part, a function of the creature’s internal representation of its 
environment” (D’Andrade, 1984, p.88 cited in Scott, 2014, p.67). This is 
consistent with the researcher’s perspective that reality is socially constructed, as 
will be outlined later in Chapter Four.  
NIS tends to focus on a macro level of analysis, exploring the broader political, 
economic and social institutions. The central principle of NIS seeks to explain 
how the external environment/societal lifeworld influences organisations to 
display conformity with institutionalised rules, values and expectations. Rather, 
than being shaped by cost minimisation and efficiency ambitions (which is the 
realm of new institutional economics (NIE) and is not the focus of this study) 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Lawrence, 1999; Ahmed and Scapens, 2000; Mattimoe, 2000; 
Scapens, 2006; Scott, 2014). This research, using NIS concepts, will show how 
the various external pressures such as central government austerity measures 
and a worldwide financial crisis impacts on Gladiator’s delivery of public services 
and management controls. By adopting external sanctions, organisations such 
as Gladiator, gain legitimacy in the eyes of their social and cultural environments 
(Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Scapens, 2006) as legitimisation can create an 
appearance of a rational efficient organisation (Carruthers, 1995). Scott (2014, 
p.71) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. It is “not a 
commodity to be possessed or exchanged, but a condition reflecting perceived 
consonance with relevant rules and laws or normative values, or alignment with 
cultural-cognitive frameworks” (Scott, 2014, p.72). An appearance of legitimacy 
helps the organisation to secure scarce resources and increase their survival 
prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Oliveira, 2010) as according to Scott (2014) 
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a lack of organisational legitimacy may carry a consequence of organisational 
punishment for its behaviour. If the organisation studied in this thesis, Gladiator, 
did not comply with the sanctions imposed by central government, its funding 
would have been cut.  
As NIS tends to explain stability rather than change in organisations, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) devised the term organisational field, which is viewed as an 
institutional force on organisational structure and behaviour. The organisational 
field is comprised of key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). There are four parts to transforming a group of 
organisations into an organisational field: an amplification of the interaction 
among organisations in the field, emanating inter-organisational structures of 
domination and coalition, expanding information loads and a heightened 
awareness by organisations that they are involved in a common venture 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Within an organisational field, organisations will 
adopt procedures and practices ‘even when there is no technical reason to do so’ 
(Baker, 2006, p.40). DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.148) asked ‘why there is such 
startling homogeneity of organisational forms and practices’ and they sought to 
explain homogeneity and not variation.  
Homogeneity is explained by the term institutional isomorphism, which is the 
process through which organisations adopt similar procedures (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Institutional isomorphism “provides explanations for changes in 
organisational practices (such as accounting practices)” (Tsamenyi et al., 2006, 
p.411). It is a “constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.149). It “includes the elaboration of rules, symbols 
and beliefs to which individual organisations must conform to gain social 
legitimacy” (Hassan, 2005, p.127). Institutional isomorphism is the domain of NIS, 
which accentuates that organisations not only compete for resources, but also for 
political influence and institutional legitimacy (van der Steen, 2006, p.16). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three types of institutional isomorphism: 
coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphisms (effectively mechanisms of 
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control to achieve conformity and stability). These can be used to describe the 
spread of rationalised procedures (Carruthers, 1995) and each is now examined. 
3.4.1 Institutional isomorphisms 
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted 
upon organisations by other parties upon which it is dependent. It also results 
from the cultural expectations of society within which the organisation performs 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism can be seen when the 
external environment imposes new structures on existing organisational 
structures through the establishment of new rules, and new monitoring 
mechanisms. For example, government organisations can force new regulations 
on dependent organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Carruthers, 1995; 
Modell, 2002; Hassan, 2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2006) as was the case in Gladiator 
where the Irish central government cut its funding. According to DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1991), the fact that these reorganisations 
may be in large, part ceremonial, it does not mean that they are inconsequential. 
Instead they signal a message to “the various stakeholders in the organisation 
that the organisation is responsive to the preferences of the society in which it 
operates” (van der Steen, 2006, p.17) which results in the organisation securing 
economic resources and influence. 
The second type of isomorphism is mimetic isomorphism. It is driven by 
uncertainty, for example, ambiguous goals and poorly understood technologies 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Carruthers, 1995; Tsamenyi et al., 2006; van der 
Steen, 2006), and organisations mirror other organisations to deal with this 
uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Modell, 2002; Hassan, 2005). 
“Municipalities are no different in that respect” (ter Bogt, 2008(a), p.38). Because 
“there is reassurance if not actual safety in numbers, and in the absence of a 
compelling reason to strike out on their own, organisations do what others are 
doing” (Carruthers, 1995, p.317). Carruthers (1995) described mimetic 
isomorphism as a driver of organisational fads and fashions. The fashion 
perspective is where organisations imitate other organisations, such as 
consulting firms, due to the lack of confidence surrounding technical efficiencies, 
goals and environmental forces (Thompson, 1967; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
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Abrahamson, 1991; Soin et al., 2002). The fashion perspective acknowledges the 
fact that the organisation is influenced by organisations outside the group 
(Abrahamson, 1991). It is where the decision centres “less around which 
technology they should adopt, and more around which organisation they should 
imitate” (Abrahamson 1991, p.595). With the fashion perspective, the potential 
adopters can still change their minds about implementation (Abrahamson, 1991; 
Lapsley and Wright, 2004). The fad perspective is where organisations 
implement a change program just to keep up legitimate appearances and retain 
competitive advantage rather than for logical reasons (Abrahamson, 1991; Soin 
et al., 2002; Lapsley and Wright, 2004). Due to organisations mimicking others in 
the group, this can lead to adoptions of inefficient innovations and rejections of 
efficient ones (Abrahamson, 1991). Soin et al., (2002, p.253) claimed that 
institutional theory helped to explain whether an accounting innovation was 
chosen because it was the most efficient technique or because it was a 
fashionable innovation promoted by consultants and academics. 
The third type of institutional isomorphism is normative, which stems primarily 
from professional groups (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Carruthers, 1995; Modell, 
2002; Hassan, 2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). Members of a professional group 
“are subject to pressure to conform to a set of rules and norms developed by their 
groups” (Hassan, 2005, p.127). Formal education produced by universities and 
the growth of professional networks are sources of “structural attributes across 
organisations” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Modell, 2002, p.658). As will be 
revealed later in Chapter Seven, their respective professional groups, for 
example, The Institute of Public Administration or civil engineers influenced the 
CEO and senior management in Gladiator. The education of a Director, via a 
Masters’ course, influenced the adoption of the BSC in the Housing Department. 
Normative isomorphism is more limited in its impact on the adoption of ‘best 
practice’ solutions as opposed to coercive isomorphism (Modell, 2002). This is 
because managers “are constrained by their own structure of reality, which is 
influenced by normative pressures and accepted ideas on ‘proper’ behaviour” 
(e.g. see: Berger and Luckmann, 1979; Pettigrew et al., 1992; Javidan and 
Dastmalchian, 1993, cited in van der Steen, 2006, p.18).  
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These three types of isomorphism may overlap, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Modell, 2002) and they “cause 
organisations to adopt comparable structures and practices” (van der Steen, 
2006, p.18).  Because of these institutional pressures, external ‘rationalised’ rules 
are born (Hassan, 2005). It is these external rules that define institution in NIS 
theory (Mattimoe, 2000). Adoption of these institutional rules helps organisations 
gain social legitimacy (Hassan, 2005). In Gladiator, all of the three 
aforementioned isomorphisms were evident.  
However, the formal rules and routines adopted by the organisation to project a 
view of legitimacy can be detached from the everyday organisational practices 
ensuring a non-disturbance of the normal processes of daily operations (Ribeiro 
and Scapens, 2006). This detachment is referred to as decoupling, which 
effectively separates an organisation’s technical work activities from its 
legitimating work activities. For example, in this research, the budgetary process 
in Gladiator was presented as a rational management process that was 
considered a management ritual. While Gladiator’s budget setting process 
reflected external rules imposed by central government, the budget control 
actions did not reflect the intention of the budget rules. “Early NIS writers saw 
decoupling as a largely given attribute of institutionalised organisations” (Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens, 2005, p.48). However, later work suggested that 
decoupling required an element of resistance (Oliver, 1991). Ansari and Euske 
(1987), Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) and Ribeiro and Scapens (2006) 
examined the processes through which decoupling occurred in organisations. 
Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005, p.44) found that in “contrast to the normal 
assumption that decoupling is an “organisational” response to external pressures, 
it is shown how decoupling can occur through the working out of a complex and 
dynamic process of resistance to accounting change: a process which 
simultaneously involves both stability and change”. They illustrated how stability 
achieved through decoupling facilitated instrumental change in the organisation.  
3.4.2 Main criticisms of NIS 
NIS can be criticised from several angles. Firstly, it has been criticised for 
assuming organisational similarity and for not addressing strategic behaviour. 
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Organisations are not powerless in their reactions when faced with external 
institutional pressures to adopt particular structures or practices (Baker, 2006). 
Oliver (1991) identified five possible organisational strategic responses to 
external institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) developed a predictive model, 
drawing from both institutional sociology and resource dependency theories, 
based upon five predictive factors (cause, constituents, content, control and 
context) which aimed to predict the strategic responses of organisations to 
external pressures. Five possible strategic responses are argued: acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. 
An acquiescence strategy can adopt three forms: habit, imitation, and 
compliance. Habit refers to unconsciously adhering to taken-for-granted rules. 
Imitation is presented as mimicking, either consciously or unconsciously, other 
institutional models. Compliance is a conscious obedience to existing values, 
norms or institutional requirements (Oliver, 1991). A compromise strategic 
response may be adopted by organisations faced with conflicting institutional 
demands by utilising tactics such as balancing, pacifying, or bargaining (Oliver, 
1991). Balancing tactics try to accommodate multiple external and internal 
stakeholders’ demands. Pacifying tactics embrace minor levels of resistance to 
institutional pressures but see organisations devoting its energies to satisfying 
the institutional source it originally resisted. Bargaining tactics are a more active 
form of striking a balance between the demands of the external constituents and 
the organisations (Oliver, 1991). An avoidance strategy attempts to eliminate the 
necessity of conformity and then conceal this avoidance. Organisations may 
engage in ceremonial pretence of institutional norms or requirements (Oliver, 
1991). A defiance strategy resists institutional pressures through either dismissal 
(ignoring), challenge (offensive), or attack (aggressive), each in order of 
increasing resistance (Oliver, 1991). A manipulative strategy is the most active 
strategic response to institutional demands and expectations and it attempts to 
influence or control institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). Oliver’s (1991) 
contribution to institutional theory shows how organisational responses to 
institutional pressures are not necessarily always passive.  
Secondly, DiMaggio (1991, p.268) argued that NIS “provides a one-sided version 
of institutional change that emphasises taken-for-granted, non-directed, 
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nonconflictual evolution at the expense of intentional (if boundedly rational), 
directive, and conflict-laden processes that define fields and set them upon 
trajectories that eventually appear as “natural” development”. Additionally, NIS 
does not explain the dynamics of organisational change, as it does not sufficiently 
theorise intra-organisational power relationships and market competition (Powell, 
1991; Oliver, 1992; Dillard et al., 2004; Tsamenyi, et al., 2006; Suddaby, 2010; 
Munir, 2015; Alsharari et al., 2015). Furthermore, Greenwood and Hinings (1996, 
p.1023) believe that NIS: 
…. is weak in analysing the internal dynamics of organisational 
change. As a consequence, the theory is silent on why some 
organisations adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite 
experiencing the same institutional pressures. 
According to Burns (2000, p.31), NIS has offered, “less insight into the 
emergence, continuation or change of institutions within firms, compared to a 
multitude of studies on the macro-institutional dimension”. While Zucker (1991, 
p,106) argues that NIS “is always in danger of forgetting that labelling a process 
or structure does not explain it”. Thus, while NIS has been very useful in 
accounting for organisational stability by describing the forces (legitimisation, 
responses to uncertainty, professionalism) that lead to isomorphism, it does not 
fully explain institutional change.  
Thirdly, it is criticised further because it presents the organisational actor as an 
individual who is primarily driven by the “desire to conform to institutional 
pressures” (van der Steen, 2006, p.20). The failure of NIS to address the role of 
individual agency and micro-level dynamics are major criticisms of NIS (Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Moll et al., 2006; Suddaby, 2010). However, 
DiMaggio (1988) later addressed this criticism when he introduced the concept 
of the institutional entrepreneur. This concept is explored later in Section 3.5 and 
will be an important concept for explaining the public service reform process in 
Gladiator. 
Finally, according to recent research in NIS, its simplistic treatment of power and 
politics has also been questioned (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens 2005; Suddaby, 
2010). The next section explains how Oliver (1992) and Greenwood and Hinings 
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(1996) strove to overcome some of the limitations of NIS and how their theoretical 
enhancements were further criticised by Seo and Creed (2002).  
3.4.3 Overcoming criticisms of NIS  
Oliver (1992), in an attempt to overcome some of the limitations of NIS, outlined 
an appraoch based on NIS that explains institutional change as opposed to 
institutional stability. Oliver (1992, p.564) held the view that “the emphasis in the 
institutional literature on legitimation processes, organisational conformity and 
enduring organisational change has tended to preclude inquiry into the factors 
that cause organisations to challenge, discard or abandon legitimated or 
institutionalised organisational practices”. She addressed how individuals who 
are constrained by institutions can bring about institutional change. Greenwood 
and Hinings (1996) subsequently built on Oliver’s work. They viewed 
organisational change as a complex process affected by the rationality of the 
market context in which firms operate together with institutional pressures. These 
authors thus introduced a processual view of institutional change.  
However, Seo and Creed (2002, p.224) argue that the framework presented by 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) is “hardly integrated and instead are 
conceptualised as two separate processes, one process involving normative 
pressures operating in the institutional context, influences the other process – 
agents political action within the organisation”. The framework does not address 
“when and how local agents change the institutional context itself” (Seo and 
Creed, 2002, p.224). Thus, both frameworks (i.e. Oliver, 1992; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996) have been criticised from the perspective that they do not clarify 
the role of the individual actor in institutional change, nor do they clearly address 
the relationship between the actions of individual actors and the wider institutional 
environment. According to Battilana and D’Aunno (2009, p.32), little is still known 
about the “individual-level enabling conditions for agency”. Therefore, the role of 
agency will be explored further in the next section, drawing from the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
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3.5 Institutional entrepreneurship and agency 
Traditionally, work on institutions was mainly concerned with stability although it 
did concede the importance of change (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Battilana, 
2006; Garud et al, 2007; Sharma et al., 2014). Work on entrepreneurship, in 
contrast, focussed on the importance of change despite its difficult attainment 
(Garud, et al., 2007). The juxtaposing of institutional and entrepreneurial forces 
into a single concept opens up research avenues for understanding why and how 
new structures, practices or organisational forms come into existence and remain 
over time (Garud et al., 2007; Battilana et al., 2009; Sharma et al., 2014). Thus, 
supporting this research in its aim to understand why and how Gladiator reformed 
its delivery of public services and management controls. 
 
The term institutional entrepreneurship refers to the “activities of actors who have 
an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to 
create new institutions to transform existing ones” (Maguire et al.,2004, p.657). 
This term is similar to DiMaggio’s (1988, p.14) conceptualisation, who deemed 
that “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in 
them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly”. Therefore, 
institutional entrepreneurs can be characterised as “agents pursuing certain 
interests and acting strategically” (Weik, 2011, p.468) and strategy can be viewed 
as a process of “mindful deviation” (Garud and Karnoe, 2001). Thus, institutional 
entrepreneurship symbolises active agency in institutional theory (DiMaggio, 
1988; Fligstein, 1997; Dorado, 2005; Scapens, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008; Sharma 
et al., 2014). And, agency in this thesis is conceptualised as a multidimensional 
concept where “an actor’s engagement with the social world that, through the 
interplay of habit, imagination, and judgement, can both reproduce and transform 
an environment’s structures” (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009, p.46) - that is, those 
humans who “have power” (Jack, 2016, p.54). Battilana and D’Aunno (2009), 
drawing on the work of Emirbayer and Mische, (1998, p.47), summarise agency 
as “a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past 
(in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to 
imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to 
contextualise past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the 
moment)”.  
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From an institutionalist perspective, institutional entrepreneurship is viewed as a 
way to explain endogenous institutional change (Sharma et al., 2014). Like earlier 
academics (e.g. Covaleski et al., 2013; Ahrens and Ferry, 2018; Englund and 
Gerdin, 2018), this research is “interested in how “[…] knowledgeable, self-
aware, calculative institutional entrepreneurs seek to overcome the paradox of 
embedded agency and influence their situation” (Ahrens and Ferry, 2018, p.14). 
Thus, institutional entrepreneurship will be drawn upon in this research to explain 
how a new CEO implemented reforms in Gladiator’s delivery of public services 
and management controls.  
Nevertheless, some institutional theorists believe the institutional 
entrepreneurship notion is inappropriate in institutional analysis as they feel it 
presents the change agent as a super hero individual and overstates their 
position (Lawrence et al., 2009; Suddaby, 2010). They prefer to conceptualise 
agency via institutional work. Institutional work describes, “the purposive action 
of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.1). Hence, it encompasses institutional 
entrepreneurship, institutional change and innovation, and deinstitutionalisation 
under the one umbrella and avoids overemphasizing any one of the 
aforementioned (Lawrence et al., 2009). However, Weik (2011) criticises the 
foundations of institutional work by arguing that its definition is very vague. 
Furthermore, she argues that there is a contradiction in “institutional work’s 
fundamentals. It draws from practice theory which avoids privileging the 
purposive mind (which is one of the aims of institutional work) and instead looks 
at the interplay of objects, activities and know-how” (Reckwitz, 2002; Weik, 2011, 
p.476). Thus, how can the purposive mind and practice theory be combined? 
Therefore, she calls for an analytical frame for agency that goes “beyond case 
studies and plausibility” (p.476). Also, Empson et al., (2013) and Hayne and Free 
(2014) all argued that Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006) typology of forms of 
institutional work is overly simplistic. They argue it “suggests that institutional 
change happens in a linear manner and that institutions are developed to replace 
others as they decay” (Empson et al., 2013, p.814) - thus not reflecting the 
complex and messy reality of institutional change (Empson et al., 2013, p.814). 
Furthermore, institutional work specifically states that its analytical focus is “on 
how actions and actors affect institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.7). 
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While this research could potentially also be conducted using an institutional work 
approach, the institutional entrepreneurship concept (in combination with the 
other theoretical concepts and frameworks adopted in this thesis, as outlined 
earlier in Chapter One, Figure 1.1) is more suited for the research purpose stated. 
This thesis aims to unravel the complex messy process of reforms in Gladiator’s 
delivery of public services. To achieve that, it reviews how existing structures 
affect actions and how actions affect structures. That is, the recursive relationship 
between structures and actions is examined, unlike institutional work that simply 
focuses on how actions affect institutions. There is also a clear example of an 
institutional entrepreneur in Gladiator, and in order to be able to distinguish 
between the different kinds of change agents in Gladiator, the institutional 
entrepreneur concept is adopted. Moreover, institutional entrepreneurship allows 
the researcher to more fully present a holistic view of strategic action found in the 
case study in Chapters Five and Six, in turn, contributing to a theory of social 
action. 
Thus, DiMaggio’s (1988) institutional entrepreneurship concept renewed 
elements of ‘old institutionalism’ (Selznick, 1949) which had been understated in 
the 1980’s with the arrival of NIS (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer et al.,1983, 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). It reintroduces agency, and illuminates the role of 
power and politics in institutional analyses of organisations (Garud et al., 2007; 
Zilber, 2007; Weik, 2011). The concept of power will be discussed in Section 3.8 
when considering whether embedded agents have the power to change their 
embedded institutions. However, it appears that the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship which presents institutional entrepreneurs as those “whose 
beliefs and actions are determined by existing institutions can break with these 
very same institutions and innovate” (Battilana et al., 2009, p.72) is paradoxical 
(Levy and Scully, 2007). This paradox relates to the structure versus agency 
debate, discussed next. 
3.5.1 The structure versus agency debate 
Both the institutional and entrepreneurship literature face the longstanding 
structure-agency debate. Theories privileging structure over agency promote 
casually deterministic models where individuals, in the extreme case, are viewed 
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akin to machines processing objective information without agency, creativity or 
the ability to think for themselves (Garud et al, 2007; Englund et al.,2011; Englund 
and Gerdin, 2018). These theories explain maintaining the status quo and 
continuity. Alternatively, theories that favour agency, often lead to heroic models 
of actors which have been criticized for being decontextualized, ahistorical and 
universalistic (Garud et al., 2007, p.961). However, these theoretical criticisms of 
stability, continuity, ahistorical, decontextualised and universalism are overcome 
in this thesis by drawing on a processual view of reform of which agency and 
structure are interwoven. This fits with the social constructivist philosophical 
perspective adopted in Chapter Four. Thus, in order to address RQ1, Chapter 
One, “why did Gladiator reform its delivery of public services and management 
controls?”, it was also necessary to add question RQ2, Chapter One, “how did an 
institutional entrepreneur handle reforms in Gladiator’s delivery of public services 
and management controls, particularly in the context of a forthcoming period of 
austerity?”. This question needs consideration of the paradox of embedded 
agency (Seo and Creed, 2002; Englund et al., 2011; Englund and Gerdin, 2011; 
Englund and Gerdin, 2018). Weik (2011) argues that the term paradox of 
embedded agency is quite ignorant, on the part of institutionalist authors, of the 
last three decades of social theory work carried out on the structure-agency 
opposition and omits any reference to actors’ reflexivity. Nevertheless, Weik 
(2011) does concede that the institutionalist authors do resolve the so-called 
paradox by referring to Giddens (1984), as discussed next. 
3.5.2 The paradox of embedded agency 
The paradox of embedded agency within institutional theory is an element of the 
broader structure-agency debate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Garud et al., 2007; 
Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009; Englund and Gerdin, 2011; Englund et al., 2011; 
Sharma et al., 2014; Englund and Gerdin, 2018). Giddens (1984) combined both 
structure and agency in structuration theory17. According to Giddens, “instead of 
being in opposition, structure and agency presuppose each other and are 
                                            
17 Note, Giddens’ structuration theory was not adopted as the theoretical lens in this study 
because it does not facilitate the researcher in gaining an understanding of the external structural 
context, and the external bracketing was not appropriate for this research as the researcher views 
structures and agency as interlinked when analysing processes of change. 
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mutually constitutive” (Sewell, 1992, cited in Garud et al., 2007, p. 961), that is, 
structure is both the medium and outcome of social practices. This is reiterated 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991), who state that the actions of human actors 
are not only directed by institutions, but are also the outcome of human 
behaviour. However, Battilana (2006, p.655) argued, “human beings tend to 
believe that institutions have always been there because most often those who 
are constrained by institutions, and those who initially created these institutions, 
are not the same”. This begs the question, if ‘actors are embedded in an 
institutional field and subject to regulative, normative and cognitive processes 
that structure their cognitions, define their interests and produce their identities 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Clemens and Cook, 1999), how are they able to 
envision new practices and then subsequently get others to adopt them?’ (Garud 
et al., 2007, p.961; Levy and Scully, 2007; Yang and Modell, 2012; Englund and 
Gerdin, 2018). Essentially, how did an institutional entrepreneur envision change 
and get others to follow suit if they were embedded in Gladiator’s existing delivery 
of public services and management controls? Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework 
strives to address the dilemma of the paradox of embedded agency, and is 
explored next. 
3.5.3 Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework 
Seo and Creed (2002) attempt to answer the paradox of embedded agency by 
attempting to conceptualise “when and how actors come to the point where they 
actually decide to revise their institutional behaviour; and the dynamics of such 
change processes” (Abrahamsson and Gerdin, 2006, p. 127). Seo and Creed 
(2002) put forward the idea of contradictions which “is key to explaining when, 
how and why institutionally embedded agents might come to question, and 
subsequently attempt to change, their and others’ taken-for-granted ways and 
beliefs” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.728). Contradictions can be 
conceptualised as a pair of features that together produce an unstable tension in 
a given system. They “represent ruptures and inconsistencies among, and within, 
established social arrangements that can incite tension or conflict and that, in 
turn, mould human consciousness and action towards change” (Seo and Creed, 
2002, p.225). Institutional change can occur if contradictions are present. Seo 
and Creed (2002, p.226) name four sources of contradiction which can explain 
“why, by what mechanism and under what conditions those contradictions lead 
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embedded agents to take collective action for institutional change”. First, 
functional efficiency may be sacrificed by complying with existing institutions to 
gain legitimacy (Seo and Creed, 2002; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns and 
Nielsen, 2006; Sharma, et al., 2014). Traditionally, institutional theorists through 
the concept of “decoupling” (see Section 3.4.1) overcame this contradiction. 
Second, contradictions can arise from non-adaptability where internal institutions 
are locked in and are resistant to changes in their external environments (Seo 
and Creed, 2002; see also Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns and Nielson, 
2006; Sharma et al., 2014). Third, by conforming to external institutions to gain 
legitimacy and stability “a multitude of conflicting and inconsistent institutional 
arrangements within a particular field or organisation” (Burns and Nielson, 2006, 
p.451) may arise. Fourth, contradictions can arise due to “misalignment between 
institutionalised ways and the divergent perceived interests of actors embedded 
in such ways” (Burns and Nielson, 2006, p.451). These four contradictions are 
likely to be highly interconnected over time rather than separate isolated sources 
of contradictions (Seo and Creed, 2002; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns 
and Nielson, 2006) and will be considered further in the course of this research. 
Nevertheless, institutional contradictions do not necessarily lead to institutional 
change (Burns and Nielson, 2006), human praxis is also necessary, which is the 
“essential mediating mechanism that links institutional embeddedness, 
contradictions and change” (Seo and Creed, 2002, p. 240).  
“Praxis defines human agency of a political nature which, though embedded in 
existing institutional configurations, attempts to influence and secure change in 
those very configurations” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.729). It “is the free 
and creative reconstruction of social patterns on the basis of reasoned analysis 
of both the limits and the potentials of present social forms” (Seo and Creed, 
2002, p. 225). Praxis epitomises the doing of change (Benson, 1977) while 
contradictions create the openings for change. The concept of praxis is 
fundamental to institutional theory and this research as it reconciles 
transformational agency with embedded agency. The Seo and Creed (2002) 
framework draws from a social constructionist perspective, which again fits with 
the philosophical perspective adopted in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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There are three components to praxis with regard to human actors. These are 
“(1) self-awareness and critical understandings of existing institutional 
arrangements, and that these arrangements do not meet the agent(s)’ needs and 
interests; (2) mobilisation, rooted in new collective understandings of the 
institutional surroundings, as well as one’s positioning within them; and (3) 
multilateral or collective action to reconstruct the existing institutional 
arrangements and, hence, impact personal (or group) circumstances” (Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.729).  
However, Seo and Creed (2002) are criticised for giving particular attention to the 
environmental context in which institutional entrepreneurs are embedded and not 
enough attention to the individual level of analysis (Battilana, 2006). Battilana 
(2006) argues that human agency can also be activated in the absence of a 
contradiction. Therefore, Battilana et al., (2009) propose that field characteristics 
and an actor’s social position (see Section 3.5.4 below) help to address the 
paradox of embedded agency and create conditions for institutional 
entrepreneurship. Thus, the next section outlines a model for the process of 
institutional entrepreneurship, which helps to address the aforementioned 
shortcoming in Seo and Creed’s (2002) framework. 
3.5.4 Process of institutional entrepreneurship 
An institutional entrepreneur (see Section 3.5) is a change agent who breaks 
away from the existing rules and practices of their existing institutional 
environment and initiates and actively participates in the institutionalisation of 
alternative rules and practices they are advocating (Battilana, 2006; Battilana et 
al., 2009). However, not all change agents are institutional entrepreneurs 
(Battilana et al., 2009). According to Battilana et al., (2009) one will only qualify 
as an institutional entrepreneur when two conditions are met: (1) the change 
agent initiates divergent change and (2) actively drives the implementation of the 
change. Therefore, Lawrence (1999) argues that in order to embed change within 
existing organisational practices, where many individuals are committed to and 
benefit from existing structural arrangements, strategies are needed and must be 
developed. Battilana et al., (2009) concur with Lawrence (1999) and write that 
divergent change implementations require a strategy that comprises of a shared 
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vision mobilising people behind the vision and motivating them towards achieving 
and maintaining that shared vision.  
Battilana et al., (2009) (see Figure 3.1), to facilitate agency analysis, framed the 
process of institutional entrepreneurship model outlining factors that enable 
institutional entrepreneurship, and the process of divergent change 
implementation. 
 
Figure 3.1 Model of the process of institutional entrepreneurship 
Source: Battilana et al., 2009, p.87. 
First, the model outlines two key categories that enable conditions for institutional 
entrepreneurship to occur, despite pressures towards institutional stasis: field 
characteristics and actors’ social position. The field characteristics (e.g. jolts such 
as financial crises, social upheaval, technological disruption, competitive 
discontinuity, and regulatory changes) resemble Laughlin’s (1991) external or 
internal jolts (see Section 3.6) which he argues can trigger organisational change. 
Institutional entrepreneurs to assist in creating institutional change (Greenwood 
et al., 2002; Child et al., 2007) can draw upon the field characteristics. 
Additionally, an actor’s social position can influence their relationship with “the 
environment in which they are embedded” (Battilana et al., 2009, p.79), determine 
their access to resources which are needed to engage in institutional 
entrepreneurship (Lawrence, 1999; Battilana et al., 2009) and affect how they 
perceive field level conditions. Thus, the model identifies both field characteristics 
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and social position as enabling factors to behave as institutional entrepreneurs 
and create divergent change (Battilana et al., 2009).   
Second, the model outlines the process of how to implement divergent change 
by creating a vision and mobilising allies behind it. In order to effectively create a 
vision for change, the institutional entrepreneur must attempt to frame the new 
vision (1) in terms of the problem it addresses, (2) as preferred to what currently 
exists, (3) and driven by compelling reasons (Rao, et al., 2000; Battilana et al., 
2009). In the literature on framing in the social movement, the three 
aforementioned dimensions would translate into diagnostic framing, prognostic 
framing and motivational framing (Markowitz, 2007; Misangyi et al., 2008). 
Diagnostic framing seeks to illuminate the failings of the existing institutionalised 
practices and assign blame (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). While prognostic 
framing sees the institutional entrepreneur de-legitimatise existing institutional 
arrangements and those supported by opponents and then promote an 
alternative project as superior to the existing one; while at the same time 
appealing to potential allies who will support the new project by presenting the 
project in terms of values and problems that resonate with them (Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005). The third dimension, motivational framing, requires 
institutional entrepreneurs to provide compelling reasons to potential allies by 
identifying with their states and interests as to why they should support the new 
project (Fligstein, 1997). Social skills are a necessity for institutional 
entrepreneurs so that they are “cognisant of and sensitive to the discursive 
(Maguire and Hardy, 2006) and cultural contexts (Boxenbaum and Strandgaard 
Pedersen, 2009) on which they are embedded” (Battilana et al., 2009, p.80). 
These skills allow them to frame their visions that will appeal to their potential 
allies.  
Furthermore, a vision needs allies to support it as it is often the case that 
divergent change programs cannot be implemented without support. Thus, it is 
necessary for institutional entrepreneurs to mobilise allies and cultivate 
cooperation and strategic alliances (Lawrence et al., 2002; Battilana et al., 2009; 
Weik, 2011). The aim of ally mobilisation is to reduce contradictions among 
potential allies, while also exacerbating contradictions among opponents by 
highlighting the failings in the existing structures and practices and demonstrating 
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why the new vision is required (Seo and Creed, 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005; Battilana et al., 2009). Discourse is often the skill adopted by institutional 
entrepreneurs to achieve allies. They need to communicate the new vision in 
terms that break from the existing institutions. The use of ‘rhetorical strategies’ 
applied by institutional entrepreneurs must resonate with the actors embedded in 
the existing institutions (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Their use of stories, 
words, expressions and meanings can be adopted to bring about change that 
breaks from existing institutions (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Suddaby 
(2010) encourages researchers to pay particular attention to the words used to 
create change. 
Battilana et al., (2009) argue that both financial resources and social position 
resources such as formal authority and social capital (i.e. information and political 
support) are essential to convincing other actors to support the need for divergent 
change. They claim that little is known “about how institutional entrepreneurs 
mobilise financial resources, formal authority, and social capital across contexts” 
(p.86). Additionally, little research exists on the activities institutional 
entrepreneurs employ to motivate actors to realise and sustain a vision for 
change (Battilana et al., 2009). Chapters Five, Six and Seven address these 
concerns. 
3.5.5 Main criticisms of institutional entrepreneurship 
Weik (2011) argues that the enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship 
because of their linearity are closer to the theoretical notion of the entrepreneur, 
which introduces a functionalist conception of a strategic individual actor. While 
the researcher acknowledges Weik’s (2011) concerns, it is counter-argued, that 
in order to analyse agency, a theorist needs to disaggregate agency into several 
component elements of which enabling conditions such as ability to create a 
vision, good social skills and ability to control financial resources and social 
capital are part. Furthermore, the researcher conceptualises the above-
mentioned enabling conditions as interwoven empirically and found within an 
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agent’s interpretive schemes and discursive practices18 (Giddens, 1984) because 
agency resides in “the interpretive processes whereby choices are imagined, 
evaluated, and contingently reconstructed by actors in ongoing dialogue with 
unfolding situations” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p.966). Thus, from this 
researcher’s perspective, an institutional entrepreneur imagines and creates a 
vision for change and mobilises allies by drawing on both their own internal 
structures and the internal structures of their potential allies via interpretive 
schemes and discursive practices. Also,  the researcher asserts that institutional 
entrepreneurs gain their own formal positions and social capitals via their own 
interpretive schemes as they will have drawn upon their stocks of shared 
knowledge, accumulated skills and mutual cognitive rules to achieve those held 
positions of authority and power (via formal positions and social capital).  
Thus, it is argued here that by adopting an institutional entrepreneurship concept, 
this research contributes to NIS theory and Seo and Creed (2002) (earlier in 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5.3) and Burns and Scapens, (2000) framework (see Section 
3.7.1). This is achieved by not overlooking the role of change agents in 
institutional change. Essentially, NIS theory contends that the driving factors of 
institutionalisation arise from the need for social legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Hassan, 2005). However, often the micro-activities of the organisation 
propel the processes of internal change (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). Moreover, NIS and Seo and Creed (2002) do not examine these. 
Therefore, this research, in conjunction with NIS theory, also adopts Laughlin’s 
(1991) model of organisations (see Section 3.6) and Burns and Scapens (2000) 
conceptualisation of management accounting change to understand how extra-
organisational and intra-organisational service-delivery and management control 
activities and institutions are interrelated in reform processes. This research 
views the external and internal factors as dynamic, complex interrelations 
                                            
18 Discursive practices consist of speech, writing and other forms of discourse that agents engage 
in to communicate meaning to others (Giddens, 1984, p. 28). Thus, discourse is a way of 
communicating. 
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empirically, but for analysis purposes, it is necessary to disaggregate them into 
their external and internal components.  
3.6 Laughlin’s (1991) model of organisations 
Laughlin’s (1991) model helps the researcher understand the processes of 
change in Gladiator by providing a conceptualisation of an organisation. This 
conceptualisation is explained in Section 3.6.1. Having a clear conceptualisation 
of what an organisation is comprised of, facilitates the tracking of organisational 
and management control disturbances in Gladiator.  In Chapter Eight, Figure 8.1 
combines Laughlin’s (1991) model with ideas from NIS theory and a number of 
other frameworks and ideas - Burns and Scapens (2000), Seo and Creed (2002), 
Battilana et al., (2009) and Hardy (1996). This theoretical amalgamation 
highlights and details the complex interrelationship over time in Gladiator 
between the exogenous shocks/jolts and the endogenous organisational change 
processes. While, it is acknowledged that there are differences in the original 
theoretical roots, they all view organisational and management control change as 
socially constructed and “socially embedded processes over time” (Contrafatto 
and Burns, 2013, p.352) thus facilitating their combination. 
3.6.1 An outline of Laughlin’s model of organisations  
Laughlin (1991) outlined a model of an organisation (which aptly fits in with the 
processual perspective outlined in Chapters Two and Four), drawing from a 
number of organisational change writers, which can be used to understand the 
organisational processes of change (Broadbent, 1992). Laughlin (1991) 
describes organisations as comprising a series of interpretive schemes, design 
archetypes and sub-systems (as depicted in Figure 3.2). Laughlin argues these 
organisational concepts remain balanced/stable until disturbed/kicked/forced by 
some external or internal issue (Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent, 1992; Gurd, 2008; 
Fraser, 2012; Contrafatto and Burns, 2013). Both, the interpretive schemes and 
design archetypes are less tangible than an organisation’s sub-systems and 
these are both created and maintained by the past and current people within the 
organisation (Laughlin, 1991; Broadbent, 1992). 
Interpretive schemes can be broken down into three levels, which are discursively 
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formed over time, namely: (1) beliefs, values and norms, (2) an organisation’s 
mission/purpose, and (3) metarules of the organisation (Laughlin, 1991; 
Broadbent, 1992). Bartunek (1984, p.355) outlines the essence of interpretive 
schemes noting “interpretive schemes operate as shared fundamental (though 
often implicit) assumptions about why events happen as they do and how people 
are to act in different situations”.  
 
Figure 3.2 A model of organisations 
Source: Laughlin, 1991, p.211. 
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Design archetypes comprise of the organisational and management structures, 
design processes, and communication systems and have been defined as 
“compositions of structures and (management) systems given coherence and 
orientation by an underlying set of values and beliefs” (Hinings and Greenwood, 
1988, p.4). They are the link between the interpretive schemes and the tangible 
sub-systems. Broadbent (1992) argues that the elements of the design 
archetypes mirror elements of the interpretive schemes. Their purpose is to 
express the view of the interpretive scheme through the tangible organisational 
elements (i.e. sub-systems). Thus, design archetypes can display how the 
interpretive schemes develop “in the context of a process of change” (Broadbent, 
1992, p.347). Finally, sub-systems are the most tangible and observable 
components of an organisation and are comprised of, for example, buildings, 
people, machines and finance (Laughlin, 1991). Next, Laughlin’s (1991) definition 
of organisational change is presented. 
3.6.2 Laughlin’s definition of organisational change  
Laughlin (1991) broadly defines organisational change as either (1) morphostatic 
(first order) change, or (2) morphogenetic (second-order) change. Morphostatic 
change usually involves some level of change in the design archetype and 
perhaps also the tangible sub-systems, but it does not filter its way through to the 
interpretive schemes. Alternatively, morphogenetic change occurs in the design 
archetype, which triggers changes in both the interpretive schemes and tangible 
sub-systems. Laughlin (1991) further classifies morphostatic change into two 
categories: (1) rebuttal, where there is no change in the design archetype (e.g. 
the change is rejected) (Contrafatto and Burns, 2013, p.352), and (2) 
reorientation, where there is some change to the organisation’s design archetype 
and perhaps the sub-systems. Morphogenetic (second order) change is classified 
in terms of (1) colonization, where there is significant organisational change 
occurring in the design archetypes (usually imposed) and which spreads and 
impacts on the interpretive schemes and sub-systems and (2) evolution, which is 
change initiated in the organisation’s interpretive schemes. Later in Chapters Five 
and Six we will see a process of colonization illuminated in Gladiator. However, 
Laughlin’s (1991) model is not without its problems and the next section outlines 
some issues. 
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3.6.3 Main criticisms of Laughlin’s model 
The first issue relates to the difficulty in specifying the interpretive schemes, 
design archetypes and sub-systems in practice (Soin, 1996; Gurd, 2008). 
Broadbent (1992, p.346) states that “while analytically separable, in a practical 
situation, recognition must be given to the ‘slippery’ or amorphous nature of the 
categories – the interpretive schemes, the design archetype and the 
organisational sub-systems […] They might be seen as strata of different 
coloured sands, slipping and sliding together, undulating and mixing in places, 
yet retaining their integrity in others”. Second, there is an issue of fragmentation 
where different job levels within an organisation can hold different perspectives, 
that is, different interpretive schemes (Broadbent, 1992; Gurd, 2008). “Agreement 
of organisational members at higher levels of the interpretive schemes (e.g. the 
metarules) might be contrasted with disagreement at the lower levels (e.g. the 
cultural level)” (Broadbent, 1992, p.362). Third, if organisational members at 
various organisational levels have different interpretive schemes, it can result in 
a fuzziness as to when first-order change becomes second-order change 
(Broadbent, 1992; Gurd, 2008). This may result in a schizoid organisation where 
interpretive schemes swing back and forth like a pendulum on a pathway of 
change (Broadbent, 1992). Additionally, change may occur in the interpretive 
schemes before the design archetype is adjusted (Broadbent, 1992). For 
example, an accounting system might not change but how organisational 
members interpret and use the information may change: 
It was the attitude of the different members of the organisation and 
their differing interpretations of the information which gave an 
indication of change. Thus, evidence of change comes from the 
attitude of the organisational members to the design archetype. The 
same design archetype is flexible enough to link to different cultures 
and this allows ‘schizoid’ organisations to continue without a need for 
change of these more tangible elements. Given that tangible elements, 
such as an accounting system, cannot often be changed 
instantaneously (because of practicalities such as cost or lack of staff 
training, for example) the existence of this flexibility is important. It 
allows for change of the design archetype to be phased in on a more 
evolutionary basis and lag behind a change in the interpretive 
schemes (Broadbent, 1992, pp.364-365).   
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Finally, Soin (1996) found that Laughlin’s (1991) model did not take the issue of 
power relationships into account (see also, Gurd, 2008). Section 3.8 of this thesis 
argues that Hardy’s (1996) four dimensions of power can support this deficiency 
in Laughlin’s model. Despite the aforementioned problems, researchers such as 
Broadbent (1992), Soin (1996), Gurd (2008), Fraser (2012) and Contrafatto and 
Burns (2013) have found this model useful in illuminating and understanding 
organisational change processes and especially the role of accounting in this 
process. This thesis draws on Laughlin’s (1991) model of organizations to provide 
an organisational concept and a language for illuminating and unravelling the 
dynamics of intra-organisational change within Gladiator, in an external context 
of a financial crisis. However, Laughlin’s (1991) framework does not “provide a 
rich descriptive analytical framework to explore the finer grained elements of 
change at the micro level” (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015, p.1019) and 
therefore the researcher combines it with Burns and Scapens (2000) framework 
and Hardy’s (1996) ideas on power. 
Thus, next, old institutional economics (OIE) is examined with the main focus 
being on the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework. Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
framework helps to analyse intra-organisational change in a management 
accounting context and is adopted to supplement Laughlin’s (1991) framework. 
A key difference between the two frameworks is that Burns and Scapens views 
rules and routines as being part of ongoing organisational practices over time 
whereas Laughlin (1991) views organisational change as more of a stop start 
sequence of environmental disturbances (Contrafatto and Burns, 2013). Having 
noted the key difference between both frameworks, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
is presented after a brief overview of its OIE informing ideas. 
3.7 OIE - main focus on Burns and Scapens (2000) framework 
OIE emerged in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century and is the oldest of 
the institutional approaches (Ahmed, 1992; Scapens, 1994; Burns, 1996; 
Scapens and Macintosh, 1996). It originates from the work of Veblen who viewed 
institutions as “settled habits of thought common to the generality of men” 
(Veblen, 1961, p.239), imposing upon individuals “conventional standards, ideals, 
and canons of conduct that make up the community’s scheme of life” (p.243). 
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Veblen was critical of the assumptions of neo-classical economics, for example, 
the notion of rational actors and the concept of static equilibria (Moll et al., 2006; 
Scapens, 2006; van der Steen, 2006), and thus called upon economists to 
examine customs, usages and habits of thought (institutions) in order to interpret 
economic decisions and actions (Hutchinson, 1991, cited in Baker, 2006, p.25). 
It achieves a balance between transaction economics (under-socialised role of 
individual behaviour) and institutional sociology (over-socialised role of individual 
behaviour) concerning human behaviour (van der Steen, 2006). OIE generally 
examines why and how structures and behaviours develop, remain and/or 
change over time rather than simply examining the existing structures at any 
given point in time (Moll et al., 2006) - thus, showing how institutions are a result 
of human behaviour as well as being a constraint on human behaviour. It is this, 
which differentiates OIE from NIS. NIS assumes “that institutions exist 
independently from individual behaviour” (van der Steen, 2006, p.23), that is, they 
take “the individual as given” (Hodgson, 2000, p.328). OIE conceptualises 
institutions as comprising of rules, routines and habits, which emphasises the 
view that institutions can facilitate or prevent change through the carriers of rules, 
routines and habits. However, OIE is not without its critics. First, its focus “is 
primarily on the micro- rather than the macro-level” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.104). 
Second, “it does not represent a single well-defined or unified body of thought, or 
methodology, or program of research” (Rutherford, 1996, p.1). Third, Ledford et 
al., (1989) concluded that institutional theory does not offer “much guidance 
regarding change” (p.8). Nevertheless, Burns and Scapens (2000) adopted the 
principles of OIE to arrive at an explanation of institutional change. 
3.7.1 Burns and Scapens framework and criticisms 
A conceptual framework drawing from an OIE-informed view of accounting is 
outlined by Burns and Scapens (2000)19 and used in this study in conjunction with 
NIS concepts, Battilana et al., (2009), Laughlin (1991), Seo and Creed (2002), 
and Hardy (1996). It builds on the institutional perspective of management 
accounting sketched by Scapens (1994). The four major elements of the Burns 
                                            
19 Despite this framework dealing specifically with management accounting change, it can also 
be used to understand reforms in other organisational practices (Yazdifar, 2013, p.81). 
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and Scapens (2000) framework are organisational rules, routines, institutional 
realm and the realm of action.  
Rules are defined as the “formally recognised way in which “things should be 
done” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.6). They are the formalized statement of 
procedures (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.7). March et al., (2000, p.9) contend, 
“rules routinise organisational activities and define authority relations, 
connections among subunits, and decision-making structures”. This echoes 
similarities to Scapens (1994) who argued that rules are necessary (though not 
necessarily sufficient) to coordinate and give coherence to the actions of groups 
and/or individuals. Rule-based behaviour could result from an explicit 
assessment of available alternatives, and the selected rules later followed to 
avoid any difficulties and costs of undertaking such assessments on every 
occasion (Burns and Scapens, 2000). By repeatedly following rules, rules over 
time become programmed behaviours which could be described as routines “or 
the habits of a group” (Burns and Scapens, 2000 p.6; Johansson and Siverbo, 
2009; Tessier and Otley, 2012; Tessier, 2014). According to Schein (2017, 
p.198), they “make life more predictable and thereby reduce ambiguity and 
anxiety”.  
Routines can be defined as the way in which “things are actually done” (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000, p.6). They are the informal practices actually in use (Lukka, 
2007). A distinction between rules and routines is that rules can be changed at 
discrete intervals by explicit decisions, whereas routines can be changed in a 
cumulative implicit process of daily action (Lukka, 2007). However, over time it 
can be seen that rules become routines and routines can be expressed as rules, 
this linkage can make it empirically difficult to distinguish between them 
(Johansson and Siverbo, 2009; Quinn, 2010). Management accounting practices, 
for example budgeting in Gladiator, can be depicted as a collection of relatively 
stable rules and routines (Lukka, 2007, p.79). Rules are the formal management 
accounting systems set out in training and procedure manuals, whereas routines 
are the accounting practices actually in use (Burns and Scapens, 2000). Roberts 
and Scapens (1985) argued that the management accounting practices in use 
may not actually mirror the systems set out in the procedures manuals.  
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Institutions, the third key element of the framework, are integral to the OIE 
approach to the analysis of processes of change (Ribeiro and Scapens 2006). 
Although there is no universal definition of an institution, it has been defined as 
“a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is 
embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people” (Hamilton, 1932, 
p.84). This definition reads well with Veblen’s view that much of human behaviour 
is determined by rules and routines (Ahmed and Scapens, 2000). Habits and 
routines are important components of institutions (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006, 
p.98). According to Burns and Scapens (2000), it is through a process of 
routinization of human activity that institutions evolve. However, they do 
acknowledge a duality between human activity and institutions, stating while 
institutions may influence human behaviour, changes in human behaviour may in 
the long run change and reshape institutions (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Burns 
and Scapens, 2000; Johansson and Siverbo, 2009). Institutions seem to have a 
normative and objective character (Burns and Scapens, 2000). They identify the 
individual or collective behaviours expected (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). Institutions always exist prior to any change by actors and as a 
result, they will shape the process of change (Bhaskar, 1989). Thus, in this thesis, 
the existing institutions in Gladiator, prior to when public service-delivery and 
management control reforms were implemented, were service-delivery as fast as 
possible and at any cost. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) have explicitly modelled (see Figure 3.3) how the 
interdependence between structure and action may lead to institutional change 
(van der Steen, 2006). This model has adapted Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) 
framework for institutional change. 
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Figure 3.3 The process of institutionalisation 
Source: Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.9. 
Burns and Scapens’ framework starts at the point of encoding “new” institutional 
ideals as rules and routines, shown by arrow “a”. This is typically influenced by 
existing routines as these incorporate existing norms and values. Arrow “b” is the 
enactment of rules and routines. However, actors may not follow the rules and 
routines as exactly specified if they are not compatible with their own norms and 
values (Yazdifar, 2013, p.84). Thus, there could be an element of resistance 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). Arrow “c” implies reproduction through actions 
undertaken by actors, however, the rules and routines may be modified or 
changed by the actors through their repeated behaviour. The final step (arrow “d” 
which is not as steep as arrow “c”) depicts the institutionalisation of repeated 
behaviour, which “in the absence of ‘external’ changes, such as advances in 
technology, or take-over crisis, there is unlikely to be a reopening of previously 
agreed arrangements and therefore routines may become somewhat resistant to 
change” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.10). These institutional arrangements 
potentially become the accepted way of doing things. Over time new institutions 
may evolve which will be interpreted in terms of existing rules and routines 
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(depicted by the dotted arrows). Thus, in summary Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
framework proposes that a study of management accounting change, or as in this 
case, management control reform, requires an understanding of, first, the 
historical (institutional) context of existing rules and routines and, second, the 
processes by which new rules and routines can become embedded and taken-
for-granted. In OIE change can happen “in terms of (new) rules or routines but, 
importantly, “no change” does not mean “static”” (Contrafatto and Burns, 2013, 
p.353) as “rules and routines are conceived as being part of ongoing processes 
of replication, adaptation, modification and/or change over time” (Contrafatto and 
Burns, 2013, p.353).  
Nevertheless, the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework is not without criticism, 
as the framework does not specify the role of human agency in institutional theory 
(van der Steen, 2006), that is, it is quiet about how agency is exercised and by 
whom (Modell, 2007, p.351). Furthermore, ter Bogt (2008(b), p.231) argues that 
to more fully understand accounting change in local government, the 
roles of individuals and groups, the “rationality” of responses to various 
pressures, as well as the role of external institutions, probably 
deserves more explicit attention than they seem to receive in the Burns 
and Scapens framework.  
Having explained the process of institutionalisation in organisational and 
management control reforms, the next section illuminates the potential impacts 
of different sources of power in explaining why and how processes of service-
delivery and management control reforms unfolded through time as they did in 
Gladiator. 
3.8 Power, Hardy’s (1996) framework 
Power’s objective is “to produce intended effects” in line with perceived interests 
(Burns, 2000, p.569), and therefore, requires action by individuals which is 
evident through politics, “the practical domain of power in action” (Buchanan and 
Badham, 1999, p.11). Maguire et al., (2004, p.975) argue that “institutional 
change is [.] a political process that reflects power and interests of organised 
actors”. Institutional theory has examined the importance of power but with 
different levels of importance being considered (Oliveira, 2010). While Old 
Institutional Sociology (OIS) concentrated on the ideas of power, especially the 
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work of Selznick, 1957, NIS from the 1970’s onwards lost its focus on power 
(Munir, 2015). However, OIE in contrast to NIS “can be said to have a greater 
tradition” on power (Oliveira, 2010, p.90). “Power and politics is integral to any 
OIE-grounded explanation of life’s ongoing processes - i.e. part of OIE’s core 
methodological underpinnings” (Burns, 2000, p. 571). Several OIE studies have 
examined internal power struggles, conflicts and resistance (e.g. Burns, 2000; 
Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Robalo, 2007; 
Yazdifar et al., 2008; Oliveiria, 2010; Al Asimi, 2017). Robalo (2007, p.106) stated 
that Burns and Scapens’ (2000) OIE framework “has been particularly effective 
in studies where power, politics and vested interests are central”. Thus, for this 
case study, the researcher draws on Hardy’s (1996) framework of power 
mobilisation to complement the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework. Its ideas 
will be helpful for unravelling the dynamic processes of public service-delivery 
and management control reforms in this research.  
Hardy’s framework drawing from Lukes (1974), dimensions of power (see Table 
3.2) helps to unravel “the complexities of processes of accounting change” 
(Burns, 2000, p.570).   The first dimension of power is power of resources, which 
portrays embedded agents as controlling key resources such as information, 
expertise, political access, credibility, stature, prestige, control of money, rewards 
and sanctions, to change people’s behaviour (Hardy, 1996). It appears to involve 
“carrot and stick” persuasion. The second dimension, power of processes, 
resides in organisational decision-making processes. This form of power exerts 
influence over “subordinates’ participation in decision-making processes” (Burns, 
2000, p.570). Such power mobilisation can occur “from behind the scenes” where 
outcomes are determined by powerful agents “through the use of procedures and 
political routines” (Hardy, 1996, p.S7). The third dimension of power is the power 
of meaning which is used to form embedded agents’ perceptions, cognitions 
and/or preferences in accepting the status quo by failing to visualise any other 
alternatives or, rather, convince agents that change is “rational”, “desirable” 
and/or “legitimate” (Hardy, 1996). Effectively, it “implies that managers who want 
to avoid/break resistance to change from different groups: employees and 
unions, use some symbols, such as redundancy compensation and also some 
reports (e.g. accounting/MA reports) (Hardy, 1996) to legitimise/justify their 
managerial decisions” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.45). 
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Table 3.2 Three dimensions of power 
 Power of 
resources 
Power of 
processes 
Power of 
meaning 
Source of power Ability to hire and 
fire, rewards, 
punishments, 
funding, authority, 
expertise, etc 
Decision-making 
processes, 
participants and 
agendas, etc 
Symbols, rituals, 
language, etc 
Action of power Principles of 
behaviour 
modification are 
used to influence 
specific actions 
New awareness 
is created by 
opening up 
processes to new 
participants, 
issues and 
agendas 
Change is given 
new meaning, 
making it appear 
legitimate, 
desirable, rational 
or inevitable 
Limits to power Continual use of 
‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ is 
required to ensure 
continued change; 
repeated use of 
the ‘stick’ may be 
counter-
productive 
New awareness 
helps sustain new 
behaviour as long 
as it remains 
within existing 
values and norms 
Change in some 
underlying values 
and norms may 
be possible but 
specific changes 
in behaviour will 
be difficult to 
effect 
Source: Hardy, 1996, p.S7. 
Hardy (1996) adds a fourth dimension of power which is the power of the system 
which reflects the unconscious acceptance by embedded agents of the values, 
traditions, cultures and structures of a given institution. It is this dimension of 
power, which requires embedded agents to call the aforementioned three 
dimensions of power into play if they are to bring about organisational and 
accounting change. These dimensions of power are drawn upon in this research 
to unravel how power facilitated an institutional entrepreneur and change agents 
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in handling changes in the delivery of services and use of management controls 
in Gladiator. 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
By drawing on NIS theory in-conjunction with the works of Burns and Scapens 
(2000); Seo and Creed (2002); Battilana et al., (2009); Laughlin (1991); and 
Hardy (1996), this chapter asserts that a theoretical pluralistic approach 
represents a useful framework for unravelling and interpreting the dynamics of 
public service-delivery and management control reforms during a period of 
austerity. As Gladiator was impacted by external environmental factors such as 
a financial crisis and central government austerity policies, NIS is considered an 
appropriate lens because it made visible the coercive austerity pressures exerted 
by the Irish central government on Gladiator. Typically, NIS focuses on the macro 
levels of analysis and mainly concentrates on how structures create stability in 
organisations, however, in this thesis it is used to show how Gladiator responded 
to external austerity measures. The main NIS concepts of relevance in this case 
study are legitimacy, strategic responses, coercive isomorphism and decoupling 
(see Chapters Five and Six). They illustrate how the external financial crisis and 
central government austerity policies influenced the actions of an institutional 
entrepreneur in Gladiator. Although NIS helps explain the emergence of new 
management control practices (for example, new budget control rules and BSC) 
by “referring to the acceptance of these practices by the wider business 
community as legitimate and desirable” (van der Steen, 2006, p.29), it does not 
clarify the role of the individual actor in institutional change. Furthermore, it also 
does not “describe how the process of implementation of new practices proceeds” 
(van der Steen, 2006, p.29). It is for this reason that this thesis also adopts 
institutional entrepreneurship and Burns and Scapens (2000) institutionalisation 
framework. Institutional entrepreneurship concepts facilitate exploration of the 
role of transformational agency (i.e. a new CEO) in Gladiator. It helps elucidate 
the processes of why and how an institutional entrepreneur restructured the 
delivery of public services and enforced management control practices. 
Furthermore, Seo and Creed (2002) complement earlier NIS theory and 
institutional entrepreneurship insights by highlighting organisational 
contradictions, which helps to explain “when, how and why institutionally 
embedded agents might come to question, and subsequently attempt to change, 
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their and others’ taken-for-granted ways and beliefs” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2005, p.728). Praxis, the doing of change is another important concept which is 
used later in Chapters Five and Six to bring understanding to the activities of 
Gladiator’s new CEO.  
Laughlin’s (1991) model of an organisation enables the tracing of austerity 
measures and a new CEO’s actions in Gladiator, stressing the importance of 
context when examining organisational change and enhancing the adopted 
processual perspective of reform in this research. Laughlin’s model combined 
with Burns and Scapens (2000) framework facilitates a distinction to be made 
(see Chapter Eight, Figure 8.1) between Gladiator’s existing interpretive schemes 
(i.e. values, norms and beliefs) and institutions (i.e. service-delivery as fast as 
possible and at any cost). Burns and Scapens (2000) framework is focused at 
more of a micro level of analysis, typically at organisational level and below and 
“it also emphasises economic change, instead of economic equilibrium, this 
makes it potentially very beneficial in understanding the evolution and 
reproduction of accounting practices” (Scapens, 1994; Al Asimi, 2017, p.95). It 
helps unpack public service-delivery and management control practices as 
unfolding processes over time at Gladiator. It facilitates explaining reforms by 
drawing on the concepts of rules, routines, institutions and action. However, the 
framework does not specify the role of human agency in institutional theory and 
this thesis strives to extend the framework by drawing out the role of agency in 
instigating public service reforms. There is a dearth of literature on the role of 
powerful and visionary individuals in organisational and management control 
change (Modell, 2007; Sharma et al., 2014).This adds further strength to the 
adoption of institutional entrepreneurship notion in this thesis. Finally, this chapter 
theorises power and politics because of a growing understanding of the key role 
played by a new institutional entrepreneur. Insight is drawn from Hardy’s (1996) 
framework of power, highlighting how the mobilisation of power and politics can 
bring about strategic change in public service organisations.  
Chapter Eight (see Section 8.3.1.1), presents a contextualist framework drawing 
from the six theoretical approaches adopted. This framework recognises that 
institutions matter. In order to more fully understand the dynamics of public 
service-delivery and management control reform, history, power, agency and 
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extra- and intra-institutional contexts are important. The next chapter, Chapter 
Four, provides a detailed account of how these various theoretical perspectives 
are incorporated into this study’s research design. It also discusses why and how 
the empirical evidence for this thesis was gathered through an interpretive case 
study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the philosophical assumptions, as well as the research 
design implemented in this thesis. Very often, a researcher’s views or beliefs 
about the world can be implicit rather than explicit in the research findings, 
therefore acknowledging and substantiating the researcher’s assumptions is an 
“intellectual duty of all academic researchers” (Hopper and Powell, 1985, p.456). 
Johnson and Duberly (2000, p.1) also argue “how we come to ask particular 
questions, how we assess the relevance and value of different research 
methodologies so that we can investigate those questions, how we evaluate the 
outputs of research, all express and vary according to our underlying 
epistemological commitments”.  
Initially, when this research began, the researcher set out to explore public 
service changes in costing, i.e. a new ABC system. However, the first four 
interviews proved crucial in determining the purpose of this research. The 
research purpose was subsequently revised to investigating the dynamics of 
reforms (i.e. why and how) in the delivery of public services and management 
controls in an Irish local authority, paying particular attention to the role of a newly 
appointed CEO and austerity measures. This objective determined the 
methodological approach adopted and the research methods to be used for the 
study. Furthermore, the research objective is also best suited to a processual 
approach because it questions how and why “managerial and organisational 
phenomena” “emerge, develop, grow or terminate over time” (Langley et al., 
2013, p.1). It was these notions, which further directed the methodological 
stances, adopted in this thesis i.e. an interpretive case study. The “ontological 
and epistemological assumptions that underlie the interpretive approach are also 
consistent with the assumptions that underlie the theoretical framework that is 
used to inform the observations” from this case study (Yazdifar, 2013, p.109). 
Figure 4.1 below provides an overview of this study’s research design with each 
element discussed in the sections to follow. 
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  Figure 4.1 Research design typology overview 
 Source: Adapted from Strang, 2015, p.4. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the philosophical 
stance adopted in this thesis, which reinforces the choice of research methods 
outlined in Section 4.3. This is followed by analysis of the data in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Research paradigm 
Paradigms provide a framework through which to conduct research. They are a 
set of fundamental beliefs that define a particular worldview for its holder, in terms 
of, the nature of the world, the individuals place in it, and the range of possible 
relationships to that world and its parts (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.107). They 
are presented in terms of ontology (i.e. nature of reality), epistemology (i.e. how 
we know what we know), and methodology (i.e. the process of research) (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011; Diaz, 2016, p.39).   
Burrell and Morgan (1979) defined four distinct sociological paradigms, which can 
be used in business and management; ‘radical humanist’, ‘radical structuralist’, 
‘interpretive’ and ‘functionalist’ as depicted in Figure 4.2.  
  
Paradigm
• Interpretivism
Strategy
•Qualitative
Method
•Case study
Technique
• Interviews
•Secondary data sources
•Observation
•Thematic analysis
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OBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVE 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
‘Radical humanist’ ‘Radical structuralist’ 
‘Interpretive’ ‘Functionalist’ 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Figure 4.2 Sociological paradigms 
Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.22. 
Hopper and Powell (1985) later extended Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) work, 
applying it to accounting research. However, Hopper and Powell (1985), in 
contrast to Burrell and Morgan (1979), treat the subjective-objective dimension 
as a continuum as opposed to a dichotomy as seen in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 Taxonomy of accounting research  
Source: Ryan et al., 2002, p.40. 
Furthermore, Hopper and Powell (1985) point out that it would be wrong to claim 
that all accounting research fits nicely into one of these categories and they have 
been criticised for collapsing the different philosophical dimensions (i.e. ontology, 
epistemology, human nature and methodology) into a single continuum 
(Laughlin, 1995).  
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The functionalist paradigm “combines an objectivist view of the world with a 
concern for regulation” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.41). It tends to assume “that the 
social world is composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and 
relationships which can be identified, studied and measured through approaches 
derived from the natural sciences” (Burrell and Morgan, 1985, p.26). Mainstream 
accounting, which is primarily concerned with the functioning of accounting, is 
similar to functionalism (Ryan et al., 2002; Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010). 
The interpretive paradigm, on the other hand, is “concerned with understanding 
the social world, and includes work that seeks to understand the social nature of 
accounting practices” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.42). “It sees the world as an emergent 
social process which is created by the individuals concerned” (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1985, p.28). It is an ‘anti-positivistic’, ‘voluntaristic’ and ‘ideographic’ 
approach to social science (Burrell and Morgan, 1985). Hopper and Powell (1985, 
p.446) further explain how: 
The focus is on individual meaning and people’s perceptions of ‘reality’ 
rather than any independent ‘reality’ that might exist external to them. 
The radical humanist paradigm shares similarities with the interpretive paradigm, 
in that it views the social world from a non-positivistic perspective. The radical 
humanist places ‘most emphasis upon radical change, modes of domination, 
emancipation, deprivation, and potentiality (Burrell and Morgan, 1985, p.32). In 
other words, it strives to surpass the limitations of an existing social world. In 
keeping with its subjectivist perspective, it places central emphasis upon ‘human 
consciousness’ (Burrell and Morgan, 1985, p.33).  
Finally, the radical structuralist paradigm adopts the opposite standpoint of the 
radical humanist paradigm advocating a sociology of radical change from an 
objective perspective (Burrell and Morgan, 1985). Radical structuralism is 
committed to radical change, emancipation and potentiality, in an analysis, which 
emphasises structural conflict, modes of domination, contradiction and 
deprivation (Burrell and Morgan, 1985, p.34). The radical structuralist paradigm 
is similar to the functionalist paradigm, in that it views the social world from a 
perspective, which tends to be positivistic. 
107 
As these four paradigms have three basic beliefs or assumptions that underlie 
them – ontological, epistemological and human nature, each are discussed next. 
4.2.1 Ontology 
“Ontology is the study of existence” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.13), in simple terms, 
what is reality? It addresses questions such as “how do we know what is real and 
how do we know when statements are true or false?” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.13). 
On one hand, the social world can be viewed as having a “concrete existence 
external to, independent of and prior to the cognition of any individual” (Hopper 
and Powell, 1985, p.431). This is an objective view of reality (Bryman, 2008), 
which mirrors Burrell and Morgan’s (1985) realism. The realist perspective takes 
for granted that the “social world external to individual cognition is a real world 
made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures” (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1985, p.4). Essentially, reality is outside the thinking mind, it is 
independent of human beings and it resembles the natural world. Whereas, on 
the other hand, the subjective view of reality “is depicted as existing only as a 
product of individual consciousness” (Hopper and Powell, 1985, p.431). In 
essence, reality is only in the mind – “the external social world consists simply of 
concepts and labels created by people to help them understand reality and 
negotiate a shared conception of its nature with others” (Hopper and Powell, 
1985, p.431). This reflects Burrell and Morgan’s (1985, p.4) nominalism (idealism) 
perspective which “revolves around the assumption that the social world external 
to individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and 
labels which are used to structure reality”. 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) present six alternative ways of viewing the world 
(Table 4.1). These different perspectives are available to the researcher for 
examining the dynamics of reforms in the delivery of public services and 
management controls and how these unfold over time. Number five, on Table 
4.1, reality as social construction20 is the adopted ontological perspective in this 
research, with a focus on the context within which public service delivery and  
                                            
20 Social construction is akin to social constructionism. 
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Table 4.1: Six ontological assumptions 
ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Reality as a concrete structure                                         OBJECTIVE 
2. Reality as a concrete process 
3. Reality as a contextual field of information 
4. Reality as a symbolic discourse 
5. Reality as a social construction 
6. Reality as a projection of human imagination                SUBJECTIVE 
Source: Morgan and Smircich, 1980, p.492. 
management control reform as a process evolves (Nørreklit et al., 2006; Ahrens 
et al., 2008). According to Pettigrew (1997, p.340), social processes such as 
service-delivery and management control practices are “deeply embedded in the 
contexts that produce and are produced by them”. Thus, explaining reform in a 
public sector organisation should be linked to reforms in its operating contexts as 
“processes are embedded in contexts and can only be studied as such” 
(Pettigrew, 1997).  
Social constructionism does not seek to explain behaviour by searching for 
fundamental laws and external causes, rather it tries to explain and understand 
how people make sense of their everyday existence (Tomkins and Groves, 1983; 
Ryan et al., 2002; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The present researcher does not 
“assume any pre-existing reality” and strives to understand how actors both 
individually and collectively use language, actions, labels and routines to help 
them make sense of their situation (Morgan and Smircich 1980, p. 497; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008, p.63). Table 4.2 outlines the main features of social 
constructionism while Table 4.3 delineates its core strengths and weaknesses. 
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Table 4.2 Key features of social constructionism 
Features Social Constructionism 
The observer Is part of what is being observed 
Human interests Are the main drivers of science 
Explanations Aim to increase general understanding of the 
situation 
Research progresses through Gathering rich data from which ideas are 
induced 
Concepts Should incorporate stakeholder perspectives 
Units of analysis May include the complexity of ‘whole’ 
situations 
Generalization through Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires Small numbers of cases chosen for specific 
reasons 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p.59. 
Table 4.3 Strengths and weaknesses of social constructionism 
 Strengths Weaknesses 
Social Constructionist Good for processes and 
meanings 
Flexible and good for 
theory generation 
Data collection less 
artificial 
Can be very time 
consuming 
Analysis and 
interpretations are 
difficult  
May not have credibility 
with policy makers 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p.73. 
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The weaknesses of the social constructionist perspective shown in Table 4.3, for 
example, difficulty in analysing data, is overcome in this thesis due to the 
researcher’s tacit21 and intimate knowledge of the organisation having previously 
worked for four years (from 2005 to 2008) as an accountant in a similar Irish local 
authority. The researcher is also very much aware of the problems and 
opportunities of the agency/structure dualism. This refers to “the split within the 
social sciences between those who consider social phenomena to be products of 
the action of human agents in light of their subjective interpretation of the world, 
and those who consider social phenomena to be caused by objective social 
structures” (Feeney, 2013, p.86). However, constructionism brings objectivity and 
subjectivity together and holds them together indissolubly (Crotty, 1998). It 
represents a middle ground on the Burrell and Morgan (1985) subjective-
objective dimension. 
A dynamic social constructivist perspective is related to process research 
questions, “that focus on how things unfold and change over time” (Langley et 
al., 2013, p.9). This fits nicely with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 
Three as this research views service-delivery and management control reform as 
a process and not a linear relationship between different factors (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000; Busco and Scapens, 2011; Hoque and Chia, 2012). The next 
section introduces the epistemological assumption adopted in this thesis. It is 
based on the adopted social construction ontology.  
4.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology, another paradigm assumption, is concerned with the nature of 
knowledge – what form it takes and how it can be obtained and transmitted 
(Hopper and Powell, 1985, p.431) or in simple terms “how do we know what we 
know” (Crotty, 1998, p.8). It poses the following types of questions: “what is the 
                                            
21 Tacit knowledge comprises the implicit understandings, which the actors have about the 
circumstances of their actions and can be contrasted with discursive knowledge, which comprises 
the explicitly discussed understandings (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.6). 
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source of our belief”, “how truth is established?” and “how belief is justified?” 
(Ryan et al, 2002, pp. 34-36). 
Similar to ontology, polarised epistemological view points between the 
philosophical perspectives of positivism and anti-positivism are presented by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979). Positive research promotes the use of “methods of 
the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond” (Bryman, 2008, 
p.13). In positive research, knowledge is understood in terms of searching for 
universal laws and the nature of relationships between variables (Byrne, 2009). 
A positive research approach is scientific, requires a priori hypotheses, 
acceptable measurement, isolation and control of variables, and verification of 
the measurement methods and variables (Smith, 2003, p.18 cited in Quinn, 2010, 
p.41). By contrast, in anti-positivistic (i.e. interpretivism – “its intellectual heritage 
includes: Weber’s notion of Verstehen; the hermeneutic-phenomenological 
tradition and symbolic interactionism) research, knowledge is understood in 
terms of an individuals own interpretation of meanings (Burrell and Morgan, 
1985). Thus, positivism is concerned with an explanation of human behaviour 
while anti-positivism is concerned with understanding human action (Bryman, 
2008, p.15). In this thesis, the researcher adopts an interpretivist approach to 
gaining knowledge. 
4.2.2.1 Interpretive and processual  
Based on the ontological assumptions adopted in this research, that of a social 
constructed reality, an interpretivist approach is warranted. Interpretive research 
is concerned with “understanding the social world and includes work that seeks 
to understand the social nature of accounting practices” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.42). 
The term interpretive has been described as “novelty, curiosity, knowledge 
seeking, innovativeness and similar terms” (Ahrens et al., 2008, p.855). Some of 
the key underpinning principles of interpretive accounting research are: 
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 A processual lens (history and path dependency matters). 
 Social, economic, institutional, cultural, political, legal (and more) 
contexts matter and should be endogenised into our explanations 
(holistic and not overly premised on assumptions and caveats). 
 Understanding (pragmatic/ambiguous and provisional) and explaining 
the dynamics and interplay of accounting practices in organisations and 
society. 
 Use different theoretical insight to assist in such explanations (eclectic). 
 Adopt multiple research methods. 
 Where possible, to extrapolate our understandings to engage in dialogue 
with practitioners (but neither statistical generalization nor prediction 
being prioritized).  
(Ahrens et al., 2008, pp.855-856). 
The interpretive approach suits this research as it aims to explore the different 
change dynamics involved in shaping how public service-delivery and 
management control reforms as a process evolve. Furthermore, it also requires 
researchers to adopt a holistic approach and is largely compatible with the core 
assumptions of social constructionism with its emphasis on processes, contexts, 
understanding and meanings. There is a consensus among academics that 
accounting is a socially constructed function (Tomkins and Groves, 1983, Chua, 
1986, Hopper et al.,1987) and Scapens (1990, p.271) concluded it is 
inappropriate to study the individual parts of social systems taken out of their 
context. Thus, this research addresses the issue of processual reform in the 
delivery of public services and management controls in an Irish local authority 
using an interpretive perspective (van der Steen, 2006).  
The processual perspective portrays the world as a set of processes “in which 
things are reifications of processes” (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002 cited in Langley et 
al., 2013, p.4). For example, “the river is not an object but an ever-changing flow; 
the sun is not a thing, but a flaming fire. Everything in nature is a matter of 
process, of activity, of change” (Rescher, 1996, p.10). The processual 
perspective sees organisations as fluid entities, permanently in process, 
continually in a state of becoming (Benson,1977; Pettigrew, 1987; Burns and 
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Scapens, 2000; Dawson, 2012) - as opposed to being stable entities comprising 
of stable states at given (and isolated) points in time (Oliveira, 2010, p.176; 
Dawson, 2012, p.130). Furthermore, Pettigrew (1990, p.268) argued that 
research should concentrate on “catching reality in flight, and in studying long-
term processes in their contexts, a return to embeddedness as a principal of 
method” thus, requiring researchers to “go beyond the analysis of change and 
begin to theorise about changing” (Pettigrew,1985, p.15), and, examine how in 
every moment reality is brought into being (Langley et al., 2013, p.5). In 1997, 
Pettigrew elaborated on his meaning of process as “a sequence of individual and 
collective events, actions and activities unfolding over time and in context” 
(p.338). This clarification illuminated the important role of both history and time in 
any processual process.  
Pettigrew (1990) argued that time is a social construction and Langley et al., 
(2013) contended how it is ironic that the “centrality of time” is excluded from 
management journals. Therefore, they call for researchers to acknowledge the 
“centrality of time” and they argue, “process conceptualisations offer an essential 
contribution to organisation and management knowledge that is not available 
from most variance-based generalizations” (p.4). This research very much 
acknowledges the centrality of time in Gladiator’s reform process by exploring its 
changes over a period from 2008 - 2013. However, despite this specific 
timeframe, the existing ways of doing and thinking about public service- delivery 
and management controls in Gladiator pre-2008 were also discussed. This is 
important as much research on organisations is “ahistorical, aprocessual and 
acontextual” and by not including or ignoring these concepts, organisational 
change processes will not be revealed (Pettigrew, 1990; p.269). In 1987, 
Pettigrew wrote that context has often been considered as “descriptive 
background” or as a predecessor that “somehow shapes change” (p.656). 
However, he warns against viewing context in these terms. According to 
Pettigrew (1987) context should be conceptualised as part of or enmeshed in the 
production of processes while also acknowledging how it can be activated or 
mobilised by actors seeking to achieve change. This displays the duality of 
contexts because processes are both constrained by contexts (structure) and 
processes shape contexts (agency) (Pettigrew, 1990, p.270). Context is a key 
element in this research as the external context of the financial crisis and central 
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government austerity pressures play a dynamic role in reforming Gladiator. In 
addition, the internal context, with the arrival of a new CEO are also pertinent to 
the shaping of reforms in Gladiator.  
Dawson (2012) also presents a processual framework of organisational change 
similar to that put forward by Pettigrew (1997). Dawson (2012, p.120), defines 
processual research as:  
the contextual, retrospective and real-time study of change as-it-
happens over time through the observed, documented and lived 
experiences of people as they seek to make sense and give sense 
individually and collectively to decision and non-decision making 
activities, the actions and torpidity of others, the multiple stories that 
transform and compete over time, and the critical incidents that occur 
in expected and unexpected ways.  
This thesis seeks to illuminate why and how the dynamic processual reforms in 
the delivery of public services and management control practices came to be in 
Gladiator. It aims to achieve this goal by following the interwoven complexity of 
structures (via: interpretive schemes, institutions) and agency (via: institutional 
entrepreneur, change agents) in the reform process in Gladiator. Process studies 
like this research that “focus on how processes (rather than things) unfold over 
time” (Langley et al., 2013, p.6) are affiliated with a social constructivist ontology, 
emphasising the importance of the dimension of time.  
Furthermore, process studies are suited to the pluralistic theoretical approach 
outlined in Chapter Three as the adopted frameworks all view organisational and 
management control change as socially constructed and “socially embedded 
processes over time” (Contrafatto and Burns, 2013, p.352). Therefore, the 
ontological and epistemological dimensions of the processual perspective fit with 
the adopted social constructionist ontology and interpretive epistemology 
adopted in this research.  
Also, there have been calls by researchers to move away from the positivistic 
research in institutional theory and to bring back an interpretive element 
(Suddaby, 2010). Thus, the interpretive perspective sits well with the theoretical 
pluralistic approach to theory explained earlier in Chapter Three. Moreover, 
Burns (in Ahrens et al., 2008, p.843) argues that interpretive researchers should 
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aim to build on existing theory, instead of inventing more new theories, and in 
Chapter Eight, Figure 8.1, this is achieved. In addition, it also addresses calls by 
researchers to “return to the rich case studies of early organisational 
institutionalists such as Selznick, Blau, Crozier, and Gouldner” (Suddaby, 2010, 
p.16). Finally, this approach to research also facilitates closer contact with human 
beings in order to analyse and understand their daily interactions and 
performance in accounting practice and routines (Granlund in Ahrens et al., 
2008).  
However, interpretive research is not without its criticisms. Some critical 
researchers argue interpretive research “does not seek to provide a social critique 
and promote radical change” (Ryan et al, 2002, p.42). They view interpretivism 
as focussing too much on the micro-social interactions and not on the major 
conflicts of interest within society (Chua, 1986). Others also claim it provides 
“poor” data, having too much emphasis on decision-making rather than control, 
weak theoretical development, using non-economics–based frameworks and 
providing few empirically testable theories (Zimmerman, 2001, pp.420-424).  
Nevertheless, interpretive researchers have defended such criticisms. For critical 
researchers to claim that interpretive accounting research is too micro focussed 
appears to be unjust upon a review of the literature. It is evident from interpretive 
management accounting case studies carried out, that both micro and macro 
issues have been considered – for example, see Dillard et al., (2004) and 
Yazdifar, (2013). “This interpretive emphasis is valuable, for as Burchell et al. 
(1980) point out, we know how accounting numbers ought to function but have 
little knowledge of the meanings and roles they actually undertake” (Chua, 1986, 
p.618). Lukka and Mouritsen (2002) suggested that Zimmerman (2001) was 
trying to promote a “normal science” approach to management accounting 
research drawing from economics based frameworks. Zimmerman (2001, p.423) 
quotes Lazear (2000) “economics is the premier social science”. This seems to 
indicate Zimmerman’s allegiance to mainstream accounting research. While 
Lukka and Mouritsen (2002, p.805) agree that such research does have its 
merits, they feel it does not assist in developing “meaningful stories about 
management accounting in its social, organizational and behavioural contexts”.  
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4.2.3 Human nature 
When deciding which paradigm one adheres to, it is also important to consider 
human nature which refers “to the relationship between human beings and their 
environment” (Hopper and Powell, 1985, p.431). Does the external environment 
determine and constrain individuals’ behaviour and experiences? If so, this 
mirrors Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) deterministic view of human behaviour. 
Alternatively, are individuals “completely autonomous and free-willed?” (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979, p.6). This is what Burrell and Morgan refer to as voluntarism.  
Researchers can incline toward either perspective or they might take a middle 
ground standpoint ‘which allows for the influence of both situational and voluntary 
factors in accounting for the activities of human beings’ (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979, p.6).  
Based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions adopted and outlined 
above, the human nature view taken here is of a voluntary nature, rather than 
being deterministic22 (Neuman, 2006). Accordingly, in this view,  
social settings and subjective points of view help to shape the choices 
a person makes, but people create and change those settings and 
have the ability to develop or form a point of view (Neuman, p.90).  
The historical, personal and cultural background of individuals can influence their 
public service-delivery reform decisions, for example, implementing new service-
delivery structures, enforcing budget controls, and a BSC, which may challenge 
and eventually replace the existing and settled ways of doing things. Such a view 
will facilitate the explanation of how public service-delivery and management 
control change as a process evolved within Gladiator. It will help understand how 
existing ways of doing and thinking about public services came to be challenged 
and slowly replaced with new ways of thinking and delivering public services, 
which over time became embedded. 
                                            
22 Determinism is “an approach to human agency and causality that assumes human actions are 
largely caused by forces external to individuals that can be identified” (Neuman, 2006, p.83). 
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4.2.4 Summary of philosophical perspective in this research 
As outlined in earlier chapters, this thesis is primarily concerned with enhancing 
our knowledge of reforms in the delivery of public services and management 
controls in Irish local governments. This knowledge will stem from the 
perspectives of the role of an institutional entrepreneur (agency); and, existing 
and new service-delivery and management control structures (e.g. existing and 
new budget rules, existing and new service-delivery structures, new BSC).  
Within the interpretive paradigm, this research draws on NIS theory and the works 
of Burns and Scapens (2000); Seo and Creed (2002) and Battilana et al., (2009); 
as outlined earlier in Chapter Three. These frameworks are further 
complemented with Laughlin’s (1991), and Hardy’s (1996) works (see Chapter 
Three). By adopting a processual theoretical pluralistic approach to research, it 
is possible to see how the macro/external environmental pressures (such as the 
financial crisis and strict government austerity measures), are interwoven with 
both the micro organisational internal processes (i.e. the internal rules, routines 
and actions at Gladiator), and agency dimensions in driving reform in the delivery 
of public services and management controls in Gladiator. Wahyuni (2012, p.71) 
articulately sums up the philosophical perspective adopted: 
Interpretivists believe that reality is socially constructed by social 
actors and people’s perceptions of it. They recognise that individuals 
with their own varied backgrounds, assumptions and experiences 
contribute to the on-going construction of reality existing in their 
broader social context through social interaction. 
4.3 Qualitative research strategy  
The research questions set out in Chapter One determined a qualitative research 
design (Saunders et al., 2009). Qualitative research aims to explain how all 
components of a process work together (Merriam, 1998). According to Hakim 
(1987, p.26), qualitative research offers “richly descriptive reports of individuals’ 
perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and feelings, the meanings and 
interpretations given to events and things, as well as their behaviour”. Thus, it 
involves the researcher studying “things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring 
to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, p.3).  
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In more recent times, accounting researchers have advised using qualitative 
research in accounting, for example, Ahrens and Chapman, (2006), Hopper et 
al., (2007), ter Bogt and van Helden (2012), van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman (2012), Parker (2012) and Burns (2014). According to Parker (2012, 
p.55), qualitative research seeks “a holistic understanding and critique of lived 
experiences, social settings and behaviours, through researchers’ engagement 
with the everyday” - hence, nicely fitting with the philosophical assumptions 
adopted above. Furthermore, it aids the researcher’s understanding of why and 
how an Irish local authority reformed its delivery of public services and 
management controls in a time of austerity and it builds explanations of the 
complex role of the actors and external factors in this reform process. Moreover, 
a qualitative approach is best suited to the why and how questions – an approach 
according to Salvato and Moores (2010) that needs further development in 
accounting research. Parker (2003, p.16) outlined that: 
Many of the methods employed [in qualitative research] attempt to 
capture the perceptions and understanding of the actors ‘from the 
inside’ so as to better understand how they make sense of, act and 
manage their daily work and situations. 
In this thesis, data was gathered in the form of words through interviews, 
observations and documents. According to Patton (1980, p.43), the depth and 
detail of qualitative data can be obtained only by “getting close” physically and 
psychologically, “to the phenomenon under study”. Examples of constructionist 
research designs are case study research, action research, ethnography, 
narrative methods and grounded theory (Myers, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). Many management accounting scholars have supported the adoption of 
case studies in qualitative research (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006; Vaivio, 2008; Parker, 2012; Burns, 2014). For example, Bruns 
and Kaplan (1987, pp.2-3) maintain: 
Because management accounting information is created to plan, 
motivate, and evaluate activities in complex organisations, research in 
the field must start with an excellent understanding of the management 
accounting processes in actual organisations […]. But since 
management accounting phenomena exists only in complex 
organisations, with their rich interactions of people, products, 
processes, markets, technologies, and cultures, it becomes extremely 
difficult to study the subject except in actual organisational settings 
where they have been developed and where they function. 
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4.3.1 Case study design 
Case studies can be viewed as a powerful basis to theory-building (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Diaz, 2016). This is evident in Chapter 
Eight (see Figure 8.1) when a new contextualist framework is presented from the 
case study findings in this research. Yin (2009, p.18) defines a case study as:  
An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
A case study approach examines in depth one, or a small number of 
organisations, events, or individuals, generally over time (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). Ahrens and Dent (1998, p.3) argued that a single case “presupposes a 
deeper appreciation of accounting in organisational and social settings and of 
information more broadly”. Suddaby (2010) argued that there was a real need to 
return to rich case studies especially when using institutional theory.  
The reason the researcher adopted a case study design was, first, because case 
studies are typically suited as a research strategy for when, how and why-type 
questions, when focus is given to contemporary events (Yin, 2009, p.13) and 
“when a theoretical framework is informing data compilation and, interpretation” 
(Yazdifar, 2013, p.113). This thesis falls into these categories as it seeks to 
understand why and how reforms in an Irish local authority’s delivery of public 
services and management controls came about. Thus, like Humphrey and 
Scapens (1996) it is argued here that the case study method is complementary 
to the methodological underpinnings of the theoretical pluralistic approach 
adopted. Second, according to Easterby-Smith et al., (2008) advocates of a 
single case study usually draw from a social constructionist epistemology while 
those using multiple case studies tend to come from a relativist or positivist 
epistemology. Due to the social constructionist ontological assumption made in 
this research, a single case study design was selected allowing the researcher to 
examine a single organisation (Gladiator) and to focus specifically on the central 
actors in its reform process. Third, the researcher had no control over events or 
behaviours in Gladiator. The complex interactions between the CEO and the 
external financial crisis were all part of an independent, complex real-life situation. 
When there is no room for manipulation of the phenomenon under study, case 
studies are deemed appropriate (Yin, 2009).   
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4.3.1.1 Limitations of the case study approach 
The case study method has some limitations. First, there is the issue of access 
or continued access (Ryan et al., 2002; Ahrens, 2004; Burns et al., 2004). 
Confidentiality may be an absolute requirement in order to gain access to 
organisations. Thus, it may be necessary to disguise the participants and 
organisation in the study. In this study, the organisational name and all the 
participants were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity. The names of the 
organisation and all the interviewees have been changed. All interviewees are 
referred to as ‘he’ to protect identities. The research objective may also need to 
be refined if access is restricted (Ryan et al., 2002; Ahrens, 2004). The 
researcher did not suffer access restrictions having previously worked in a similar 
organisation.  
Second, there is the issue of researcher bias, as there is no such thing as an 
objective case (Merriam, 1998; Ryan et al., 2002). Case studies represent the 
researcher’s interpretations of social reality (Scapens, 1990; Ryan et al., 2002). 
However, by using a team of researchers (which was not possible for this thesis) 
with different experiences and backgrounds it is possible to reduce such bias in 
the data collection and analysis processes (Ryan et al., 2002). In this study, the 
researcher’s bias was reduced by spending time at the local authority, which 
helped gain a better understanding of the local authority’s background 
(McKinnon, 1988). Additionally, interview questions were kept general and 
unaided while also continually asking “why” and “how” concerning any process 
changes. Throughout this process, the researcher strove to remain objective and 
keep an open mind.  
Third, some limits must be placed by researchers on the subject matter in the 
case study, as it is not possible to study all aspects of a social system (Humphrey 
and Scapens, 1996; Ryan et al., 2002; Hansen, 2011). One solution is to place 
limits on the area of study but to make those limits quite explicit (Ryan et al., 
2002, p.159) facilitating other researchers to extend the work into areas not 
examined. Alternatively, one can study ‘everything’ but more at a surface level 
(Ryan et al., 2002). This research within the timeframe available examined in 
detail the change processes in one local authority service, namely Housing.        
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Finally, interpretive case study research seeks out theoretical generalizations as 
opposed to statistical generalizations. “The former attempts to generalize 
theories so that they can explain the observations that have been made, the 
latter, however, are concerned with statements about statistical occurrences in a 
particular population” (Ryan et al., 2002, p.149). Although statements about 
statistical occurrences may enable researchers to make predictions about 
occurrences, they do not necessarily provide explanations of individual 
observations (Ryan et al., 2002). It has been suggested by positivists that the 
case study method does not allow the rigour of natural scientific designs as it 
rarely allows “generalizations to be made from specific cases to the general 
populations” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p.97). However, the uniqueness of the 
case study method is that generalizations can be made from theory and it comes 
in two forms. Firstly, case studies in different or new contexts are used to extend 
(i.e. generalize) the theory to a wider set of contexts. Secondly, “theory is used 
to extend the applicability of the case study findings to other contexts” (Ryan et 
al., 2002, p.149). 
Researchers who seek to produce statistical generalizations by adopting a 
sampling logic regard case studies as exploratory. However, case studies can 
also be explanatory when they are “used in conjunction with the logic of 
replication and extension to produce theoretical generalizations” (Ryan et al., 
2002, p.150). It is argued there is no other research method which offers as much 
potential as the case study method to explore the “richness” and “deep 
understanding” of the detailed processes and working of an organisation (Ahrens 
and Dent, 1998). Case studies provide ways of thinking about solutions (Ryan et 
al., 2002, p.161). 
4.3.1.2 Types and classifications of case study 
Case studies can be used in a variety of ways and the type of case study adopted 
will be determined according to its purpose. They can be: descriptive, illustrative, 
experimental, exploratory, and explanatory case studies. Positive researchers 
view the world as objective and external to themselves and they are concerned 
with developing general theories (Ryan et al., 2002, Scapens, 2004). Thus, they 
regard case studies as largely exploratory and used to generate ideas and 
hypotheses for later testing in large-scale statistical studies (Ryan et al., 2002, 
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Scapens, 2004). However, on the other hand, interpretive researchers view the 
world as socially constructed and subjective (Scapens, 2004). Here we see the 
importance of explanatory case studies in explaining the “holistic quality of 
observed social systems and the practices of human actors” (Ryan et al., 2002, 
p.147). It is important to be aware that exploratory case studies may be used in 
the early stages of interpretive research to identify the issues to be explored 
(Ryan et al., 2002) and the aforementioned mirrors what happened in this 
research. Initially, the researcher carried out four exploratory interviews at 
Gladiator to discern the matters of concern. It was during these initial interviews 
that the researcher became aware of the dynamics of reforms in Gladiator’s 
delivery of public services and management controls. Moreover, for that reason 
an explanatory case study was adopted because they: 
attempt to explain the reasons for accounting practices. The focus of 
the research is on the specific case. Theory is used in order to 
understand and explain the specific, rather than to produce 
generalisation. If available theories do not provide convincing 
explanations, it may be necessary to modify them (Scapens, 1990, 
p.265).  
As outlined earlier, the ontological assumption which underpins this research is 
social constructionism and the epistemological is interpretivist and processual. 
These assumptions help the researcher understand how the delivery of public 
services and management controls are conditioned by the socio-political system, 
and how “it provides a set of rules which structure certain types of organisational 
behaviour, and how these rules emerge out of the social practices of the 
organisational participants” (Scapens, 1990, p.268).  
The objective of this research is to understand how reforms in the delivery of 
public services and management controls as a process evolves, and how 
different socio-political dynamics, such as a financial crisis, austerity measures, 
institutional entrepreneurship, power, institutions, rules and routines, shape, and 
are shaped, by reforms as a process. Based on the philosophical assumptions 
and research objective, an interpretive/explanatory case study is most 
appropriate for this research. It facilitates the researcher in understanding the 
delivery of public services and management controls as a social practice by 
locating them in their historical, social, economic, and organisational context. The 
empirical observations in Gladiator (See Chapters Five and Six) are explained 
123 
using multiple theories and these theories are then modified based on the 
empirical observations (Ryan et al., 2002). Effectively there is a two-way 
relationship between observation and theory (Ryan et al., 2002; Bryman, 2008). 
Researching a single organisation provides the researcher with an in-depth 
understanding of the process of institutionalisation at a micro level (Dambrin et 
al., 2007, p.174). Thus, a single case study was adopted to achieve depth of 
analysis on reform processes over time in Gladiator, which is in agreement with 
the ontological and epistemological perspectives adopted in this study. It is better 
to “work longer and with greater care, with a few people than more superficially 
with many of them” (McCracken, 1988, p.17).  
4.3.2 Undertaking case study research 
Ryan et al., (2002) and Scapens (2004) suggest four main steps for undertaking 
a case study, namely: (1) preparation; (2) collecting evidence; (3) assessing 
evidence; and, (4) identifying and explaining patterns. Each step is now described 
in relation to the present study. 
Preparation – this is the first step in case study research and it requires the 
research question(s) or objective(s) to be determined. These were presented in 
Chapter One. The research question(s) or objective(s) will then specify the 
research methodology and research methods. It is important that the research 
question/objective is sufficiently focused in order to draw up the research plan. 
The Irish local authority chosen for this research was based on access (Burns et 
al., 2004; Saunders et al., 2009). The researcher having previously worked as a 
financial accountant in a similar Irish local authority had fortunately gathered 
many contacts in the sector. Burns (2004) advises getting access to case study 
companies near where you work or live. This reduces obstacles in gathering 
information. Once access was requested in Gladiator, it was granted. At the 
exploratory stage of this study, the researcher set an objective to examine 
changes in an Irish local authority’s costing systems (knowing they had 
implemented a type of Activity Based Costing system). It is important to be aware 
that the first step of preparation cannot be set in stone as will be seen in step two 
below, researchers may need to revise/refine the initial research objective as the 
research progresses. However, according to Ryan et al., (2002) once the 
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research plan is created it is also important to review theories relevant to the 
case. Scapens (2004, p.265) argues that in order to make research meaningful 
to others, the researcher “should make explicit, and as comprehensive as 
possible, the theory that shapes the case study”. At the beginning of this study, 
the researcher drawing from prior knowledge of Gladiator, considered either 
institutional theory (mix of both NIS and OIE) or structuration theory for her thesis. 
However, it was not until some initial data was gleaned through the interview 
process that the theory most suited could be selected - which transpired to be 
institutional theory. However, the early adoption of institutional theory did not 
mean additional theory could not be introduced as the research progressed. 
Scapens (1990, p.274) argues, “the researcher should be flexible to allow such 
development to take place”, as happened in this thesis. As the research, 
advanced, institutional theories on their own did not suffice to explain the reforms 
in the delivery of public services and management controls at Gladiator. 
Therefore, it was later decided that organisational change concepts and power 
concepts were also required. These helped further flesh out the process of 
change at Gladiator. 
Collecting evidence – consideration of the research questions and a review of 
theory will indicate, but not drive, the types of evidence that should be looked for 
in the case study. The researcher should always be alert to any evidence that 
seems important in explaining the case. The formal sources of evidence include 
artefacts, interviews, observations and questionnaires. Additionally, “informal 
evidence such as casual comments, body language or speech tone often provide 
valuable clues for further lines of questioning” (Quinn, 2010, p.128). Interviews, 
documentation (both internal and external), e-mails, telephone conversations, 
informal coffees, casual comments, speech tone and body language were all 
gathered in this thesis (see Section 4.3.3 for further details). Such evidence 
facilitates a processual approach to management control and service-delivery 
reform as according to Langley et al., (2013, p.6) “longitudinal data are necessary 
to observe how processes unfold over time........mixed methods combining 
interviews, archival data, and observations […..] correspond well to a perspective 
emphasizing process questions and an ontology where processes rather than 
things are the main focus of attention”. During this study’s initial exploratory 
interviews it transpired that Gladiator was going through a strategic service-
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delivery restructuring process and was in a period of revolutionary change (Burns, 
2000). Upon reflection, the researcher refined her initial research objective in step 
one to reflect this new exciting research opportunity in public service-delivery and 
management control reform processes. From this researcher’s experience, there 
can be a recursive relationship between steps one and two of carrying out case 
study research. 
Assessing evidence – qualitative empirical research is concerned with procedural 
reliability, contextual validity and transferability of evidence (Saunders et al., 
2009). Procedural reliability requires a good research design where the research 
questions are clearly addressed, a comprehensive research plan must exist and 
all field notes must be correctly documented and analysed. Contextual validity, 
which indicates the credibility of the case study evidence, can entail three 
different elements: the validity of each piece of evidence, the validity of particular 
sources, and the researcher’s assessment of the validity of their own 
interpretations of the evidence. Contextual validity refers to triangulation of the 
evidence. This means collecting and validating each piece of evidence from more 
than one source on the same issue (Ryan et al., 2002). According to Lincoln and 
Guba (1985, pp.110-128), “the only generalisation is: there is no generalisation”. 
Instead, according to Scapens (2004, p.269), Lincoln and Guba (1985) talk about 
the transferability of the findings from one context to another and ‘fittingness’ as 
to the degree of comparability of different contexts.  
The final step identifying and explaining patterns is where diagrams and charts 
are prepared to help link the salient themes and issues identified from the 
evidence. Patterns can be identified manually or using analysis software, which 
in turn, can form the basis for explanations of the issues and are potentially a 
basis to add to theory development in the future. Once the aforementioned four 
steps are completed, the findings must be reported. In order for the report to be 
convincing, it must first be authentic (researchers’ interpretations are grounded 
in the case). Second, it must be plausible (text makes sense to the reader and 
the author displays a high level of knowledge). According to Baxter and Chua 
(2008, p.106), plausibility concerns “what is it about the way in which the 
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researcher writes that makes his/her field research sensible and believable”. 
Third, it should be critical23 (the case may raise new ideas and/or add to theory). 
Case studies allow researchers to focus on issues that are “intriguing, puzzling, 
contradictory, etc” (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996, p.101). In this case study the 
researcher was intrigued by the dynamics of reforms in the delivery of public 
services and management controls which occurred in Gladiator particularly 
during a period of austerity – in particular curious as to why and how these 
changes came about. 
4.3.3 Actual methods employed 
The four steps of case study research proposed by Ryan et al., (2002) and 
Scapens (2004), described above, were followed in this thesis. In advance of 
collecting evidence, a case study selection process was required. Yin (2009, 
p.91) describes how a case can be selected, as follows: (1) it may be known from 
the outset of the research as it is unique; (2) contacts are used or access is readily 
available; or, (3) a screening procedure is adopted to select the case best suited. 
As already explained above, the researcher was previously employed in a similar 
Irish local authority organisation; thus, past contacts were availed of to gain 
access.  
The case organisation is an Irish local authority. A visitor role was adopted (Ryan, 
et al., 2002; Scapens, 2004), and given the nature of the research objectives 
presented in Chapter One, the study is primarily concerned with understanding 
the dynamics of environmental jolts, structures (institutions, rules and routines), 
and institutional entrepreneurship (agency) in the reform process of the case. 
Multiple sources of evidence such as interviews, field observations, company 
documentation including specific financial and non-financial reports and media 
articles were all utilised during the data collection phase. However, the primary 
vehicle of data collection was interviews.  
                                            
23 The criticality of the text relates to the possibilities it provokes (Ryan et al., 2002, p.158). 
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4.3.3.1 Rationale for the interview method 
An interview has been defined as a “conversation with a purpose” (Webb and 
Webb cited in Burgess, 1982, p.107). Patton (1980, p.196) explains this further: 
We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot 
directly observe… We cannot observe feelings, thoughts and 
intentions. We cannot observe behaviours that took place at some 
previous point in time. We cannot observe situations that preclude the 
presence of an observer. We cannot observe how people have 
organised the world and the meanings they attach to what goes on in 
the world – we have to ask people questions about those things. The 
purpose of interviewing then is to allow us to enter into other persons’ 
perspective. 
The objective of this study was to ask interviewees about “facts of matter as well 
as their opinions about events” (…) and “even ask the interviewee to propose her 
or his insights into certain occurrences” (Yin, 2009, p. 107), so that an overall 
picture of the organisation’s activities could be formed from the interviews. This 
technique, for the researcher, is “a source for understanding how individuals 
make sense of their social world and act within it” (May, 1997, p.129). 
Interviews can be either structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Saunders et 
al., 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2015). In this study, a series of semi-structured 
interviews were conducted to gain in-depth insights with respect to the research 
objective and questions (see Chapter One). Interviews were deemed an 
appropriate research technique as they are in line with the study’s research 
design, which seeks to provide an understanding of the social processes of 
organisational and management control change. Lee (1999, p.62) characterises 
semi-structured interviews as “having an overarching topic, general themes, 
targeted issues, and specific questions, with a predetermined sequence for their 
occurrence” and “the interviewer is free to pursue matters as circumstances 
dictate”. Thus, according to Patton (1990, p.278), semi-structured interviews 
“allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective” or as Covaleski et al., 
(2013, p.341), describe it as allowing “interviewees to express themselves 
according to their own interpretive schemes using their own vocabularies”. 
Easterby-Smith et al., (2008, p.144) citing King (2004) state that “the main aim of 
qualitative interviewing is generally seen as attempting to gain an understanding 
from the respondent’s perspective which includes not only what their viewpoint is 
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but also why they have this particular viewpoint”. The literature on qualitative 
interviewing supports the interview technique adopted in this study as the 
researcher strives to discover the meanings that interviewees attach to the 
delivery of public services and management control changes and to their 
perceptions of the driving factors of these reforms. 
Initially, a general interview guide approach was adopted to cover all relevant 
topics in a systematic manner and to provide direction for questioning during the 
interview. However, this approach was combined with ‘creative interviewing’24, 
which allowed flexibility to respond to situational dynamics rather than following 
the predefined interview guide (Mason and Dale, 2011, p.36). All interviewees 
were encouraged to speak freely and openly “about what they felt was most 
affecting them and their job” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.120). The researcher, from the 
outset, clearly explained the purpose of the interviews and stressed 
confidentiality. Additional questions were asked when new issues materialised or 
when initial interviewee responses needed further exploration by the researcher 
while previous questions were removed from the interview schedule when they 
were considered not relevant. All interviews were pre-arranged via e-mail and 
telephone and all interviewees were given a brief summary of potential questions 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). As the researcher had previous public service 
organisation experience, the interviewees’ tended to be quite open and honest. 
They were encouraged to recount anecdotes and their own opinions about the 
organisational reforms in Gladiator. Furthermore, the researcher was at an 
advantage due to her background experience, which provided an in-depth 
understanding and grasp of many of the contextual issues at play in the 
organisation. This prior knowledge reduced what Dawson (2003, p.101) terms 
the “going in at the deep-end” effect, whereby background knowledge of a case 
must be acquired to improve understanding. This prior knowledge also enhanced 
“the researcher’s ability to understand the body of tacit25 knowledge” held by the 
                                            
24 A term coined by Jack Douglas (1985). 
25 Tacit knowledge “refers to the ability to use knowledge acquired from experience in carrying 
out tasks and activities in the pursuit of particular objectives […] and individuals are often unable 
to explain the theoretical basis for their action” (Dawson, 2003, p.100). 
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interviewees “at the case site, whereby, for example, individuals cannot provide 
a basis for their daily actions” (Quinn, 2010, p.134). 
As explained earlier, the initial interviews with the CFO and senior accountants in 
Gladiator were exploratory in nature. These interviews were informed by a 
general research objective, which, at that time, was to explore the changes in a 
cost system in an Irish local authority. This research objective was arrived at by 
spotting ‘various ‘gaps’ in the literature’ (Sandberg and Alvesson, 2011). The 
interview questions (see Appendix A) were mainly open-ended to allow the 
researcher to discover issues worthy of further research. The initial interview 
guide covered organisation background, cost system changes, and the 
involvement of finance. These initial four interviews proved to be critical for this 
research. Upon completion of these four interviews, it became evident that 
Gladiator was in a state of reform in its delivery of public services and 
management controls. After further literature reading on public service reforms, 
the initial research objective was revised to understand the dynamics of reforms 
in the delivery of public services and management controls in an Irish local 
authority, which was subject to the arrival of a new CEO and austerity measures. 
The researcher then returned to the case study with a revised interview guide. 
First, questions on detailed descriptions of the organisation’s background; 
interviewee’s role, responsibilities and background were investigated. Second, 
detailed accounts of the service-delivery reform processes were examined. Third, 
detailed accounts of the management control reforms (i.e. new budget control 
rules and capital budgeting techniques and BSC); the role of budgeting in 
controlling staff behaviours; the role of central actors in introducing reforms in the 
delivery of public services and management controls were all investigated (see 
Appendix B).  
By using open-ended questions during these interviews, interviewees were 
allowed to expand beyond the “facts of a matter” (Yin, 2009, p.107) and give 
opinions about events. This allowed areas of interest to be explored in greater 
detail than would normally be possible (Adam and Healy, 2000). This set of 
interviews was refocused on reforms in the delivery of public services and 
management controls in a staid and constrained Irish local authority. They 
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gathered depth about the dynamics of the reform processes in Gladiator. The 
interviews sought the interviewees’ perspectives on the structural service-
delivery processes and the management control reform processes in Gladiator 
while also seeking to understand what factors, circumstances and conditions 
influenced those viewpoints. The interview guides acknowledged the importance 
of the centrality of time in their interview questions. The interview scripts were 
slightly modified depending on the interviewee’s role within Gladiator.  
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, the researcher carried out “informal 
conversation interviews” (Marshall and Rossman, 1995, p. 80). These 
conversations were highly informal and occurred over coffee breaks and lunch. 
There were no predetermined questions and at times no questions at all. These 
informal conversations added further insight to the researcher’s understanding of 
the service-delivery and management control changes at Gladiator. Phone 
conversations and e-mails were also used to clarify interview data gathered and 
to help direct the fieldwork. These additional data gathering methods often 
enhanced the researcher’s knowledge, especially when the informal 
conversations evolved into other topics beyond the original intention of the 
conversation. 
4.3.3.2 Conducting the interview process  
Face-to-face and, mostly individual, interviews were conducted with each 
interviewee located at their own office. A list of interview dates and interviewees 
job role positions are presented in Table 4.4. A total of 20 interviews were 
undertaken, each lasting between one and two hours. The interviewees selected 
tended to snowball from previous interviewee’s comments and suggestions. The 
interviews ranged from the CEO, CFO, directors, middle managers and lower 
level staff. This allowed the researcher to reach a broad spectrum of viewpoints 
within the organisation. Interviewing accountants, non-accountants, senior 
managers and lower level staff enabled the researcher to determine the extent to 
which austerity measures, a new CEO and management accounting and control 
information played in Gladiator’s reform process.  
 
131 
Table 4.4 Table of interviews 
Interview 
    No. 
Date Position Duration 
1 11/01/2011 A Senior Accountant (1) 1 hour 
2 11/01/2011 A Senior Accountant (2) 50 minutes 
3 14/01/2011 A Senior Accountant (3) 1 hour 
4 14/01/2011 Chief Financial Officer 1 hour 10 minutes 
5 30/06/2011 Chief Financial Officer 1 hour 
6 29/07/2011 A Senior Accountant (3) 1 hour 
7 19/08/2011 A Senior Executive Officer (1) 2 hours 30 minutes 
8 25/11/2011 A Director of Service (1) 2 hours 
9 8/12/2011 A Director of Service (2) 1 hour 
10 8/12/2011 A Director of Service (3) 1 hour 
11 3/02/2012 A Senior Executive Officer (2) 1 hour 30 minutes 
12 24/02/2012 A Senior Executive Officer (2) 2 hours 
13 24/02/2012 Administrative Officer 1 hour 
14 23/03/2012 A Senior Executive Officer (3) 1 hour 
15 23/03/2012 A Senior Executive  Officer (4) 1 hour 
16 18/07/2013 A Senior Staff Officer (1) 1 hour 15 minutes 
17 18/07/2013 A Senior Staff Officer (2) 1 hour 
18 19/07/2013 A Senior Accountant (3) 1 hour 
19 22/07/2013 A Senior Staff Officer (3) 1 hour 
20 27/08/2013 Chief Executive Officer 1 hour 15 minutes 
Please note for confidentiality reasons the researcher cannot specify the location or 
service of each of the interviewees. 
 
No staff level or qualification was prioritised over the other. Additional notes were 
taken during the interview, recording body language and reaction to certain 
questions.  
Patton (2002, p.383) outlines how: 
The period after an interview or observation is critical to the rigour and 
validity of the qualitative findings. This is a time for guaranteeing the 
quality of the data. 
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After each interview, the researcher took time to reflect and record any 
observations made and any emerging thoughts triggered from the interview. 
These reflective periods also helped the researcher prepare for the next 
interview.  
4.3.3.3 Merits and limitations of the interview process 
“The purpose of interviewing is to understand the perspectives and experiences 
of the people being interviewed” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.122). Interviews are more 
appropriate for studying complex situations, they are useful for collecting in-depth 
information, questions can be explained, information can be supplemented and 
interviews have a wider application (Kumar, 2005). They offer the opportunity to 
modify a line of enquiry by following up on interesting interviewee responses 
which is not possible with postal and self-administered questionnaires (Robson, 
2002). This displays the flexibility of the interview method. Qualitative enquiry 
such as the interview method can “take us into the mental world of the individual, 
to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world” 
(McCracken, 1988, p.9).  
However, there are also limitations of the interview method. According to Kumar 
(2005, p.132), “interviewing is time consuming and expensive, the quality of data 
depends upon the quality of the interviewer, the quality of data may vary when 
many interviewers are used and the interviewer may introduce his/her bias”. 
Interviewing requires “careful preparation – making arrangements to visit, 
securing necessary permissions – which takes time; confirming arrangements, 
rescheduling appointments to cover absences” (Robson, 2002, p.273). Time 
budgeting and planning are crucial for designing interview guides, conducting 
interviews and analysing the data. The researcher was mindful of the limitations 
in planning and executing the interview process.  
As the interview process can also be subject to poor recall, bias and poor or 
inaccurate articulation (Yin, 2009), all interviews were digitally recorded. This 
overcame the poor recall problem and allowed the researcher the opportunity to 
use direct quotes from the interviewees while also facilitating a focus on the 
interview responses rather than rapid note taking. All interviewees in this study 
were assured beforehand that all information provided was confidential and that 
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recording enhanced the research process as there was less need for writing 
quotes etc. All interviewees agreed to be recorded. The researcher made brief 
notes during and after each interview for example off-the-record comments, body 
language.  
Findings were verified by asking similar questions to different interviewees, “as 
well as through verbal feedback on any interpretations to date during subsequent 
visits to, and across, particular subjects” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.732).  
Despite some claiming that recording devices can intimidate interviewees (King, 
1994) and result in concentration lapses in the interviewer (Brownell, 1995) it was 
decided the advantages of recording the interviews outweighed the 
disadvantages. The researcher transcribed the first four recordings herself. The 
transcripts were made during the days following the interviews. The remaining 
interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber. The researcher then 
listened to the recordings and checked them with the transcriptions, to ensure 
reliability of the work done by the transcriber and to understand pauses and 
unspoken words (Yazdifar, 2013).  
The interviews were also supplemented by company documentation. Access to 
external documents and newspaper clippings as well as internal documents such 
as minutes of meetings, presentations and new management tools adopted 
(BSC) were forthcoming. These documents provided some degree of 
triangulation of information gleaned from the interviews, and in some cases 
provided greater detail. 
Finally, all of the gathered information “formed a database to answer questions 
like: What did people say? What did they feel? What did they think? What were 
the main themes, issues, problems, and questions that I perceived during the 
interview? Which questions did the contact focus most centrally on?” (Yazdifar, 
2013, p.125). 
4.4 Analysis of data 
The researcher reflected upon using either ‘manual’ methods or technology-
supported techniques for analysing her interview data. Access to QSR NVivo9 
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software package was forthcoming and it was evaluated in 2011. There are 
potential advantages of NVivo9, especially in its ability to manage large volumes 
of data. Nevertheless, the researcher realised that the tool did “not ensure that 
the important themes or patterns are identified” (Moll et al., 2006, p. 391). It was 
thus concluded that NVivo9 would provide little additional benefits over a manual 
coding system to analyse the empirics. 
To analyse research data three main processes can be carried: summarising 
(condensation) of meanings; categorisation (grouping) of meanings and 
structuring (ordering) of meanings using narrative (Saunders et al., 2009, p.490). 
The first two processes were combined in this thesis and further enhanced by the 
researcher’s diary, summaries and self-memos, which all together helped to: 
1. Comprehend the data; 
2. Integrate related data drawn from different transcripts and notes; 
3. Identify key themes or patterns from them to further exploration; 
4. Develop and/or test theories based on these apparent patterns or 
relationships; 
5. Draw and verify conclusions (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Saunders et al., 
2009, p.491). 
Summarising involved condensing the large body of interview data (and internal 
documentation) into fewer words. This helped illuminate the principal themes and 
the relationships between them in Gladiator. It also aided referencing in the case 
study write up. 
Categorising data involved developing categories and then subsequently 
attaching relevant chunks of Gladiator’s interview data and internal 
documentation to those categories (Saunders et al., 2009). The categories 
developed in this thesis were driven by the research objective and research 
questions. They provided a “well-structured, analytical framework” to facilitate 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2009, p.493) and subsequently write up a cogent case 
study of public service-delivery and management control reform. As already 
explained, the researcher carried out four initial exploratory interviews and out of 
these came the researchers redefined research objective – as set out in Chapter 
One. Subsequently, the next six interviews focused on service-delivery and 
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management control reform in four of Gladiator’s main services (waste, housing, 
water and roads). These interviews were held at management level between 
June 2011 and December 2011. Data analysis started by firstly summarising 
each interview, reading, and re-reading the interview transcripts in combination 
with the field notes of the interviews (i.e. comprehending the data). It was an 
iterative process (Eisenhardt, 1989), going back and forth between the empirical 
data gathered and the initial theoretical perspectives (i.e. NIS and Burns and 
Scapens, 2000). This subsequently caused the decision to focus solely on one 
service, Housing. The housing service was chosen because it was the first 
service, after waste, which had implemented its new structure. Water services 
was in the process of being taken over by Irish Water26 and roads services were 
only starting their reform when this research was concluding. Five key issues 
were identified which were consequential for the next stage of this study (i.e. 
identifying key themes): 
1. A worldwide financial crisis and central government austerity policies. 
2. A new CEO of Gladiator. What activities did he carry out? 
3. Budget practice reforms. 
4. A new housing structure had been implemented. Why? How? 
5. For the first time a BSC had been introduced by the housing director. 
Why? How? 
The key themes led to the adoption of further theoretical perspectives (i.e. 
Battilana et al., (2009), Seo and Creed (2002); Laughlin (1991) and Hardy (1996)) 
with which to develop this research (see Chapter Three). Chapter Eight, Figure 
8.1 illustrates an in-depth understanding of the relationships between the themes 
and issues analysed in Chapter Seven.  
Finally, the analysis drew and verified a conclusion. At this stage, the researcher 
had triangulated between interviews, documentary evidence and between 
interviews with different managers. If any issue was unclear to the researcher, 
                                            
26 An Irish water utility company set up in 2013 responsible for providing and delivering water services 
throughout Ireland. https://www.water.ie/about-us/our-company/  
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she sought further clarification from the interviewees by either e-mail or 
telephone, thus enhancing the plausibility of conclusions drawn. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The researcher views life as being socially constructed and is interested in 
understanding why and how processes develop and become what they are or are 
not over time. Therefore, originating from this point of view, interpretivism and 
processual perspectives provide the best standpoint for this research. Scapens 
(1990, p.268) claims “to study management accounting as social practice, it is 
necessary to look at the relationship between day-to-day social action and the 
dimensions of social structure. This will involve looking at both time and space, 
i.e. setting them in their wider social context and examining how they have 
evolved over time”. This study will touch upon the relationship between structures 
(rules, routines, institutions) and action (role of central individuals, routines) as 
well as the history of service-delivery and management control practices (i.e. 
budgets and BSC) in an Irish local authority, particularly in the context of a period 
of austerity. Thus, being based in “contextually grounded social interaction rather 
than in conversational analysis” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.129). 
The chapter also explained why a single case study approach was selected and 
how it was appropriate for the theoretical frameworks embraced in this study. It 
discussed the research methods applied and how the interview technique to data 
gathering was conducted. It argued that data triangulation was applied which 
strengthened the results of the research which are now presented in the following 
three chapters (Chapters Five, Six and Seven). 
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CHAPTER  FIVE - CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the case study which aim to address the 
research questions as set out in Chapter One, Section 1.4. The research 
questions help to unpack the dynamic and complex processes of Gladiator’s 
reforms during a period of austerity. 
As this research’s ontological assumption is social constructivist, Section 5.2 
presents important and useful information on background and context to the case 
organisation. The importance of context in shaping why and how the delivery of 
public services and management controls as processes unfold over time, has 
already been referred to in various studies (for example, in Chapter Two (Burns, 
2000; Dawson, 2003; Yazdifar, 2013), Chapter Three (Laughlin, 1991; Burns and 
Scapens, 2000; Battilana et al, 2009), and Chapter Four (Pettigrew, 1990; 
Dawson, 2012; Langley et al., 2013).  
Section 5.3 discusses the dynamic jolts catalysing reforms in Gladiator, 
highlighting how the internal (i.e. new CEO) and external (i.e. financial crisis and 
austerity pressures) factors were interwoven and overlapping. Furthermore, it 
illuminates the internal strategic tactics of a new powerful CEO, as well as, how 
the why reasons were enmeshed with the how processes to further progress 
Gladiator’s service-delivery and management control reforms. In Section 5.4 the 
dynamics of implementing new service deliveries and management controls is 
presented. It reveals how the McCarthy Report, Local Government Efficiency 
Review Group (LGERG), Croke Park Agreement (all external to Gladiator) and a 
sense of urgency, understanding existing mind-sets and communication (all 
internal to Gladiator) were all drawn upon to drive the reform process. Section 5.5 
focuses on Gladiator’s financial management control practice, i.e. budgets. This 
section reveals how budgets were prepared but had little impact. It illuminates 
how Gladiator reverted back to enforcing existing budget rules as well as 
enforcing new rules, for example, capital budgets rules. Section 5.8 concludes 
the case study findings. 
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5.2 Gladiator’s background pre-2008 
Some background pre-2008 (i.e. pre-financial crisis) for Gladiator is now given. 
The organisational details were obtained from internal documents, financial 
budgets and corporate plans of Gladiator. Additionally, it draws on the interviews 
conducted with staff from various departments across the organisation, such as 
CEO, CFO, senior accountants, senior and middle management and non-
management staff. 
The local government services delivered by Gladiator cover eight main funding 
divisions as depicted in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1 Local government services 
Pre-2008, Gladiator, due to its size was managed (geographically) as three 
independent units – A, B and C (see Figure 5.1), comprising thirteen directorships 
(for example, Director of Services Unit A, Director of Services Unit B, Director of 
Services Unit C, Head of ICT and Head of Finance27). Each unit (A, B, C) had 
                                            
27 To retain Gladiator’s anonymity the size of the local authority and its full 13 directorships are 
not listed. 
Division Group  Description 
A Housing Directorate 
B  Road Transport and Safety 
C Water Supply and Sewerage 
D Development Management 
E Environmental Services 
F Recreation and Amenity 
G Agriculture, Education, Health and Welfare 
H Miscellaneous Services 
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their own director of services, operating independently of each other and each 
was responsible for the delivery of the following within their unit - water, roads, 
housing, waste management, and limited local responsibilities for planning, 
environment and finance. Each unit’s director of services was typically supported 
by senior executive officer(s), senior engineer(s) and analogous grades with 
direct reporting relationships to the director of services. Gladiator’s employees 
had multi-functional staff roles, that is, they could be working in their unit (A, B or 
C) across a variety of services; for example, an employee could be working 
across water, housing, roads and waste management services as part of their 
individual job role.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Gladiator’s organisational structure pre-2008. 
Gladiator has a board of councillors (i.e. elected representatives), who are 
elected every five years according to their unit (A, B or C). The councillors have 
a democratic and statutory mandate to represent the interests of the citizens who 
voted them in. The primary purpose of councillors is to develop and implement 
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policy for the range of local authority services delivered. The full board of 
councillors meet twice a month to discuss local authority business and they are 
split further into three independent committee groups according to their unit (A, 
B, C) each of whom meets once a month to discuss matters about their own 
constituencies. The next section describes Gladiators specific context pre-2008. 
5.2.1 Gladiator’s context pre-2008 
Prior to the 2008 worldwide financial crisis, Gladiator operated within a context 
that was known in Ireland as the Celtic Tiger28 growth period (1995-2007) (Mac 
An Bhaird, 2010). The Irish central government exerted pressure on Gladiator to 
build new housing developments and, because Gladiator was dependent on 
central government for its financing, it had no option but to follow their 
instructions. This coercive pressure exerted on Gladiator from central 
government (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.150) aligns closely with Hardy’s 
(1996) idea of “power over resources”. Senior Executive Officer (3) stated how:  
In the boom times, the government pushed out massive allocations, 
gave us massive allocations and told us to build, build, build. And we 
built, built, built. There were mixed developments comprising private 
housing, affordable housing and social housing. 
There was no shortage of funding during this time, and meeting the demands of 
councillors and customers was top priority, as the CFO recounted: 
Demands took over from expenditure. We had huge demands placed 
on us to provide services because of the growth in the housing market 
and in development in general. This development needed water 
schemes, sewerage and roads; and the political pressures from 
‘screaming’ councillors to deliver these, across the whole city/county, 
was huge. We responded, and tended to overspend. But we had 
enough money at the time and this kind of behaviour was generally 
acceptable. 
As mentioned, the CEO’s priority was the demand of councillors and customers 
and there was little top-down pressure from either Gladiator’s senior managers, 
or indeed central government, to strictly manage costs.  
                                            
28Celtic Tiger refers to a period in Irish history where housing development and money was 
plentiful. 
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The ‘screaming’ councillors, and the general political pressure to 
deliver services across the whole city/county was huge; and we would 
always respond to those pressures as quickly as possible (CFO). 
This situation resonates with Hardy (1996, p.S7), who argued that the ideas of 
power can be mobilised “from behind the scenes”, where outcomes are 
determined by powerful agents “through the use of procedures and political 
routines”. Thus, there was seemingly a pattern in Gladiator whereby its service 
management ethos was less about seeking (cost) efficiency, and more about 
responding to councillor and customer demands. Moreover, this emphasis on 
prompt service-delivery had over time influenced some managers towards an 
undercurrent belief that financial control matters were not the business priority, 
but a secondary concern, highlighted by Director of Service (2): 
A common way of thinking amongst staff at Gladiator was one of 
‘money didn’t matter’. There was a huge comfort zone in Gladiator, 
pre-2008. The organisation was awash with staff numbers, and we 
could do anything because we had the money to do so. 
This suggests that service logics were more compelling in Gladiator pre-2008 
than financial (or economic) logics. NPM is centered on profit so this is a clear 
example of tension “between the indigenous culture” of Gladiator “and that of 
NPM” (Sharma, Lawrence and Fowler, 2012, p.333). Furthermore, such service-
delivery practices were generally perceived as legitimate, as they complimented 
societal demand for prompt execution. General society required upgraded water 
and sewerage infrastructure, in addition to the construction of more roads and 
housing. Moreover, Irish society was not too concerned about the related costs, 
but rather its demands for services. Thus, illuminating how the “expectations and 
values both inside and outside the organisations and rules in society” need to be 
considered in any service-delivery and management control reform decisions (ter 
Bogt, 2008(b), p.214).   
Also, in spite of value for money, accountability and performance management 
being highlighted in Gladiator’s corporate documents (pre-2008), such features 
(which are common to NPM principles (Hyndman and Lapsley, 2016)) did not 
appear to impact staff belief systems which prioritised service-delivery at any 
cost:  
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Service-delivery is all about the money but that is not a local authority 
ethos, because in the economic boom years this local authority was a 
cash rich organisation (Director of Service (2)).  
Moreover, staff not only believed that their primary goal was to meet customers’ 
demands, but also as quickly as possible, and at any cost. The CFO, for instance, 
explained how: 
During the good times, there were different pressures. The pressures 
then were not on restructuring or for reducing costs. The main 
pressure then was ‘how do I get a new sewerage treatment plant in a 
small village where someone wants to open 15 houses in 2 months’. 
And you had that sort of thing everywhere around the city/county. So 
we lost control of expenditure: demand took over from expenditure and 
service-delivery at any cost and as quickly as possible became the 
mind-set. 
Additionally, there was also a mind-set that working for the public sector equates 
to a guaranteed job for life. Pandey (2010, p.567) state, “the social contract in 
public organizations emphasizes job security…”, and, as explained by Director of 
Service (2): 
There is this entitlement mentality in the organisation, the mentality 
and belief, that staff are entitled to a job for life. 
Drawing from institutional theory, we might think of the pre-2008 service-delivery 
activities at any cost approach as constituting unquestioned and rather taken-for-
granted assumptions in Gladiator. As Burns and Scapens (2000, p.8) eloquently 
put it, “members of the group simply take-for-granted that ‘this is the way things 
are’”. However, one of the consequences of this taken-for-granted assumption in 
Gladiator was that financial budgets were never really enforced and since 
councillor and customer demands were being met in a timely manner, it was 
difficult to see how such assumptions underlying service-delivery and 
management control would ever be altered purposefully. 
In summary, the context of Gladiator prior to the 2008 financial crisis depicted 
minimal controls over service deliveries and finance and a widespread belief of a 
job-for-life and service deliveries at any cost and as quickly as possible. However, 
the following sections describe how embedded beliefs such as costs don’t matter 
were jolted by both internal organisational and external environmental influences 
(see also Laughlin, 1991; Battilana et al., 2009; Contrafatto and Burns, 2013).  
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5.3 Internal and external jolts catalysing reforms in Gladiator  
Figure 5.2 below provides an overarching view (from February 2007 to November 
2011) of internal and external pressures on Gladiator. They were all part of an 
ongoing and complex process, connected rather than autonomous. By reviewing 
these jolts, it reveals why and how the delivery of public services and 
management controls began to change at Gladiator, and thus, addressing the 
research questions outlined in Chapter One, Section 1.4. And, very interestingly, 
illuminating how the ‘why’ reasons were enmeshed with the ‘how’ processes 
which further enabled rather than constrained Gladiator’s service-delivery and 
management control reforms.  
Figure 5.2 Overarching view of the external and internal jolts on Gladiator 
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5.3.1 Internal jolt pre-crisis 
In early 2007, Gladiator appointed a new CEO as the previous CEO’s term had 
ended. The new CEO explained, how, when he first arrived at Gladiator: 
There was an enormous amount of development going on. We were 
at full tilt trying to keep up with this development, and getting ahead of 
our planning was a challenge at that time. The biggest concern I had 
was getting money spent and getting investment in the ground. 
This was reflective of the economic climate in Ireland at the time - money was 
plentiful and the construction sector was booming. Nevertheless, despite this 
thriving external economic environment, the new CEO would become an 
instrumental figure for instigating and instilling service-delivery and management 
control reforms at Gladiator as he brought what Battilana (2006, p.667) describes 
as a “fresh perspective” to his job. He had the power and determination to 
mobilise change and amongst other things, attributed this to resource power from 
his position of authority, and the realisation of staff that, following the financial 
crisis (post-2008), the existing service-delivery and management practices were 
no longer viable:  
I was relatively new, which makes it easier to change direction, I think. 
Being new in the door also helped, because I see things differently. 
Next, everybody realised that things had changed after September 
2008, so I didn’t have to really convince people. It was self-evident 
from all the messages that things had suddenly changed, and people 
were in a more receptive mood. Also, on the ground, there was a lot 
of fuzziness and racing along. And, a cohort of people realised that 
this can’t go on. So I wasn’t really coming in and changing what people 
were necessarily happy with, and comfortable with, or going to defend. 
They realised that something had to change. They might not agree 
with how it went, but I was there to convince them what they had at 
the moment wouldn’t continue (CEO). 
Thus, the CEO was seemingly perceived by many as a change agent who 
“possessed the authority, conviction and persuasion to impose the changes” 
(Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.739): 
The CEO has a finance background and is big into analysing the 
numbers. And, he is looking for a lot more stuff than the previous CEO 
might have done (Senior Staff Officer (1)). 
The new CEO arrived at Gladiator with substantial experience having worked in 
the local authorities sector, at several such organisations across Ireland. Such 
experience underpinned his ability to relate to Gladiator’s staff and shape a vision 
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that they were “inclined to endorse” (Battilana et al., 2009, p.80). Senior Executive 
Officer (1) remarked:  
The CEO has worked in a number of other local authorities across 
Ireland, and anyone with that experience has seen certain things work 
well, and other things that don’t make sense.  
The CEO explained how, particularly through his re-handling of the budget 
processes, he immediately began to see opportunities for change, and eventually 
put alternative procedures in place: 
When I first arrived, I couldn’t get my head around the budget. I had to 
rely on what the finance department was telling me. The way the whole 
budget process moved along I found it risky. I was used to situations 
where I get some sense of the figures, and can then ‘see’ how it is all 
going to pan out. But here, I couldn’t believe it, each of the units (A, B, 
C) all operated differently. I couldn’t stand over it.  
He also explained how he would increasingly question certain metrics: 
I found it very hard to grasp the organisation as a whole. I struggled to 
understand the budget presented to me during my first year of tenure. 
And, when I asked questions about the figures in the budget, I got 
three different answers from each of the three units (A, B, C). For 
example, with questions like ‘what is our overall spend on roads?’ or 
‘what are the total number of water treatment plants in existence?’. It 
appeared that the three units were following different service-delivery 
practices. And, I was uncertain of the accuracy of information being 
presented to me. 
Also, there was no complete and timely management information about the 
performance of the organisation as a whole due to its unit organisational 
structure: 
When the CEO asked for example how many staff were involved in 
road services, the individual units could not give a definitive answer, 
because it might be 40% of one person’s time and 30% of another 
person’s time but also not exclusively related to roads. So, the 
question becomes how can we manage this and how do we ensure 
efficiency and performance, when someone is pulled and dragged 
across a broad range of services. We did not know what the various 
services were actually costing us, and the CEO came here and said “if 
we can’t measure it, how can we manage it” (Senior Executive Officer 
(1)). 
“Most managers are not satisfied with the information made available to them for 
performance management or decision-making” (Simons, 2011 cited in Jack, 
2013, p.156) and a perceived uneasiness towards the accuracy of managerial 
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information at Gladiator convinced the CEO of a need for reform. Accordingly, 
one of the first things he did was request details on how the local authority was 
resourced, and how its services were delivered: 
Early on [the CEO] questioned the staffing and other costs needed to 
deliver our services – for example, in housing, water, roads and waste. 
What were the processes involved, and how efficient are we in terms 
of current operations? (Senior Executive Officer (1)).  
The CEO was co-opting senior management and staff into Gladiator’s policy and 
decision-making. It became apparent to him from this questioning, that there were 
variations in the service-deliveries and management controls across the three 
units (A, B, C). A regional director of services managed each unit and each unit 
delivered services independently from the others. Each unit interpreted the 
service-delivery legislation rules differently and had slightly different ways of 
delivering their services, illustrating different routines being in operation at each 
of the three units. This is consistent with Burns and Scapens (2000, p.12), “in the 
process of enactment and reproduction of the emerging routines, the intended 
rules may become modified..”. An example from the housing service (see Chapter 
Six) illuminates this difference: 
Our architects in A always applied for Part 8 planning when they were 
drawing up plans for extensions to houses for disabled people. After 
reviewing this process and the planning legislation I told them “we 
don’t need to get Part 8, it is not a new house and it is not over 126 sq 
ft which requires it”. But, the architects’ reply was “we have always 
done it”. It transpired that unit C also followed the same routine as unit 
A but unit B did not apply for Part 8 planning. After my questioning, it 
meant that A and C no longer had to routinely apply for planning 
permission so a big chunk of time was saved. I was delighted (Director 
of Service (1)). 
This difference in each unit’s approach to housing-delivery only became known 
when the new CEO and the newly appointed director of housing questioned it. 
The identification of the inconsistency between the planning legislation (rule) and 
architects’ practice (routine) helped shape staff “consciousness and action to 
change the present order” (Seo and Creed, 2002, p.225). Consequently, for 
example, the accepted way of applying for planning permission for extensions to 
disabled persons houses was abandoned when the new director of housing 
instructed architects that this was no longer a requirement.  
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The second phase of the new CEO’s attempt to better understand and hopefully 
improve service-delivery and management controls was asking senior 
management to pinpoint the main problems in service-delivery:  
I asked the directors of services at each unit to tell me what the big 
burning issues were. What were the big strategic issues facing the 
organisation; and what was wrong with Gladiator? I still have the 
feedback there in the cupboard, and it will die with me. Asking a 
director or a manager to say what they think is wrong, and how it can 
be fixed, engages them and stops them complaining.  So I gave them 
a chance to say what they thought. Now, if I had only got one view, I 
would have thought to myself that they all got together to decide a plan 
together. In fairness they didn’t, and I actually got so many different 
views. I realised then that there wasn’t any clarity across the 
management team in respect of what they wanted to do (CEO). 
The CEO explained, “this was a technique I learned from one of my previous 
managers”. He was drawing from his ‘stock of knowledge’ (Giddens, 1984; Burns 
and Scapens 2000). Through his questioning, the CEO was subtly and, gradually 
eroding the existing interpretive schemes at Gladiator (see Laughlin, 1991, 
p.227). Senior management were now conscious of the inefficiencies in their 
service deliveries and management control practices because the CEO had 
brought Gladiator’s problems (contradictions) out into the open.  
Thus, in the initial stages, the CEO involved senior managers and directors in the 
reform of Gladiator’s service-delivery and management control practices. The 
next section investigates further into the individual efforts and actions specifically 
of the CEO to create a vision of a need for change in Gladiator’s delivery of public 
services and management control practices (see Figure 5.3) including his dealing 
with various challenges along the way. 
The Development Directorate (DD) and Efficiency Committee (EC) driven by a 
desire to achieve efficiency improvements in Gladiator’s delivery of public 
services, happened before the financial crisis of September 2008. The Strategic 
Service Review Groups (SSRGs) came about because of the financial crisis and 
the resulting slowdown of economic activity (i.e. declining revenues), in-
conjunction with the Irish central government’s austerity pressures. These 
strategic tactics were ongoing during Gladiator’s reform process and are 
discussed in the following sections. 
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Figure 5.3 CEO’s strategic reform tactics 
The main driver of reform in Gladiator (post September 2008) became budgetary 
stress. ter Bogt (2008(a)) highlighted similar findings where he found budgetary 
deficits in the 1980’s to be the main reasons for management control reforms in 
Dutch local authorities. In Gladiator, both the internal and external change jolts 
were intertwined and supportive of each other. Each of the strategic tactics in 
Figure 5.3 formed part of the why and how, Gladiator, predominantly, through the 
entrepreneurship of the new CEO, reformed its delivery of public services and 
management controls.   
5.3.1.1 Internal strategic tactic (1) - DD 
The CEO established a DD in 2007, the overriding role of which was to: 
Deal with change really; to progress the whole change agenda, and, 
to look at the whole area of performance management (Director of 
Service (1)). 
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In essence, DD was a support department to the other existing units A, B, and C 
in terms of trying to manage their performance and seeking alternative ways to 
improve operational efficiencies:  
DD was set up as a dedicated resource that would work with the other 
directorates in terms of generating ideas and being a fresh pair of eyes 
in terms of how to do things (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
The DD was only a relatively small department, comprising a director and one 
other senior executive officer, whose remit was to seek efficiency improvements. 
This reflects the sentiment of NPM literature, which “often suggests that an 
important explanation for changing the control of government organisations is the 
desire to improve performance, that is, to increase economic efficiency and 
effectiveness” (Sharma et al., 2014, p.192). DD, in particular, was central to the 
processes of reforms in the delivery of services and use of management controls. 
In particular, DD had no specific allegiance to the traditional practices for service-
delivery and had enthusiasm to explore alternative new ways: 
The directors of services (units A, B and C) could be doing things ‘right’ 
but are they doing the ‘right things’? That’s where the benefit of an 
independent department can come in, with no hidden agenda or axe 
to grind. There is value to such a facility and resource in the 
organisation, and that was why the DD was set up (Senior Executive 
Officer (1)).   
Thus, it was “central to the process through which new ways could be carved out” 
(Sharma et al., 2014, p.206). 
The main recommendation of DD was the centralisation of service-delivery (see 
Section 5.4, below for more detail). This was intended to ensure that services 
were delivered according to the same rules rather than by different variations of 
the same rule: 
The units were doing a ‘jack of all trades’ for everyone. They were 
doing everything, but no one really knew what they were doing. The 
DD suggested a centralised function, managed by one director, as a 
solution to this (CFO). 
This new ‘standardisation’ approach mirrors similarities with Alvesson and 
Kärreman’s (2004, p.429) case study, Global, whose “organisational dimension 
of control is characterised by a fine-tuned hierarchy, standardised work 
procedures, output measurements and the HRM system”. It is also one of the 
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doctrinal components of NPM reflecting a corporatized style “with detailed 
service-wide rules, common service provision in key areas of operation, detailed 
central control of pay bargaining and staffing levels” (Hood, 1995, p.97).  
5.3.1.2 Internal strategic tactic (2) - EC 
In February 2008, the CEO went a stage further in his efficiency agenda by 
establishing an EC. Such a committee had already existed, since 2003, with a 
dual responsibility for internal control and efficiency. However, the CEO 
separated the functions and gave responsibility for internal control to the Internal 
Audit Department. This strategic move by the CEO consequently freed up the EC 
to focus solely on efficiency matters, and demonstrates what Burns and Scapens 
(2000, p.18) referred to as intentional change by the CEO, that is, change which 
“occurs by conscious design…..through the actions of a powerful individual…”. 
The EC was a part-time committee that met monthly. Its appointments were over 
a three-year period and the retirement of members was on a rotational basis. 
Having said that, special arrangements applied in relation to the retirement of the 
committee’s inaugural members. The projects officer was a member of the EC 
and acted as secretary. He was the senior executive officer who also sat on the 
DD: 
The projects officer sits on the EC but he is the common link because 
he is also the person who heads up the DD section (Senior Executive 
Officer (1)). 
EC’s primary role was to review, and advise the CEO and senior management of 
the levels of efficiency and effectiveness around the organisation29. Its typical 
tasks included examination of any business process improvement reviews and/or 
review expenditures, for example in relation to phone bills or documentation 
storage. As Senior Executive Officer (1) puts it, EC’s main role was to: 
Identify processes and projects that would be worthy of a review, and 
then to prioritise which projects actually get done. 
The CEO appointed all EC members, twelve in total and its chairperson. 
Members were drawn from senior and middle management staff levels from 
                                            
29 Internal document- title not revealed for confidentiality purposes. 
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across the whole organisation. The CEO filled the EC with members he was 
confident would agree on organisational issues that he believed needed to be 
examined. It was suggested by some that a more random committee 
composition, drawing from the management level would less likely have reached 
agreement on what should be reviewed, as multiple agendas would have got in 
the way: 
From the management’s perspective, if the CEO had put a team of 
directors and seniors into this, he’d never have reached agreement, 
never (Senior Executive Officer (3)).  
Each EC member was required to think about the raised issues from the local 
authority’s perspective, not the perspective of their unit (A, B, C). The committee 
worked closely with the DD, promoting the efficiency agenda throughout the 
whole of the local authority.  
So EC was set up to identify areas across the organisation where 
efficiency reviews would be worthwhile and maybe should be carried 
out while the DD provided the resource of a senior executive officer’s 
time to carry out such efficiency reviews (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
However, the urgency for these efficiency reviews to be completed was made 
ever more critical, in September 2008, when a worldwide financial crisis struck. 
5.3.2 External jolts – worldwide financial crisis and central government 
funding cuts 
In September 2008, Gladiator felt a major jolt in the shape of a worldwide financial 
crisis. Its impact was first borne out in the collapse of the Irish construction 
industry, alongside reduced bank lending and a fall in Irish tax receipts. The Irish 
central government consequently came under pressure to reduce public 
expenditure and public sector staff numbers. This coercive pressure stemming 
from the regulatory expenditure rules pressured central government to slash the 
funding it was giving Irish local authorities by 24% (Department of Finance, 2009). 
Consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983, p.150) comments of “in some 
circumstances, organisational change is a direct response to government 
mandate..” and because Gladiator was/is dependent on Irish central government 
for part of its finance it had to accordingly comply with its expenditure rules.   
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Simultaneously, the financial crisis had a direct knock on effect on Gladiator’s 
own revenue streams, one such example was decreased rates intake due to 
businesses going out of operation. It became very evident to all Gladiator staff 
that the local authority was struggling for cash as was highlighted by its CEO: 
Cost is now a major pressure because the money has dried up. 
The CFO explained: 
Pre-2008 pressure was about responding to the delivery of service. 
You did not have time to say “hang on a second could we deliver this 
better, or cheaper, or even did it matter?”. Efficiency never was our 
priority, which was indicative of the prices being charged. It was also 
indicative of what was happening across the whole country, and the 
way that we had lost the run of ourselves.  
These quotes signal how management financial controls and economic efficiency 
were not being strictly adhered to prior to 2008 and is similar to Sharma et al’s, 
(2014, p.200) case study of a telecommunications organisation where “costs 
mattered little”. Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005, p.732) also illustrated similar 
findings in a UK-based manufacturing pharmaceuticals company revealing, “a 
culture of money didn’t matter”.  
In trying to handle the new financial extremes, the Irish central government 
established an advisory committee on ‘Public Sector Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes’ (PSNEP), the remit of which was to give advice on areas where 
public expenditure could be reduced. Established in 2008, the PSNEP was 
formed from a realisation that government finances had become reliant upon a 
credit-fuelled and speculative property boom, which no longer existed.  
While these cost-cutting actions were taking place external to Gladiator, internally 
Gladiator’s CEO was continuing to drive his efficiency agenda, highlighting how 
the internal and external dynamic processes of reform were interwoven and 
continuous. According to some at Gladiator, their CEO was a visionary: 
The CEO could see what was coming down the line, if he didn’t 
restructure the organisation, and look for efficiencies, it would be 
imposed on us instead by the Department of Environment (Senior 
Executive Officer (1)). 
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I think what drove the CEO to implement change was that if we don’t 
reorganise ourselves, the government will just send somebody else 
who will do it for us (Director of Service (2)). 
5.3.2.1 Internal strategic tactic (3) - Strategic Service Reviews and SSRGs  
At the start of 2009, the DD project officer with four newly assigned staff members 
were commissioned by the CEO with the task of carrying out four strategic 
service-delivery and management reviews (SSRs), focused on each of its core 
services - waste, housing, water and roads. At this stage not all the services listed 
in Table 5.1 were reviewed. In the context of an economic crisis, the aim of the 
SSRs was “to develop the most economic, efficient and effective management 
structures for service-delivery” (Source: Internal document30, 2009). The term 
SSRs quite soon became a familiar part of the day-to-day discourse in Gladiator, 
as one interviewee explained: 
We've come up with the term Strategic Service Reviews (SSRs) 
ourselves. The word strategic is in there because we're hoping that the 
structures that we develop will serve us into the future. We're looking 
forward, strategically, so they should be best for the organisation, but 
not just for 2010, or 2011, or 2012. Hopefully they’ll be best all the way 
into the future like 2015 or 2020 (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
The SSRs were monitored by four new SSRGs (i.e. Waste, Housing, Water, 
Roads). The latter comprised of senior managers each of whom were again 
appointed by the CEO. The CEO placed individuals who were in support of reform 
with staff members who were indifferent or opposed to the service-delivery 
change at Gladiator. By doing this, staff who were resistant to service-delivery 
reform at Gladiator would find it hard to stand up against other senior 
management colleagues who were in support of the changes. One senior 
executive officer explained how the forming of SSRGs was very intentional and 
calculated by the CEO, rather than some creative innovation: 
I don't think creative thinking is the right way of putting it. Again, I 
suppose in any management team scenario you're going to have 
people who are supportive of change, you're going to have people who 
are perhaps totally resistant to it, and you might have people that are 
somewhere in between, that one might regard as possible blockers 
who are more intent in protecting their own patch. They might not be 
visibly opposed to the change but you might have what you might call 
                                            
30 Internal document title withheld for confidentiality purposes. 
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passive resistance. They are giving all the signals that they're in 
agreement with things but in reality they're actually doing nothing at all 
to actually make it happen. So they're nodding in agreement with the 
CEO, that yes CEO we should be doing this, but in actual fact they're 
not doing a whole lot to make it happen (Senior Executive Officer (1)).  
The entrepreneurship of the CEO was a pertinent illustration of what Hardy (1996) 
referred to as ‘the mobilisation of power over decision-making’. The CEO 
recognised “that interests and grievances might not be articulated, remaining 
outside the formal decision-making arena, and…that conflict could exist even if it 
was not directly observable” (Hardy, 1996, p.S7). The calculative choice over who 
comprised such important decision-making groups was further highlighted by 
Senior Executive Officer (1): 
So you have people who are very proactive compared to the people 
who are passively resistant and visibly resistant and then all shades 
and colours in between. I would say that in terms of these groupings 
there's a certain element of selection where the people that may be 
somewhat resistant are put into these groups where they have some 
say but at the same time they're counteracted or maybe outnumbered 
by people who would be more positive and more disposed to change. 
So it eventually forces them into a situation where they're brought 
along with the tide. There is an element of that. 
Once the SSRGs were established, the DD review team set out to understand 
and improve the existing structures and everyday practices for delivering 
services. For example, if a staff member was involved in processing housing 
grants, the DD team examined how many grants were received annually in 2005 
to 2009 and what were the numbers of staff involved in that task. This could have 
shown that grant volumes had gone down but staff numbers remained the same.  
The DD team also worked very closely with a senior accountant to gather staff 
costs and view how payroll costs were allocated out to the three various units (A, 
B, C). Senior Executive Officer (1) described how the SSRs were based on data, 
which helped legitimise our actions to staff. They had to be based “on some sort 
of (defensible) principles and priorities” (Pollitt, 2010, p.29). Thus, emphasising 
how accounting had become “part of the institutional framework within and 
through which public services” were “now delivered” (Humphrey and Miller, 2012, 
p.306).   
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We knew that down the line, if we came up with a new structure, one 
of the first things people would ask was how we made that decision, 
or how did we work out the number of staff each service should have. 
So we had to bring things back to numbers (Senior Executive Officer 
(1)).  
Lockett, Wright and Wild (2015, p.80) highlighted similar characteristics in their 
study of UK universities illustrating “the potentially central role that metrics can 
play in the establishment of a new institution”. And, in this respect, management 
accounting information was particularly relevant for providing visibility to the 
reasons for service-delivery and management control reforms as they helped to 
“identify and ex-ante legitimise such a need” (Hiebl, 2018, p.28).  
In summary, the overall objective of the SSRs, carried out by DD, was to re-
develop delivery methods to ensure high quality services in, for example, waste, 
housing, water, roads at the lowest possible cost (Source: Internal organisation 
document, 2009). Once completed, the DD team would then report its findings to 
the SSRGs and EC. So respectively, DD, EC and SSRGs were central to the 
process by which new ways of service-delivery and management controls would 
be designed and implemented in Gladiator. The SSRs were further strengthened 
by their project charter, CEO’s letter and a variety of staff involvement. 
Each project charter was signed off on by each respective SSRG. It 
communicated what was within the SSRs scope and, possibly even more 
importantly, what was not within its scope. By having clear guidelines, the 
impression of objectivity was created. The project charter also communicated 
why the service review was required,  
The project charter summarised what the need for change was, in 
other words why are we doing this at all, what's the driving force? And 
the driving force for those service reviews was the loss of staff, the 
reduction of staff numbers, the pressures in budgets and the likely 
reduction of staff into the future and the need to look at things 
completely afresh and you know take a clean sheet approach to it 
(Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
The project charter was facilitating the CEO “develop a vision that frames a 
change project (1) in terms of the problem it helps to resolve; (2) as preferred to 
existing arrangements; and (3) as motivated by compelling reasons” (Battilana et 
156 
al., 2009, p.79). The project charter also set out the post review organisations 
goals - for example, a new service-delivery and management control structure, 
with clear roles and responsibilities for all positions in the new service structure. 
This was effectively an outline of the to be vision of service-delivery in Gladiator. 
The project charter document was only one page in length and was deemed 
simple but effective for conveying at a glance: (1) the purpose of the reviews; (2) 
what the reviews aimed to achieve; and (3) the reviews’ remit.  
A further part of the CEO’s entrepreneurship was in how he wrote a letter, in June 
2009, to all the staff, outlining how “the purpose of the reviews - in the context of 
the current economic conditions, in particular - is to develop the most efficient 
and effective service-delivery structure for each of these key service areas” 
(Source: CEO letter, 2009). The CEO stressed to staff how their input and 
cooperation was invaluable to the review process, helping to ensure that best 
service-delivery and management control structures were put in place. Thus, the 
CEO’s letter reinforced the importance of staff commitment to organisational 
reforms in the management of controls and delivery of public services at 
Gladiator: 
There is nothing to beat a letter from the CEO informing all staff of 
what is ahead, in this case, the service-delivery and management 
reviews; and highlighting the need for change and the need for staff 
participation and cooperation (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
Communication from senior management to less senior staff was also critical to 
the SSRs process, as were the information gathering interviews with these less 
senior staff. Less senior staff were an essential input to the SSRs because they 
knew the everyday workings of service-delivery and management at Gladiator. 
The SSRs enhancers were informing staff about the change, its reasons and 
values, thus, staff “were involved in what was happening” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.199) 
so it would make reform smoother. While the internal SSRs were in progress 
(completed in late 2010), externally, the McCarthy Report, LGERG and Croke 
Park Agreement were also in motion.  
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5.3.3 External jolts – McCarthy Report, Local Government Efficiency Review 
Group and Croke Park Agreement 
In July 2009, the PSNEP committee published a report entitled the “McCarthy 
Report” which was given the name An Bord Snip Nua by the Irish media, because 
it recommended cutting (i.e. snip) public sector spending and staff numbers. 
Moreover, this threat of job losses came on top of a general pay cut already 
imposed on public sector employees by the Irish central government. An 
Administrative Staff Officer explained:  
Staff are now fearful for their jobs because it had always been the case 
that your job was the one thing you didn’t have to worry about 
(Administrative Staff Officer).  
In December 2009, the Irish central government then established a LGERG to 
undertake a review of the cost base and staff numbers in Irish local authorities. 
Their report in 2010 outlined a number of recommendations, most of which were 
efficiency-grounded recommendations for Irish local authorities. In addition, this 
report specifically highlighted that there were too many senior and middle 
managers in Irish local authorities. Then based on the findings in both the An 
Bord Snip Nua report and the LGERG report, the Croke Park Agreement was 
signed in June 2010.  
In essence, the Croke Park Agreement was an agreement between the 
government and public sector unions. It was signed against a backdrop of private-
sector pay cuts and layoffs; and a need for greater efficiency in local authority 
service-delivery. However, according to the terms, central government 
guaranteed that no further pay or pension cuts, or compulsory redundancies, 
would be enforced. Additionally, there were to be restrictions and safeguards 
against changing work practices. There would also be more consultation and 
greater union involvement when changes in public sector management were 
being proposed, as well as further protection against outsourcing any in-house 
operations. Moreover, independent, but binding, third party adjudication on 
disagreements would be adhered to. In return for such government guarantees, 
public sector staff promised no industrial action, and agreed to cooperate with 
wide-scale government reform that were intended to reduce cost and headcount 
but also deliver more efficiencies, flexibility and job redeployment. The Croke 
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Park Agreement communicated the seriousness of the financial crisis in Ireland, 
signalling a need for change and presenting levers for change for the Irish central 
government, as conveyed by a member of staff at Gladiator:  
Salary cuts and the Croke Park Agreement signalled the significance 
of the economic crisis to us, and that our taken-for-granted job security 
mentality had come to be threatened (Administrative Staff Officer). 
Scott (2014, p.63) argued, “to confront a system of rules backed by the machinery 
of enforcement is to experience, at one extreme, fear, dread, and guilt…”. 
Interestingly, and as will be seen later in Housing (see Chapter Six), staff fears of 
redundancies made openings for service-delivery and management reform in 
Gladiator. However, these findings are in contrast to Powell (1991, p.194) who 
contended that any attempt to change existing routines are often resisted as they 
threaten individuals’ sense of security.  
Thus, post-2008, due to the external jolts staff were aware of Gladiator’s 
budgetary stress: 
Our staff knew times had changed and that we did not have enough 
money (CFO). 
This staff realisation put reform of its management control practices into motion: 
So we had to change the way we ‘sang’, we now controlled our 
expenditures, and I hope that going forward we would retain that 
control. I think it is something that takes a while. It requires staff 
attitudes to change and accept expenditures must be controlled. 
Because if you don’t change your attitude, you lose that expenditure 
control again (CFO). 
Similar findings were found by Dent (1986) when he traced changes in European 
Railways (ER). He traced the “way the railway culture, one of the central elements 
in the interpretive schemes, changed from what he called a ‘railway culture’31, to 
a new cultural base whereby the commercial, financial and accounting concerns 
became dominant” (Laughlin, 1991, p.226). This major shift in ER’s taken-for-
granted assumptions was ruptured (Burns and Scapens, 2000) by harsh 
                                            
31 ‘Railway culture’ means that “the purpose of the railway was to run trains. In doing so, financial 
considerations were secondary” (Dent, 1986, p.27). 
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government “policies in all areas of private and public endeavour” (Dent, 1986, 
p.27). This echos similarity to the findings in Gladiator above. 
5.3.4 Findings of the strategic service reviews 
In November 2010, the final report compiled by DD which documented all of the 
findings of the SSRs acknowledged that while the previous service-delivery 
model served the local authority well, inefficiencies were also revealed in both 
service related structures and processes [Source: Internal document32].  
Table 5.2 SSRs findings 
SSRs findings  
Different reporting structures and operational practices 
Staff roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined 
The two main findings from the SSRs as set out in Table 5.2 were as follows: 
different reporting structures and operational practices were evident across the 
three geographic units (A, B, C) in Gladiator. According to one director of service 
“the three different ways of delivering services at units A, B and C, seemed to 
create a mind-view with bad habits”. This is further explained by Senior Executive 
Officer (2) who outlined the ramification of such differences, for example, in 
housing: 
So, we could have two tenants who are in similar accommodations, 
but they are paying different rents based on different rent schemes, 
even though everyone is governed by the same legislation. At one 
point, we had twelve slightly different rent schemes. 
This is an example of how “in the process of routinisation, previously formulated 
rules may become modified as the group locates mutually acceptable ways of 
implementing them” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.6). The SSRs facilitated “the 
catching-up of underlying technical inefficiencies that have been masked over the 
                                            
32 Internal document title withheld for confidentiality purposes. 
160 
years by virtue of conforming to the prevailing institutional arrangements at a 
particular time and space” (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.729).  
Furthermore, staff roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined. Individual 
staff were regularly found to be involved in the delivery of multiple services (e.g. 
delivery of water, roads and/or housing) and, according to some interviewees’ 
this jack-of-all-trades situation was not necessarily seen in a positive light: 
How do you manage, and how do you ensure efficiency, and 
performance, and so on when somebody is pulled and dragged across 
a broad range of services? These were the big concerns that we came 
across when we did the reviews (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
Thus, the findings of the SSRs helped make explicit the 
weaknesses/inconsistencies of the existing service structures and this 
awareness incited reflection and questioning of fundamental (institutional) 
service-delivery logics by senior management. The next section presents the 
dynamics of implementing a new service-delivery and management control 
structure at Gladiator, and thus, continuing to address how Gladiator handled 
reforms in its delivery of services and management controls that strove to achieve 
greater efficiencies during a time of austerity. 
5.4 The how dynamics of implementing new delivery of services and 
management control practices 
The DD project officer and his team were tasked with deciding how the business 
units (for example, Figure 6.1, Chapter Six) in each service (i.e. waste, housing, 
water and roads) should begin to interact with each other post-transformation. 
They also had responsibility to identify and document each of the services’ core 
objectives, staff roles, responsibilities, key performance indicators, and targets. 
These responsibilities are in line with NPM practices outlined in Hyndman and 
Lapsley, (2016). In so doing, DD reviewed the organisation structures of other 
local authorities and state agencies, and even private sector organisations such 
as hotels and airlines. Because, “there is reassurance if not actual safety in 
numbers, and in the absence of a compelling reason to strike out on their own, 
organisations do what others are doing” (Carruthers, 1995, p.317).  
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We looked at how other State Agencies were structured, to see could 
we learn something new from it. Doesn't necessarily mean it's the ideal 
way of structuring an organisation either. So we made a conscious 
effort to look beyond that again and even look at the likes of ordinary 
private companies, hotels, airlines and so on, how they're structured 
and how they operate. Because if you look at how the hotels are 
structured, the airlines and so on, you'll learn something new from 
each of them (Senior Executive (1)). 
They reviewed strategy and annual reports, searched online as well as visiting 
some private companies. One of the main consequences of this external 
benchmarking was a decision to appoint a single service decision maker for each 
service. There would no longer be three geographic unit deliveries of services. 
As Senior Executive Officer (1) explained: 
Now that’s a big departure here. Where you once had three different 
geographic units (A, B and C), each having their own responsibilities 
for their own units, and now the organisation is moving towards a 
situation of one central service decision maker (Senior Executive 
Officer (1)).  
Another new organisational principle suggested from the DD SSRs was the 
elimination of multi-functional staff roles. Staff would no longer be spread across 
various services such as waste, housing, roads and water but instead focus on 
the delivery of one service only. This represents a radical change to staff roles 
and routines, and will be explained in the housing service (see Section 6.3.2, 
Chapter Six). 
DD members addressed four SSR reports (i.e. waste, housing, water and roads) 
to the four SSRGs (comprised of senior management) outlining its advice and 
recommendations in terms of what could be done in terms of improving its 
delivery of its services and management controls. It is important to stress that 
DD’s role was advisory, and that it held no power with regard to enforcing its 
suggestions for service-delivery reforms: 
We can’t hold a gun to a director’s head and say you must do it this 
way, or you must do it that way. The process owner is the person who 
has ultimate responsibility for the process. They are free to consider 
our report and take it on board, or dismiss it, or, maybe elements are 
taken on board, or elements are put on hold for a while (DD Project 
Officer). 
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The DD then presented the four SSR reports findings and suggestions to EC. 
Moreover, as senior managers had been common to both the SSRGs and EC, it 
would have been hard for them to argue with the findings: 
Senior staff were involved in the drawing up of the new structure 
through the SSRGs. So they would not go against their own structure. 
Staff were part of the change process from the start, so it wasn’t 
suddenly one morning they were told this is what is happening - it was 
a gradual process that started a couple of years ago really (Director of 
Service (1)).  
Consistent with this, Tessier and Otley (2012, p.796) found “the fact that control 
users participated in the initial phase of development, led to the implementation 
of accepted controls”. 
The recommendations were sanctioned by the CEO and councillors, effectively 
representing new rules which underpinned the intended new service-delivery and 
management control practices at Gladiator. However, the new staff roles and 
service-delivery designs and controls would also require the active support of the 
directors of services and their managers33 to be implemented successfully.  
5.4.1 Breaking established mind-sets 
Therefore, drawing on his formal authority as head of the organisation, the CEO 
set about instructing the directors and senior managers that it was their 
responsibility to ensure that the new service structures and management control 
practices were implemented (see Chapter Six, Housing). Therefore, the CEO 
strove to have the historical business assumptions re-orientated towards cost-
efficiency and effective management - the reasons cited by many organisations 
for introducing NPM practices (ter Bogt, 2008(a)). However, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983, p.147) argued “today,.. structural change in organisations seems less and 
less driven by competitiveness or by the need for efficiency”. They contend that 
organisation mimicry and a desire to comply with external rules and regulations 
are drivers of organisational change. Nevertheless, ter Bogt’s (2008(a)) research 
                                            
33 Managers are akin to senior executive officers of each function in a service, for example, see 
Chapter Six, Housing, Figure 6.1. 
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findings in Dutch local authorities indicates that efficiency and effectiveness will 
continue into the future as pushers of organisational reform.   
Consequently, the directors of services and senior managers were quite 
instrumental in shaping the new processes of service-delivery, which were 
intended to become the new and generally accepted approach in Gladiator. The 
CEO pressed, “The new director of each of the functions is to ensure that change 
happens”. Senior Executive Officer (2) also remarked how he remembered the 
CEO making it clear in his early days that the directors and senior managers did 
the jobs they were paid for. He recalled the CEO saying to senior members: 
Make no doubt about it, you are going to be tested in the next few 
years, not the staff downstairs. Your management skills are going to 
be tested. If you can’t manage, then it will fall apart and we will quickly 
see criticism from the councillors. So, you have to manage and you 
have to be prepared to manage (Senior Executive Officer (2) citing the 
words of CEO).  
Having received such instructions from the CEO, the senior managers then had 
to consider how they would approach making sure that staff in Gladiator would 
embrace or accept, and implement the enforced change. Figure 5.4 illuminates 
factors utilised by senior staff to instil reform acceptance in Gladiator’s lower level 
staff. 
 
Figure 5.4 Factors utilised by senior management to achieve staff 
acceptance 
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They referred to the Croke Park Agreement for nurturing staff buy-in to the 
reforms, as the CFO explained: 
We will absolutely listen to suggestions from staff where they think we 
may be doing it incorrectly but most of this restructuring is done with a 
lot of thought and a lot of evaluation. We are effectively using the 
Croke Park Agreement as the driving mechanism and saying “Well, 
the Croke Park Agreement says we have to do this”, and so we are 
doing it. 
The Croke Park Agreement legitimised the restructuring actions taken by senior 
management at Gladiator helping them increase their survival prospects. This 
resonates with Meyer and Rowan’s (1991, p.41) argument that organisations are 
forced to adopt new practices and procedures to increase their legitimacy and 
survival prospects. 
A sense of urgency was also created by senior managers by drawing on the 
financial crisis and austerity pressures: 
My opinion is in terms of change management if there isn’t an urgency, 
you know, forget it. The urgency was there but then I always find the 
implementation comes along then and if you don’t create that urgency 
as well with the implementation you are lost. You have got to just keep 
driving it (Director of Service (1)). 
For instance, ter Bogt (2008(b), p.230) discovered in Dutch local governments 
that “the change processes will take quite some time, especially if the persons 
involved do not feel an urgent need for radical changes”. In addition, Kotter (1995) 
found over 50% of companies transformation efforts failing because they did not 
create enough of a sense of urgency to reform themselves into more competitive 
organisations, thus, illustrating the importance of a sense of urgency in reforms. 
In addition, Administrative Staff Officer explained how staff awareness of the 
external factors (i.e. financial crisis) also helped management in their efforts to 
gain staff acceptance of service-delivery reforms: 
Well the good thing from the management point of view was that 
people were losing their jobs right left and centre outside of Gladiator 
and the pension levy had been cut in Gladiator, there is so much going 
on and that is why people accepted the changes, they don’t like it but 
they were scared for their jobs. 
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As well, Director of Service (2) described how staff acceptance of the service-
delivery changes was further achieved by: 
Constantly talking with staff and telling them these were the roles and 
duties which were there. I would have done this with each of them on 
a number of occasions. I then reinforced this is the way we’re doing 
things now. This is how the organisation is set up. There is no going 
back, the money has dried up and we have less resources. 
Director of Service (2) also explained, “I kept shoving that message down their 
throats until they got it”. The above evidence reflects verbal repetition of the new 
rules and routines at Gladiator, which would eventually impact on its existing 
ways of thinking and doing. Thus, illustrating what Burns and Scapens, (2000, 
p.12) refer to as “existing routines and institutions”.  
The service reforms were also further promoted by an Organisational Partnership 
Committee (OPC). OPC was a national initiative, introduced to the Irish public 
sector in 2001, where representatives of local authority management and unions 
met on a quarterly basis. The CEO of Gladiator attended two of the four yearly 
meetings, and he was permitted to signal any future plans within the organisation. 
Equally, however, this setting also allowed union representatives and local 
authority staff members to flag any areas that warranted immediate management 
attention. 
The OPC is a two way communications process, it is all about 
communication. It gets the message out in good time, that change is 
on the way and that reviews ‘are’ on the way; and all that helps. It helps 
to ensure that people are open to the changes, and that unions are 
aware of the changes at an early stage. The last thing you want is 
unions hearing about it at the last minute and then feeling they were 
excluded from the process, or that their role was not recognised or 
acknowledged (Senior Executive Officer (1)).  
This is in line with earlier research, which found that a reform process tends to be 
smoother when it is facilitated by clear communication (Contrafatto and Burns, 
2013). 
So far, this chapter has covered the complexities of the processes (why and how) 
leading up to and implementing reform in Gladiators services. As this research is 
examining reforms in service deliveries and management controls, the following 
sections present the consequences of service-delivery reforms on Gladiator’s 
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budgeting practices. Public budgeting represents public sector organisations’ 
planning, control and accountability structures (Johansson and Siverbo, 2014) 
and budgets are effectively Gladiator’s financial management control practice. 
Again, let’s reiterate, that management control, in this thesis, is viewed in its 
broad sense. It is concerned with a manager’s ability to monitor and focus “worker 
behaviour, output and/or the minds of employees” on its organisation’s objectives 
via technical (i.e. formal) and, socio-ideological (i.e. informal) controls (Alvesson 
and Kärreman, 2004, p.424).  Thus, it is about ensuring someone does what they 
are supposed to do (Macintosh and Quattrone, 2010), in effect, influencing 
individuals’ behaviours (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015), of which budgets are 
intertwined. The following sections deal with Gladiator’s budgeting practices pre 
and post 2008 as this helps highlight and explain why and how budget practices 
evolved as they did, through time, and within Gladiator (Burns, 2000). While also 
continuing to address the two research questions outlined in Chapter One, 
Section 1.4. 
5.5 Budget preparation and approval – pre-2008 
This section presents Gladiator’s budget setting and control practices pre-2008. 
Gladiator was (and is) required by legislation (Local Government Act, 2001) to 
prepare budgets. The annual budget setting process was a taken-for-granted 
routine at Gladiator as it was a statutory duty to present a budget to the councillors 
(Senior Accountant (3)). Senior Accountant (3) further explained: 
If you don’t give out budgets to keep within, then your cashflow will 
actually run into trouble. 
Pre-2008, the budget preparation process was conducted from September to 
December, each year. It was viewed as an integral part of the management 
control process, involving the input of mostly middle management in the Finance 
section of each of the three units (A, B, C). Budgeting in Gladiator was shaped 
by statutory guidelines issued by the central government. The latter were written 
and formalised guidelines, originally issued to all Irish local authorities in 1976. 
The CFO explained: 
First and foremost we do our budget because it is a statutory 
requirement to do so. We must produce an annual budget that 
balances and delivers services at the local level. This is subject to a 
political process, going through the rigours, and includes setting the 
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charges to be paid by our customers. So we are accountable and 
responsible to the extent that we must comply with the government’s 
statutory requirements and also produce a budget that is acceptable 
to the elected council, who ultimately have to approve the budget and, 
at the same time, have to set customer charges that are both 
reasonable and acceptable. And that is the primary purpose of the 
budget.   
The relationship described here between Gladiator and Ireland’s central 
government resonates strongly with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983, p.150) notion 
of coercive pressure which “results from both formal and informal pressures 
exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent 
and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function”. 
Traditionally, the budget information was produced by the finance managers at 
each of the three units (A, B, C) as opposed to being centralised and prepared 
by the senior accountant in the support Finance Department. Senior Accountant 
(3) met regularly and separately with each of the three unit’s budget team 
members to discuss their budgets. Budgets at the three units were underpinned 
by dominant routines and beliefs that the budgets were akin to their wish lists and 
this was the prevailing way of thinking in Gladiator: 
Originally, we would send out budgets to the three units and say, “this 
is the budget you had for 20XX. This is how much you’ve spent to date 
so how much do you want for 20XX based on what you have already 
and are there any other projects down the line that you’d like to do if 
you had the money”. So they would send in their wish list, let’s call it. 
So then the CFO would decide whether the funding was available and 
whether they will get the funding requested or not (Senior Staff Officer 
(3)). 
Once the CFO approved the prepared unit’s budgets, they were then approved 
at each of the three unit council meetings (A, B, C) in November of each year. 
With approval of the units’ budgets, the senior accountant aggregated all three 
budgets to obtain an organisational budget for the local authority. This overall 
budget would then be approved at the full council budget meeting (i.e. comprising 
all councillors) in December of each year. For the most part, the councillors 
passed the budgets. 
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If the requested budgets were approved, it signalled, in the eyes of the units, 
legitimacy for their spending plans. In addition, even if the budgets allocated were 
reduced, budget holders still spent what they initially requested:  
Even if we reduced a budget holder’s budget what was their reaction? 
In the past, some of their reaction was I will spend it anyway or I will 
overspend. In the good times we allowed an element of overspend at 
local level and some discretion because we assumed they were doing 
the right thing (CFO). 
This highlights how budget expenditure rules were not adhered to at Gladiator 
and again further reflected in the comment below: 
Budget items were considered to be ongoing costs and they were not 
questioned (CFO). 
The next section presents why embedded, traditional budget preparation and 
approval routines were challenged. 
5.6 Budget preparation and approval – post-2008 
The events, which catalysed the service-delivery restructuring at Gladiator (see 
Section 5.3 earlier) also effected changes in the budget setting and approval 
process, namely, (i) the arrival of a new CEO, (ii) a downturn in the global 
economy and (iii) the new CEO’s move towards centralised services. Starting in 
2009, the three units ceased to prepare individual unit budgets. Instead, a single 
organisation budget was prepared centrally by the Finance Department. 
Although, the CFO and Senior Accountant (3) - before the arrival of the new CEO 
- had spoken about centralising the budgeting process, they thought: 
The councillors will never go for a centralized budget but then with the 
arrival of the new CEO and with the national level changes to refuse 
and water and because everything seemed to be changing, the CEO’s 
budget process change was taken on-board as well (Senior 
Accountant (3)). 
The new CEO reinforced the senior accountant’s perspective about change by 
saying: 
It is harder to change things the longer you are in an organisation, the 
longer you are there, the harder it is to achieve change and the less 
you change, it’s a terrible thing to say, but that is what happens. Being 
new to the organisation helps (CEO). 
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Battilana (2006) also concurs with the CEO’s sentiments as she contends that it 
has been shown that the longer the duration of an individual’s tenure at an 
organisation the less likely they are to conduct divergent change. She argues that 
new managers bring fresh perspectives to their tasks. Thus, allowing them to 
introduce divergent change compared to managers with a long tenure in the 
organisation. The CEO articulated how the changes in the budget setting 
processes were not something a lot of thought went into. Speaking as someone 
with considerable power, the CEO recalled how:  
I said to myself I can’t live with the existing budget process and when 
I think about it now it was probably because I knew less and less about 
it. It was not a structure that you could manage but it was a facility that 
had kept everybody happy. 
In a related way, the traditional budgeting process at the units was not completely 
transparent, according to the CEO, who remarked: 
There was certainly a lot of loose money out in the divisions. We had 
some hint of that alright. There was a sense that the divisions had their 
own money, I knew they had money which we didn’t know about. 
Similarly, Director of Service (2) added that: 
People in the divisions were squirrelling money away (Director of 
Service (2)). 
A lack of clarity in the budget and taken-for-granted budgeting practices amongst 
the units (A, B, C) meant it came as little surprise that they were questioned by 
the CEO, and subsequently the budgeting process became centralised (one 
organisational budget) rather than the three individual unit budget approach.  
These changes from individual unit to centralised budgeting processes did not 
meet any significant resistance, as was explained by Senior Accountant (3): 
If Gladiator was a cash rich organisation, we might have had a stronger 
reaction to the budget process change. However, the fact was we had 
less money and we all knew we had less money and because of that 
the budget changes were taken on board. 
The praxis of the CEO is present here, firstly, his self-awareness and critical 
understanding of how the existing budgeting practices did not meet the needs 
and interests of Gladiator (Burns and Nielsen, 2006, p.451); secondly, his 
mobilisations and, thirdly, the collective action of Gladiator’s management to 
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reform the existing budget setting process at Gladiator (Burns and Nielsen, 2006, 
p.451). 
Centralisation of budget preparation obviously brought change to the respective 
units’ staff rules and routines. Staff located at the units would no longer be 
involved in budget preparations for Gladiator: 
The finance people at units A, B and C were no longer required to 
prepare the budgets. They didn’t have to prepare a budget book or 
anything like that, and they were happy with this new situation because 
it was less hassle for them. They no longer had any budget decisions 
to make (Senior Accountant (3)). 
The new way of preparing the budget was accepted by Gladiator’s staff because: 
The new CEO could actually say “lets do something different” which 
an existing CEO wouldn’t even attempt to do and also with the 
centralising of certain services such as housing and water, these all 
helped bring about this new budget process change (Senior 
Accountant (3)). 
Thus, again it is evident that the CEO’s formal position (i.e. “higher hierarchical 
positions” see Battilana, 2006, p.665) and being new in conjunction with the new 
service structures, helped bring about change in the historic budgeting 
processes.  
While lower level staff was no longer required to prepare the annual budget, 
senior management at units A, B, C also no longer had a say in the budget. The 
directors of services lost some of their decision-making powers (Hardy, 1996) 
and they were now handed down a budget by the management accounting 
team34 (comprised of senior accountant, senior staff officer and lower grade staff 
in the support Finance Department) and told they had to operate within its 
parameters. The budget control rules were changed by the CEO, stating that 
budgets must be met and not overspent.  
The units’ directors recognised that they had no decision-making input 
in to what budget they got. They also knew this was due to the 
economic times we were living in. They knew the budgets they were 
                                            
34 The management accounting team was comprised of only one accountant, the other members 
were a senior staff officer and a number of clerical officers. They are located in the Finance 
Department of Gladiator, which is a support department to units A, B and C (see Figure 5.1). 
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allocated were as good as what they would have prepared 
themselves. They knew they could not do any more than what I was 
doing (Senior Accountant (3)). 
The CFO outlined how incremental budgeting35 was no longer the accepted way 
of budgeting and how zero based budgeting (ZBB)36 was becoming the new 
budgeting method: 
We are I would not say quite zero based but we are approaching that. 
We have to start with a blank sheet because income has reduced, 
because you are under pressure to deliver services with less money. 
We are now forced to examine all items of expenditure, items which 
before you might have accepted as being an on-going cost. You are 
now questioning them, attempting to reduce them or, in some cases, 
eliminating them. 
Centralising the budget-setting process elevated the importance and the 
involvement of the central management accounting team, in turn allowing them 
to more rigorously examine all the income figures included in the units’ budgets. 
As a result, units-based income figures were quickly cut to perceived more 
realistic numbers and, according to  Senior Accountant (3) this was “why, touch 
wood, we are now doing ok cash-flow-wise”.  
The above illustrates that there was not only a change in how the budget process 
was completed but also there was a change in what was being done. Because of 
the centralisation of the budgeting process, the management accounting team 
was better able to monitor the income figures and present more realistic income 
figures in their budget reports. The result being better management control of 
Gladiator due to the improved budget information. Senior Accountant (3) noted: 
We were always very good at monitoring expenditure but we were not 
very good at monitoring incomes. When we centralized the budgeting 
process, we cut the incomes a way down. So, it is helping us to 
manage better, I think anyway (Senior Accountant (3)). 
Despite overall acceptance of the changes amongst staff, politically the 
councillors were unhappy with the changes in the budget process. Traditionally, 
                                            
35 Incremental budgeting focuses on the increase between last year’s and this year’s budget. 
36 ZBB requires all managers to justify all costs as if the programmes involved were being 
proposed for the first time (Seal, Garrison, Rhode and Noreen, 2015, p.849).  
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at the local authority budget meetings held in November, unit-councillors would 
need to agree charges for water, housing, refuse, and so on. However, with 
centralisation, they no longer had authority to decide on such service charges. 
As a senior accountant put it “they now had no decision to make”. There had been 
radical changes in the decision-making processes for the councillors. 
Nevertheless, despite there now being no need for councillors to hold their annual 
budget meetings in November, they demanded that their unit budget meeting still 
took place before the full local authority budget meeting. This illustrates the 
enduring nature of embedded traditional routines as Senior Accountant (3) 
described: 
I suppose it was a political thing, let’s say there was a difficult decision 
to be made, the councillors could actually turn down the budget, which 
they have done on occasions. So they could then go back to their 
constituents and say “well, I didn’t accept that budget at all” and then 
they would go into the full council meeting where the budget would be 
passed. However, they could always say they had not accepted it in 
their own unit council budget meeting, well that is my opinion on it 
anyway, it was political power. You see the council budget meeting is 
open to the press.  
Additionally, the councillors also requested that they still be presented with 
budget reports on a per unit basis compared to a single report for the 
organisation. They claimed they needed to know what was going on in their own 
constituency. It seems the councillors saw the centralisation of the budget 
process as an erosion of their power. So even though there had been a change 
in the budget preparation routines the councillors still held onto the November 
unit budget meetings. Thus, some old budget approval legacy routines were held 
in place, which in terms of Burns and Scapens (2000) framework, illustrates the 
power of institutions. The next section examines budgetary control in Gladiator. 
5.7 Budgetary control  
As outlined earlier in this chapter, prior to 2008 and the financial crisis, Gladiator 
was a cash-rich organisation with a management knowledge that there was 
always surplus cash, as the following comment by the CFO indicated:   
In the better times, people were just left to their own devices, and there 
was a mentality of everything will be ok in the end, because we were 
a wealthy organisation and we can get over it.  
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Being a cash-rich organisation was a taken-for-granted way of thinking and it 
underpinned the daily activities at Gladiator. Historically, the management 
accounting team monitored agreed budgets at units (A, B, C) - the aim of which 
was to ensure they operated within budgets. Such management behaviour, 
however, was rather ceremonial, and simply gave an appearance of legitimate 
and rational budgetary control at Gladiator. However, in practice, any questioning 
of over- or under-spending against the budget caused few problems for budget 
holders. This was because it was widely accepted there was abundant cash 
available to meet any budget deficits incurred, and in fact this was what always 
happened at budget year end. In effect, the budgeted and actual figures were 
independent and unrelated, as the following quotes reveal. 
Traditionally in November and December there were situations where 
staff would have available budgets left and just to spend the budget 
they would buy equipment, machinery or road materials in order to use 
up their budgets. This behaviour was deemed acceptable if the budget 
holders were buying something they needed for the start of the next 
year. However, if they were buying something which was going to 
deteriorate before they were going to use it then that was an absolute 
waste of money (CFO).  
The budget holders knew there was surplus cash there to begin with 
(Senior Staff Officer (2)). 
However, with the downturn in the Irish economy, and the various NPM-rooted 
pressures to improve efficiencies and drive down costs, the once taken-for-
granted discretion to overspend was ended by instruction from the new CEO.  
Senior Accountant (3) recalled how: 
The directors of services knew the seriousness of the CEO’s budget 
instruction, before we would ask them for cuts in expenditure and 
nobody would come back to us, but when the CEO said they were to 
come back, they did.  
Gladiator was now enforcing the fundamentals of budgetary control (i.e. one 
cannot exceed budget figures). The management accounting team routinely 
enforced and monitored the budgets by communicating: 
Now, not only can you not overspend, but also you must not spend 
anything you don’t have to spend. We will not accept overspending, 
and we will monitor you on a regular basis to make sure you are not 
over spending (CFO). 
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Gradually, the management accounting team found that people’s own practice 
began to change when staff understood that there were no longer abundant cash 
flows available, and that the management accounting team were no longer 
accepting budget overspend.  
From a finance and management accounting perspective we sat on 
people more, from an earlier stage. We questioned the budgets from 
an earlier stage, and really sat on them (CFO). 
The above quote reflects what van der Stede (2001) and Johansson and Siverbo 
(2014) refer to as tight budget control. Each month, the management accounting 
team sent monthly budget reports to the responsible budget holders holding them 
accountable for their own budgets.  
 
A new ERP system (implementation initiated in 2012) enhanced the production 
and quality of these monthly budget reports. It was initially proposed due to its 
ability to deal with taxes such as VAT but it also allowed the management 
accounting team to run a lot more detailed reports on its units, service functions 
and cost and revenue codes. The new ERP system aided the management 
accounting team in their efforts to increase management control at Gladiator by 
providing better reports and restricting access to income and cost codes.  
The new ERP system is going to make a big difference. I think it will 
anyhow, because the way we have it set up, not everyone has access 
to every code under the sun, whereas on our previous system we 
couldn’t restrict people to codes. So they could have charged to 
whatever code they wanted. They could have charged to my code and 
they shouldn’t be charging to it at all. Whereas the way we have it now, 
there is security on every person. So they only have access to their 
own group of codes. So I suppose it means they haven’t the option to 
start charging to the wrong place. So they can only charge to their own 
little groups of things. So it’ll become more obvious if codes are going 
over, out she goes. Do you know what I mean? And it was then the 
fact that we’re harping on to them all the time with all our extra reports 
and all the rest of it, I think it has made a difference and will make a 
difference down the line (Senior Staff Officer (3)). 
This new system triggered the creation of new rules restricting staff access to 
income and expenditure codes on the budgeting system thus enhancing 
management controls. As the implementation of the new ERP system was in its 
infancy at the point in time of this study’s final interviews it was not explored any 
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further except for acknowledging it facilitated37 management control changes 
which were already taking place within Gladiator. This is similar to Scapens and 
Jazayeri (2003, p.229) findings where a new ERP system “facilitated incremental 
changes to the existing ways of working (i.e. evolutionary change), rather than 
fundamentally challenging them (i.e. revolutionary change)”.  
Capital budgets per job were also prepared by Gladiator. However, with the 
arrival of the new CEO and his questioning of how management controls were 
practised he instructed the management accounting team to now prepare a three-
year capital programme. This was a new budget control rule, which was 
something entirely new for Gladiator. This was also a requirement of the Value 
for Money Unit Local Government Audit Service Report (VMULGAR) 2007. 
We introduced capital budgeting which we didn’t have before. 
Traditionally, we had a capital budget per job and if the job went on for 
a number of years, it didn’t matter as long as you had the initial budget 
up. That initial budget was then your target but in many cases it 
overran, but there was no setting a new budget, you were just gone 
over (CFO). 
In implementing this new capital budget control, the management accounting 
team upon the request of the CEO, closed all the capital codes on the ERP 
system except those that already had budgets allocated to them. This action 
reflected the CEO’s mobilisation of power over resources (Hardy, 1996). In the 
past, budget holders could code expenditure items into a variety of capital codes, 
whereas this new practice required budget holders to explain why they wanted a 
capital code re-opened and what they needed the money for.  
There was now capital budget control.  What was very interesting in 
this was that let’s say the directors of service asked for two hundred 
and fifty million and they only spent seventy million, the CEO wanted 
them all to answer why did they ask for this when they didn’t actually 
need it? (Senior Accountant (3)). 
The CEO held the directors of service accountable for their actions and according 
to Senior Accountant (3): 
In June, the directors of services had to tell us whether they were on 
track or not with their budget targets rather than leaving it until year 
                                            
37 As opposed to being a driver of management control change. 
176 
end. They also had to come back in Sept and tell us what they were 
spending, why or why not?. Again the CEO said ‘you are not to spend 
unless you have to’. So why should you ask for the budget when you 
don’t actually have to spend it? So spending is way down. 
However, the CEO subsequently changed the budget control rule from the 
preparation of a three-year capital budget programme to an annual capital budget 
programme. The CEO was of the opinion that with an unstable economy and so 
many changes continuously occurring in the environment, a three-year capital 
programme did not make sense. In effect, it would be “an act of fiction” (CEO). 
Despite this being in conflict with the requirements of the VMULGAR 2007, the 
CEO changed the rule to annual capital budgets. Annual capital budget 
preparation became an annual routine for service directors.  
In addition, new performance management practices were also being developed 
at Gladiator. The CFO explained how the management accounting unit has 
always produced financial information based on financial inputs but the financial 
inputs had never been shown against the actual outputs in the organisation itself. 
What we are trying to do now with the new service-delivery structures 
is to establish performance indicators that relate the financial input to 
the actual delivered output (CFO). 
In addition, the VMULGAR (2007) also called for local authorities to report on key 
performance indicators, which focused on financial performance, and to include 
reports on the achievement of budgetary targets and accountability for significant 
variances. At the point in time when this research’s interviews finished, these 
financial performance indicators had only started to be implemented in Housing 
(see next chapter). 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter reveals an ongoing, intertwined, complex relationship between both 
internal and external jolts in a process of reforms in Gladiator’s delivery of public 
services and management controls during a period of austerity. The internal jolt 
and activities (i.e. DD, EC, SSRs, SSRGs) of a new CEO interwoven with the 
external jolts, such as the financial crisis and central government austerity 
measures, created a shift in staff thinking by impacting their taken-for-granted 
belief of a job for life and highlighting the seriousness of cash shortages at 
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Gladiator. The CEO’s use of communication and individual power (i.e. over 
resources and decision-making) along with his ability to use both technocratic 
and socio-ideological controls were essential to the reform process.  
There was also a strategic position given to management accounting in the 
reform process. The communication of management accounting information 
along with the enforcement of existing budget rules and the introduction of capital 
budgets all became tactics for creating a shift in existing staff interpretive 
schemes and institutions. Lasting reform required changes at the level of 
language and actions. Next, Chapter Six presents the findings of Gladiator’s 
housing service. 
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CHAPTER SIX – CASE FINDINGS - HOUSING SERVICE  
 
6.1 Introduction  
Having covered the challenges faced by a local authority in Ireland during times 
of austerity, particularly highlighting the purposeful activities of a new CEO, this 
chapter becomes more focused. Section 6.2 hones into a particular service, 
housing, within that local authority. This is important because this was the service 
whose reforms were most developed at the time of this research. Then, Section 
6.3 discusses how Gladiator, during a period of austerity, handled reforms in its 
delivery of housing and management controls. It illustrates how the reforms 
brought about radical change in its ways of thinking and doing about housing 
services (i.e. institutional change). It also reveals the tactics adopted to break 
potential staff resistance. Section 6.4 examines budgeting practices (i.e. the 
financial management controls) in Housing, presenting how historically budget 
control was not the norm but slowly it shifted to become the accepted way of 
managing. Section 6.5 presents the BSC, a new control technique implemented 
by the new housing director; effectively it was his housing plan for the year. 
Finally, Section 6.6 concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Housing service 
Traditionally, Gladiator delivered its housing service through each of its three 
units A, B, C (see Chapter Five, Figure 5.1). Its mission was to maximise the 
provision of accommodation for those who were unable to provide 
accommodation from their own resources (Source: Internal document38). For 
example, each unit would independently process and assess applications for 
housing, and make subsequent awards. Such an approach caused the 
duplication of work, backlogs and inefficiencies. Additionally, there was no formal 
measurement on how long delays were for housing and each unit carried out its 
operations and service-delivery in different ways.  
                                            
38 Internal document title withheld for confidentiality purposes. 
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When the new CEO arrived, he immediately asked questions like “what are the 
costs and the staff requirements to deliver housing services?”. However, there 
was no information for the total performance of housing due to its geographical 
unit structures (i.e. housing was delivered in three ways by unit A, unit B and unit 
C and its information had never been aggregated). As Senior Executive Officer 
(1) explained: 
We had three separate units and, no matter what questions were 
asked, each unit would interpret the questions different. They would 
come back with somewhat inconsistent responses or maybe not quite 
what was being asked. It was very very difficult to get an overall view 
of housing in the organisation. 
Thus, historically, there had been no overall management control system or 
mechanism for housing services. It was evident that having the organisation 
divided into three independent units, each with a different director of services led 
to variations in service-delivery and local management control. Senior Executive 
Officer (3) recalled how, when he started working at Gladiator: 
Having three units, in my opinion, meant it was a nightmare to manage 
the housing service. It was more or less like dealing with three 
separate authorities. 
The new CEO, having worked in various other local authorities across Ireland 
and bringing his previous local authority experience could not get his head around 
the geographic split into three units for delivering the same housing service at 
Gladiator. Senior Executive Officer (3) noted how when he first arrived at 
Gladiator: 
I was an outsider coming in. It seemed to me the most natural thing to 
have housing delivered by one head of service to the city/county, and 
that this unit concept was inefficient. Personally, I am not one bit 
surprised that the CEO pushed for a centralised housing service.  
The incompleteness and insufficiency of the housing service information base 
incited the CEO to request that the DD carry out a SSR on housing (see Chapter 
Five, Section 5.3.2.1). Senior Executive Officer (3) acknowledged the enormity of 
this task for DD: 
It must have been a very difficult job for the DD, in particular because 
they had to look at all the activities in housing, water, waste and roads. 
And, they had to look at them in extreme detail. In other words, they 
had to carry out an ‘x-ray’ of the activities for each service, see what 
staff were tied into these activities, and think about how we could better 
180 
deliver and manage the services within housing. What staff would you 
need in each unit to serve the public and keep the politicians happy. 
The SSR findings (see Chapter Five, Section 5.3.4) disclosed that staff generally 
did not have clearly defined job roles. Thus, Gladiator’s technical controls 
(Tessier and Otley, 2012) were not clear. Rather, their roles were multi-functional 
which effectively meant that the same person could be responsible, for waste, 
housing, water, and roads. The directors of services time was consumed by 
routine, operational matters that should really have been handled by middle 
management, thereby, allowing the former to focus on more strategic issues. 
Worse still, tasks and activities, which were probably more appropriate for junior 
grades were being handled by senior staff - e.g. payments, administration work, 
recoupments, and more. Having said that, there were also some cases where 
junior staff were handling tasks that were more appropriate to middle-
management or even senior staff. Highlighted in Chapter Five, Section 5.3.4, 
Senior Executive Officer (1) was mindful enough to question: 
How can we manage this and how do we ensure efficiency and 
performance, when someone is pulled and dragged across a broad 
range of services?  
Furthermore, a lot of the service-delivery information developed over the years 
was in people’s heads, that is, their “tacit know-how” (Yazdifar, 2012, p.62).  
Upon completion of the housing SSR it was decided to change the existing 
structures in housing services. Some staff members were of the belief that the 
new housing structure was going to be implemented regardless of whether they 
thought it was a good idea or not. Senior management were seen to determine 
the housing structure outcomes with subordinates not really having any real input. 
Staff input was more of a strategic move to be seen to have included staff 
comments, however, the decision had already been made to restructure housing; 
The new structure was imposed on staff whether they thought it was 
good, bad or indifferent and to be fair, staff were consulted to a certain 
degree but it was going to be done anyway (Senior Staff Officer (1)). 
This is similar to Yazdifar’s (2013, p.201) case study findings in Omega, where 
the change was imposed in a “democratic-autocratic” style. Democratic in the 
sense that “CC explained the present situation and justified the need for change, 
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and let people talk and discuss what they thought was relevant [….]” (Yazdifar, 
2013, p.201), and it was autocratic in terms of, “if a decision was made and 
finalised, no delays and changes in the plan were acceptable, except reasonable 
ones” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.201). 
Thus, Gladiator established five housing business units, which would report into 
an overall decision-maker, the director of housing (see Figure 6.1). One senior 
executive officer described the restructuring as “something which is fairly radical 
for a local authority”. The following will now explain in more detail what was the 
nature and purpose of each of the five housing business units. 
Figure 6.1 Gladiator’s new centralised housing structure 
Policy and Coordination is a small business unit, comprised of only three staff 
members but deals with councillors’ representations on behalf of their 
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constituents and housing policies. This unit holds all the housing documentation 
with regard to staff roles and department structures. Social Operations is a 
business unit comprised of five sub units, namely Processing, A, B, C39 and 
Travellers. It is the largest unit in the housing service. It involves managing the 
processing of housing applications within time deadlines set out in the Social 
Housing Regulations 2011. Applications are then forwarded to the housing 
officers to make a decision as to whether the applicant is approved or not for 
social housing support. The housing officers then notify the Processing unit of 
their decision and the Processing unit notifies the applicant as to whether their 
application has been successful or not. A, B, C are the counter locations where 
the public can call in and deliver housing application forms or query by telephone. 
The Travellers unit puts in place the legislative framework to meet the needs of 
travellers’ resident within Gladiator’s geographic area. Gladiator is committed to 
meeting the accommodation needs of the traveller community. Housing Options 
is a business unit, which is comprised of four sub-units: (1) Purchasing Options, 
(2) Social Leasing, Voluntary and Part V, (3) Rental Accomodation Scheme 
(RAS), (4) Improvement Grants. Purchasing Options is a unit, which deals with 
people who wish to buy their local authority house. The Social Leasing, Voluntary 
and Part V unit is allocated funding from the Irish central government to lease or 
rent residential properties from private owners. The local authority will enter into 
a legal arrangement with the private owner for the use of the property for an 
agreed term and guarantee rent payments for the term. These properties are then 
used to house people who are unable to source suitable accommodation from 
their own funding. RAS is a nationwide scheme availed of by people who are on 
rent supplement for 18 months or more and who have a long-term housing need. 
The aim of the scheme is to provide good quality rental accommodation for 
eligible persons. Housing grants are provided to older people and people with a 
disability to facilitate them in their continued independent living in their own 
homes. The Finance40 and Administration business unit is comprised of five sub-
units: Capital Finance, Housing Loans, Rent Collection, Administration and 
Monitoring and Control. The Capital Finance sub-unit deals with the management 
of the housing capital accounts. In the original housing function layout, housing 
                                            
39 A, B and C represent the three geographic units in Gladiator (see Chapter Five, Figure 5.1).  
40 The Finance and Administration unit in housing is not to be confused with the support Finance 
department where the management accounting team reside (see Figure 5.1, Chapter Five). 
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loans were to be managed by the Housing Finance and Administration unit. 
However, the CFO said his department was keeping the housing loans under his 
remit and as a result, housing loans were not transferred to the Housing Finance 
and Administration unit. This resonates with Hardy’s (1996) power over resources 
as the CFO held onto the resources he wanted. The rent collection sub-unit 
manages the rent collections for the whole local authority – A, B and C. Rent is 
no longer collected by the separate units A, B and C. Monitoring and control 
supervises the internal controls across the housing function. It also keeps track 
of income, expenditure, procurement procedures, budget management and 
control. The Technical and Architecture business unit is comprised of a small 
number of housing architects and engineers. They are involved in drawing up 
housing plans for buildings and extensions and carrying out housing and 
maintenance and repairs. 
Together, the five housing business units (see Figure 6.1) are accountable to one 
individual, the director of housing. Having housing services under the remit of one 
director ensures housing issues are dealt with properly and as efficiently as 
possible. The five to one (i.e. five business unit heads to one director) reporting 
structure means control is much tighter and staff can now be held accountable 
due to their clear responsibilities. It ensures a two-way communication across the 
new flat service structure.  
If one service unit is getting frustrated by the fact that another service 
unit is not delivering their part of the service fast enough, the unit 
heads can try and hammer out the issue between themselves and if 
it’s the case that they cannot sort the issue among themselves then 
there is one decision maker who can intervene and make the call. So 
control is now much tighter. The structure is now very clear (Senior 
Executive Officer (1)). 
Historically, the business units would have been headed up by a senior executive 
officer. However, Senior Executive Officer (1) described how: 
Business units are no longer managed by a senior executive officer. 
Firstly, we wouldn’t have the staff numbers to allow that, but what we 
are introducing now is a system whereby it could be a grade seven or 
a grade six who heads up the business units. Traditionally, a grade six 
or grade seven would have to report directly to a grade eight before 
getting to the director of service; but now they will report directly to the 
184 
director in charge - i.e. the central decision maker. This is a radical 
change for the local authority. 
These structural changes saw staff jobs being redefined with new rules being 
established clearly outlining what their job roles entailed. “Rules routinize 
organisational activities and define authority relations, connections among sub-
units, and decision-making structures” (March, Schulz and Zhou, 2000, p.9) this, 
in turn, nurtured increased staff accountability and is evident in the following 
comment.  
Staff were now held more answerable to tasks. They could no longer 
simply pass tasks on to their senior executive officers. Management 
staff were being made manage. With this type of arrangement, if there 
is a grade six in charge of the business unit, and they are reporting 
directly to the director of service, they will have to perform. There is no 
other option. There is nobody else they can go to (Senior Executive 
Office (1)). 
The CEO was very proactive and vocal in pressing his intention for managers to 
manage (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4.1). In so doing, he believed that the 
increase hands on management would turn around staff performance that in turn 
would bring about improvements in organisational efficiency. The next section 
describes the implementation of the new housing structure, illuminating the 
activities of the CEO and his allies in handling the reforms. 
6.3 Implementation of the new housing structure - how 
In order to achieve the new centralised housing structure, the CEO had to decide 
which unit, A, B, or C would be designated head of housing or water or roads41. 
The CEO knew that politically he would have to allocate one service to A, one to 
B and another to C. He was aware that to ensure a successful implementation of 
the housing structure, he had to keep the councillors on board with the new plans. 
He knew that if housing, roads and water were all centralised at A, councillors at 
B and C would have felt their power and influence was being diminished. Knowing 
this, the strategic decision was made that the directorship for housing would be 
                                            
41 Upon completion of SSR’s, Waste was sold off as it was no longer cost effective to continue to 
deliver this service. 
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located at C, while roads at A and water at B. This presented the idea that 
services were fairly allocated between the three units. 
The decision as to which unit got which service was determined by where the 
newly appointed directors of service were currently located and for the CEO to 
push the restructuring through: 
[The CEO] handpicked the three directors, for housing, water and 
roads. He needed to select three people who believed in the process, 
who believed in the change and who were solid with the workers. The 
CEO could not have put someone into the role who thought this whole 
thing was a mess, no consultation, no this, no that (Senior Executive 
Officer (3)). 
The CEO gained the support of his potential allies by presenting the structure in 
terms of values and problems that resonated with them. He also promoted and 
communicated the housing SSR report as superior to the existing housing 
structure.  
The first newly appointed director of housing was asked personally by the CEO 
to stand in, for one year only, to ensure the implementation of the new housing 
structure happened. The reason for one-year tenure was that housing already 
had an incumbent director. Interviewees were puzzled by the appointment, 
because the incumbent had years of housing experience but in hindsight they 
could see why this new person was selected - he “worked days and nights” 
(Burns, 2000, p.575) and was a keen advocate of performance management and 
risk control, as highlighted in the quote below: 
He was brought in for the year to set up the new housing structure. 
The year has now gone and he is still here. To be fair, he did a super 
job. He had no major background in housing, an engineer by 
background. To be fair, he managed it, worked so hard on it, working 
days, nights, weekends and all. The CEO hand-picked him. And you 
know, I suppose at the time, people would have questioned that was 
a bit of a strange thing, because there were directors who had 
experience in housing, but when you stand back from it a year later 
you could understand how he was picked and put in there (Senior 
Executive Officer (3)). 
Also, another interviewee stated: 
The director was mad into performance management and risk (Senior 
Executive Officer (2). 
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These comments highlight how the new director was an ally of the CEO as he 
shared the CEO’s vision of reform and had the determination to drive it as 
explained by the CEO: 
At least mentally, he was committed to making the new housing 
structure happen, rather than another director who might say, well, 
that’s all very fine, but that won’t work around here. So that helped. He 
was the best person to head it up on the basis he had all the thought 
processes he wanted. If you look at it, you can see it in his 
management report. 
The new director’s management report will be examined later in Section 6.5. It 
elaborates on how the new housing director reformed management control in 
housing. Next, how the CEO mobilised allies, cultivated cooperation, and 
strategic alliances for housing reform is described.  
6.3.1 Changing mind-sets for a new housing service structure 
There was a shared consensus among the interviewees that one of the main 
personal concerns for the majority of Gladiator’s staff was where they would be 
placed geographically. If they were located at A, they did not want to be moved 
to B or C. This could result in increased travelling time and travel costs for staff. 
Interviewees explained how: 
The CEO had a thinking in his own head and explained how he could 
have taken people from C and placed them at A because [this] is 
allowed  within their contracts. The CEO has authority over staff roles 
and location. However, the CEO believed that would get him/her 
nothing, it would only get him bad will (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
I suppose the fact that the conscious decision was made as far as it 
was possible to not relocate staff, that was appreciated and in terms 
of staff motivation that made a huge difference. Whereas if they had 
been moved there would have been absolute murder (Director of 
Service (3)). 
This strategic job location approach helped lessen potential internal conflict for 
the CEO and senior management team. Similar sentiment findings were revealed 
by Yazdifar (2013, p.195) in his case study of Omega where the FD commented 
that to break possible resistance to change “you have to be seen to be doing 
something for the employee, not just money”.  
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Another possible obstacle to the successful restructuring of Housing was the 
potential loss of job identity. Some housing staff members were very upset when 
they learned that their job role in housing located at unit B was being relocated to 
unit A. So, despite having maintained their location at unit B they were now going 
to be allocated a new job role. According to interviewees, housing is a service 
where staff members are emotionally attached to their jobs. They feel their job 
role purpose is to provide good quality housing for people in need as described 
by Senior Executive Officer (2): 
There are some people who have a personal attachment to the job. 
Like the Head of C said at one of our meetings, he said, “you really do 
have to have a heart to work in housing. I see staff who are very 
attached to particular aspects of their job. You have staff dealing with 
rent applications for elderly people and people with disabilities and you 
have staff that see very sad situations here. It is hard to explain to 
people why anybody would want to hold on to that job role, but some 
staff do”.  And, in this day and age, when the public sector is being run 
down to such a huge extent, some staff need to feel that they’re doing 
something that confers meaning for them. 
This is similar to Shamir (1991, p.440) who argued “the motivation for carrying 
out tasks and continuing in an employment are not only a matter of instrumental 
or even ‘hedonistic’ motives (such as pleasure from the activity itself), but the 
motivation may come from the meaning for the individual, e.g. in terms of 
affirmation of his or her identity and collective affiliations”. Nevertheless, despite 
some evidence of staff upset at their changing job roles, this was overcome by 
what was happening in the Irish economy. Senior Accountant (3) explained: 
Staff were also aware that people were losing their jobs right left and 
centre outside of the local authority and our wages and pensions had 
been cut so that is why people accepted it, they don’t like it but they 
got on with it. 
Additionally, the existing housing service mind-set, as explained by the CEO, was 
another potential obstacle to reform: 
Housing by its nature is about people and people in lots of difficulty. 
And housing staff are very good at thinking about housing and social 
problems and all that mix of what they’re trying to fix. However, they 
don’t necessarily spend a lot of their time thinking about the 
management structures and the reporting and the project 
management and the KPI’s. So it’s a pretty challenging directorate for 
anybody to kind of say, well, we really are about fixing all of these 
188 
problems with people who need housing but we also need to sustain 
the view that you still need to have financial management. 
Lapsley and Pallot (2000, p.225) illustrated how at one of their case study sites 
“it was necessary to remind managers that financial constraint always matters 
when dealing with public money”. So how was this contradiction in mind-sets 
overcome? According to the CEO: 
You have to have perseverance and it takes a long time. I’ve used the 
management team, I have probably lost sight a small bit of it now, but 
each director of service is required to come with a management report 
every quarter to our management meeting. So even if they don’t agree 
with this new management accountability ethos or they’re milk and 
watery about it, they know they have to present a management report 
on their service activities at the meeting. 
This new quarterly management reporting rule and routine (Burns and Scapens, 
2000) to present the financial performance of their services to the CEO and their 
colleagues was radical for the senior managers. As the CEO put it: 
This creates competition among the directors because nobody wants 
their figures to be low in front of their colleagues. It gets them to 
question why certain figures are poor etc. It is a slow process but they 
know it will be asked for and they have to present their quarter results. 
Thus, we can see the CEO acknowledges that change can be slow, but by 
requesting management accounting information on a consistent basis staff 
behaviours began to change. They also began to interact more favourably with 
management accounting information. Furthermore, the factors utilised by the 
CEO and senior managers to drive the reform agenda (see Chapter Five, Figure 
5.4) also formed part of the complex process of minimising possible housing staff 
resistance to reform. The next section examines the interaction between the five 
housing business units (i.e. the new housing structure). 
6.3.2 Interaction between the new five housing business units 
The managers of the five housing business units (set out in Figure 6.1) came 
together and set out work procedures (i.e. technical controls (Tessier and Otley, 
2012)) detailing how each business unit would interact with each other. They then 
sat down with all the business unit supervisors and worked through the new job 
role duties and responsibilities. Subsequently, the managers, wanting to gather 
staff input into these new duties and responsibilities, asked the supervisors to 
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discuss them with the subordinates who report directly into them. Clear 
communication and lower level staff involvement was essential to establishing 
new housing service procedures. 
However, due to the tacit knowledge held by these lower level staff members, it 
transpired that some of the housing service procedures belonged to A, some to 
B and some to C; some of the procedures belonged to social operations and 
some belonged to housing options. This triggered the managers to question how 
the five business units were going to interact with each other. Senior Executive 
Officer (2) described how they overcame the issue: 
So what we did was we called a day-long meeting of all the section 
heads below us, so we had ourselves, the senior staff officers and staff 
officers that were in charge of sections. And we sat down and went 
through the housing structure one by one, starting with social 
operations, saying who is going to interact with social operations, in 
what context and we listed out all the procedures that we had to 
develop just to interact with each other. I think we ended up with 
something like 156 procedures. And then we devised who does what. 
The business unit heads signed off on the new agreed procedures and 
they were saved up on a shared server for the housing unit staff to 
refer to when needed.  
The procedures outlined who was responsible for what, as explained by Senior 
Executive Officer (2): 
Before we offer to sell a house on the tenant purchase scheme we 
need to know whether the house is capable of being sold. Is it freehold. 
We have to know the tenant has the right to buy the house, that they 
have the required tenancy and that their rent is up to date. We don’t 
have that information, social operations do. So, we must interact with 
the social operations unit and housing finance unit.  
This highlights how each housing business unit is independent but they were also 
interrelated. The Social Operations business unit is linked to the Housing Options 
business unit and the Finance business unit and vice versa. The managers wrote 
all of the procedures down and had them as their rulebook (i.e. management 
control) which was open to reform once it was agreed with all units. 
What we said was let’s get the procedures on paper, which was a lot 
of work, but we got them on paper step by step. They are not written 
in stone but as you go through it you might need to change them. BUT, 
if you are changing something you have to discuss it with the other 
business units first. Any housing policy updates are maintained by the 
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Housing Policy and Coordination business unit (Senior Executive Staff 
Officer (2)).  
The housing procedures noted above provided structure to service-delivery as 
well as “making them more understandable for users” (Tessier and Otley, 2012, 
p.786) and objectifying “know-how” (Tessier, 2014, p.163). They were also 
allowing for “control improvement” by allowing revisions if they were deemed 
appropriate (Tessier, 2014, p.155). Housing now had clear objectives and job 
roles for staff.  
If you have a central function managed by one director and responsible 
for a clear set of objectives well then those are the objectives they will 
follow. It is now taking some of the power away from the unit levels 
who were doing a jack of all trades, doing everything but no one really 
knew what they were doing. The new structure resulted in changes to 
power relations, the new structure clearly displayed what staff were 
required to do resulting in transparent job roles (CFO). 
Having user involvement in the design of the new housing procedures reflects 
what Adler and Borys (1996) refer to as good practice in the design of new 
controls. Senior Staff Officer (1) described how staff supported the restructuring 
because they were included in the redesign: 
Now in fairness, everybody is trying to look at things, trying to review 
them all the time and trying to do things better. We are not just 
changing it for the sake of changing it. 
Nevertheless, despite the downward and upward interactions between staff 
members in the housing business units, it is important to realise that the new staff 
roles were, according to Senior Staff Officer (1) “akin to learning to drive” for them: 
If you get behind the wheel as a learner driver, you say “Crikey!, how 
can I drive?”, I have to steer it, I have to change the gears and I have 
to press the brake. But, after a while things become automatic. That is 
a similar scenario to our new housing structures and job roles. 
Senior Staff Officer (1) has clearly described how, by following the rules and 
continually repeating them, things eventually became automatic (unconscious). 
The new routine job roles and structures over time became the norm in the new 
housing structure. In terms of Burns and Scapens (2000) framework, Senior Staff 
Officer (1) has described (in his own words) housing’s process of 
institutionalisation. Burns and Scapens (2000, p.12) describe it as “if, over time, 
the emerging routines become widely accepted in the organisation such as they 
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become the unquestionable form of management control then they can be said 
to be institutionalised”.  
The above described how the housing business units’ managers established new 
service rules. They clearly outlined how each housing unit should interact with 
each other, as well as each individual staff member’s role. Interaction and direct 
communication between higher and lower level staff was a necessity. The next 
section will continue to address RQ2, by describing how the management of 
budgets42 during a period of austerity was reformed. 
6.4 Budgets in housing 
Budget control was not a practice enforced at Gladiator. Senior Executive Officer 
(3) described how when he arrived at Gladiator: 
I couldn’t get over it when I arrived here first, actually, I was aghast 
really. Nobody in my business unit knew about budgets. People just 
continued to charge to codes over the years. The codes would have 
been massively overspent and still nobody took people to task on it. 
In the newly implemented housing structure, the manager of the Finance and 
Administration business unit (see Figure 6.1) controls the capital and revenue 
expenditure budget codes.  
We’re monitoring the budget, we control both the expenditure and 
income side to see if they have exceeded 50% of the budget, if half 
the year is gone, we are asking questions of the code holders, who are 
responsible for the codes as to why you have exceeded the budget, or 
if they are not up to the 50% as to why isn’t the money being spent. It 
is monitoring and controlling budgets to an extent that was never there 
before (Senior Staff Officer (2)). 
Housing staff were now being held accountable for their spending and income 
figures. New stricter budget control rules formally recognising the way in which 
“things should be done” were being enforced (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.6). 
For example, in order to open a new budget code or use an existing budget code 
on the new ERP system (see Chapter Five, Section 5.7), the requesting person 
had to get approval from their senior executive officer.  
                                            
42 Budgets are part of Gladiator’s housing financial management control practice. 
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If somebody opens a budget code and they don’t have funding towards 
it, then the senior executive officer will be asked at the end of the year 
“why did you open that code when there isn’t any budget for it. Where 
are you going to get the money for it”. There is now more strict 
guidance for people to follow (Senior Executive Officer (4)). 
Historically, the support Finance Department of Gladiator (see Figure 5.1, 
Chapter Five) had authority to open budget codes, but that task was taken away 
from them and allocated specifically to the senior executive officer of the housing 
Finance and Administration business unit. 
Finance cannot open a budget code in housing because the senior 
executive officer is responsible for the housing codes, not them. 
Whereas before, you see, it would have been them. He has to keep 
drilling it into them and saying “how many times do I have to tell you, 
you can no longer open a budget code”. I think that is the only way, by 
drilling it into them and I think they are getting there now. We have 
more control now (Senior Executive Officer (4)). 
This is an illustration of a reform to Housing’s management of controls. Senior 
Executive Officer (4) explained how necessary it was for him to continually re-
enforce to staff, that their historic routine of opening budget codes was no longer 
acceptable. He had to keep repeating this new rule until the practice became 
routine and eventually over time the norm to no longer open budget codes without 
his approval. Thus, housing staff were now held responsible for their allocated 
budgets, which according to Burchell et al., (1980, p.5) shapes their views 
because what gets “accounted for” represents what is important and the 
organisation’s reality. Budgets were no longer prepared to legitimise spending 
but used to plan and control housing’s spending and income activities.  
The next section discusses the BSC, a new management control tool 
implemented by the newly appointed director of housing. This continues to 
develop our understanding of research objective two by illuminating further how 
an Irish local authority handled reforms in its management controls. The BSC was 
a new management control tool and practice for housing.  
6.5 BSC and performance management 
Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson (2000, p.727), for instance, contended, “top 
management is expected to achieve control with the help of management 
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accounting techniques, whereby people or units are made accountable for certain 
activities and results”. In June 2011, the new director of housing implemented a 
BSC in the housing service, known locally as the department’s business plan. 
The business plan was prepared manually on a word document and it 
represented the housing department’s new management control system. 
According to Director of Service (1): 
Business planning is back on the agenda again, the CEO has it on his 
agenda, he mentions performance management a lot now and I think 
he is seeing it coming through now in housing so it is diffusing. 
Historically, there were always three housing business plans prepared in terms 
of unit A, B and C. Now the housing department has a centralised business plan 
under the responsibility of one individual, i.e. the director of housing. Thus, the 
performance management information available now for housing was different.  
Now we have a centralised business plan and we’ve one person 
responsible. For example, if you go back to the unsold affordable 
housing at A, B and C. C had no problem, they had eight houses. B 
had five hundred houses and A had about two hundred houses. And, 
each unit is trundling along in its own way and trying to get the houses 
let or sold. Being centralised means they are all in one place, it is all 
amalgamated, it is a lot clearer to move them all along together. So it 
is different in that sense. It is easier to control, you should achieve your 
targets more easily, because they are within the control of one body, 
not three different geographical units. That’s the change there really 
(Director of Service (1)). 
The housing business plan allowed the managers to communicate strategically 
to staff as it provided the “context for organisational actions, the meaning of 
events, knowledge, information and motivation” (Mazzei, 2014, p.91). However, 
the actual term BSC was not used, because the director of housing believed that 
the housing staff would just view it as another irrelevant academic management 
accounting tool. That is why no use of BSC terminology was made, instead it was 
referred to as the housing business plan as the term business plan was 
understood by staff and accepted. 
The director of housing implemented the BSC in the housing 
department. Now the director would not use that lingo out there, 
because that lingo is the worst thing you could use. The director 
referred to it as their business plan (Director of Service (1)). 
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The director of housing explained that for him to be able to manage an efficient 
and effective delivery of service, he needs clear rules, routines and reporting 
structures. As Director of Service (1) explained about the housing director’s 
reasoning for introducing the BSC: 
You see he would find it very hard to work in a place where he is not 
clear about things. He likes clear structures, he would hate to go into 
a meeting if he was not clear about something. He just has to have the 
facts, perhaps that is the engineering background in him. He likes to 
have things simple and straightforward in as far as he can. Some 
people would think the business plan (BSC) could be simplified further 
but for him they are happy with this process, it is as simple as it can 
be. 
Thus, the new procedures made “life more predictable and thereby reduce 
ambiguity and anxiety” (Schein, 2017, p.198). The director’s newly developed 
business plan (see Figure 6.2) listed the organisation’s 2011 strategy for housing. 
It displays the four BSC perspectives - Customer, Internal Process, Learning and 
Growth and Financial. These were drawn upon by the director to outline 
Housing’s strategic objectives. The director believed that by clearly outlining 
Housing’s strategic objectives to his staff, its mission of “improving the quality of 
life of the people of XX by enhancing the physical, social, cultural and economic 
environment in a sustainable and socially inclusive manner” would be achieved 
(Source: Figure 6.2). The business plan helped the director manage his staff by 
clearly communicating to them what they should be striving towards: 
I suppose the main thing about people is that they don’t know what 
their big performance indicator is, what are we existing for? What do 
we get up in the morning for? The business plan sets out key 
performance indicators (KPI) for staff. The overall KPI for housing is 
the waiting list and how many people are on the waiting list (Director 
of Service (1)). 
Table 6.1 presents the key strategic housing objectives determined by the 
housing director for 2011. These are described next.  
The customer perspective outlined how Gladiator wanted to provide its 
communities with the best housing service it could afford to provide. The internal 
process perspective displayed Gladiator’s desire to provide necessary housing 
where needed and explained it will work closely with other government and 
external agencies who also impact on this process. Gladiator also looked at 
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where shared services could be incorporated to enhance service-delivery of 
housing. For the learning and growth perspective, Gladiator wanted to ensure its 
management information systems were up to date and that they had the required 
technologies to provide the best housing service possible. They also wanted to 
implement an effective staff performance management system. Finally, for the 
financial perspective, Gladiator wanted to collect income and control 
expenditures. 
However, the business plan was not without its risks. A lack of both financial and 
staff resources were identified as being key limitations, and risks, to the 
achievement of the business plan. Each of the objectives in Figure 6.2 and Table 
6.2 were assigned performance measures and targets (see Appendix C, due to 
size not presented here). The staff held responsible for attaining each of the 
objectives were named on the business plan (for confidentiality reasons they 
were removed from Appendix C) and they could see how they were being 
measured and whether they were on target or not. “Ambiguity can cause tension 
and anxiety”, whereas “formalisation can help reduce ambiguity by making it 
clearer for employees what is expected of them” (Tessier, 2012, p.152). 
Management accounting information facilitated the director of housing in 
alleviating any ambiguities for staff by helping to clarify their roles, responsibilities 
and targets which according to Hopwood (1990, p.12), is “why many 
organisations are looking afresh at the power of accounting information”. In 
addition, Hiebl (2018) also argues that management accounting information is a 
political resource to aid change agents in organisational reforms.   
In addition, the risk of not achieving the targets was also incorporated into the 
plan (see Appendix C).  
What is the risk of not achieving the target, i.e. between 1- 4. Would 
the impact be big or very small, it is either a level 1, 2, 3 or 4. If the risk 
is low or high you have to think what have I got to do to achieve this. 
A lot of people can create targets but they don’t do anything with them, 
they just sit there. So the business plan outlines when is the start and 
finish date and who is responsible for each target (Director of Service 
(1)). 
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Figure 6.2 Gladiator’s Housing Department’s business plan (BSC)  
Source: Internal document.  
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 
 
 
 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
C1: Provide us with good community services 
We will assure that our communities have the best services we can affordably provide 
 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
IP02: Provide housing where needed 
We will work to ensure that necessary housing is provided to support a comfortable 
lifestyle and the continued development of Gladiator 
 
IP10: Liaise with government, local development agencies & external agencies 
We will assure effective liaison between our plans and activities and the plans and 
activities of other government, local development and external agencies whose activities 
impact Gladiator 
 
IP15: Establish shared services where appropriate 
We will identify areas where a shared service approach can be implemented with 
improved service-delivery 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
L2: Manage technology resources & develop management information systems 
We will ensure that we manage the technology resources available to us and that we have 
the management information systems we need, and that these systems work together in 
an integrated and effective fashion 
 
L4: Manage and enhance team & individual performance 
We will implement an effective performance management system that will allow us to 
measure performance and to enhance the performance of each individual and team in the 
organisation 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
F2: Maximize income collection 
We will continue to collect income for services provided, where appropriate, while 
identifying additional areas where fees would be appropriate and ensure that fees fully 
reflect the cost of services 
 
F3: Control expenditure 
We will continue to control all expenditure and will work to provide the required levels 
of services 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
Table 6.1 Gladiator’s Housing Department’s strategic objectives  
Source: Internal document. 
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The business plan transformed management controls in housing and its targets 
were reviewed every 6 months. 
At the end of the year you have either met the target or exceeded it. If 
it is half way through the year you may need to take action to get back 
on target if you are below it (Director of Service (1)). 
Having this performance management information allowed the managers to see 
where there were backlogs in their business units. The following explores why 
housing staff supported the new management control system. 
6.5.1 Housing staff buy-in to the BSC  
The housing director argued that the housing staff had in general accepted the 
new performance management system (i.e. the BSC), because many were 
involved in setting the targets, and providing the director with the information ‘for’ 
the business plan. Senior Executive Officer (4) agreed with this sentiment: 
The BSC drives people, because we are always telling them we are 
going to get caught on our targets. We tell them if we are not going to 
meet the target and ask what can we do to meet it. If we don’t meet 
the target, we’re letting people down. 
Senior Executive Officer (2) concurred: 
Well, we have our business plan and we look at the business plan and 
we set our targets and, for example, with affordable housing, we will 
say, what houses do we currently have on our hands, and then we will 
intend to have those occupied by a certain day, we look at that. 
In addition to staff participation, effective communication was also part of the 
process in gaining staff acceptance of the new management control practices.  
You will always have 1% or ½% of staff that will have problems, they 
might be afraid to do certain things or they do things very well but at 
their own pace and they disregard whatever target you set. Generally, 
I find that most people are ok. I think it is about clear communication 
and about having monthly meetings with the housing management 
team (Director of Service (1)). 
Furthermore, the director of housing was a motivated, driven and passionate 
director. He strove to succeed as a director of housing which is evident in the 
following statements. 
Every quarter the director of housing reports back to the CEO and 
senior management team on housing’s progress. He never wants his 
199 
results way down. Before the quarterly meeting, he starts preparing 3-
4 weeks in advance, he has to gather all the data from his staff and 
pull the results all together. That drives the importance of performance 
down the line, so it is a continuous circle, isn’t it (Director of Service 
(1)). 
While staff participation, communication and a motivated, effective leader were 
all important actions for staff acceptance of management control reform in 
housing, they were not carried out in a vacuum. It is important to remember the 
jolts in Chapter Five, Figure 5.1. These outlined how the financial crisis triggered 
a reduction in revenues as well as pressuring central government to cut public 
expenditure and public sector staff numbers through the McCarthy Report, 
LGERG and the Croke Park Agreement. These had all occurred prior to the 
implementation of Housing’s new business plan, and thus helped pave the way 
for its acceptance. 
6.6 Reflections on Housing’s reforms 
Reflecting on Housing’s reforms, Director of Service (1) concluded: 
Everything is up for change all of the time. I suppose looking at it now, 
when the new housing structure is up and running, it took a number of 
months to change it obviously, it is like changing the engine in a car 
while it is still running. You have to keep it going and keep everything 
happy but at the same time you have to pull everything out. A lot of 
staff are open to change I would say, but then again it makes a 
difference to have the likes of the housing management team who will 
drive it and make it happen because you cannot do it on your own. 
The above director of service’s comments aptly reflect the need for allies to 
implement new public service reforms. Service-delivery reform is something, 
which cannot be achieved by a single individual. It is also evident how the housing 
restructuring and new management control system could not have been 
implemented without buy-in from staff. The consequences of the changes in 
Gladiator’s management control system has seen more discussion and improved 
accountability emerging. Senior Executive Officer (2) described how he 
communicates on a weekly basis with his staff. They discuss the priorities around 
their unit and how they are going to achieve them. 
I would say alright that there is more calling to account in the sense 
that there is more discussion. I suppose we are more focused on what 
we said we would do as opposed to being focused on what we have 
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to work with. We are more focused, I personally think we now look at 
tasks and say this is what we want to do. We want to have these 
houses leased, how are we going to do this? We are not saying we 
have only one engineer, we have only one architect, we have only one 
this, how do we do it? What we do is we shift priorities and we change 
things depending on demand out there. So there is a lot more 
discussion, I think (Senior Executive Officer, (2)).  
Thus, to summarise here, to achieve staff buy in, power, good communications, 
and an institutional entrepreneur with allies, were essential.  
6.7 Concluding remarks 
Gladiator’s housing structure was centralised during a period of austerity. This 
was a radical change for this local authority as it now had only one overall 
decision maker, i.e. the director of housing. In implementing this new structure, 
the CEO was strategic in choosing his allies. His chosen director of housing 
believed in reform and pushed it through via his new BSC, and budgets were now 
actually enforced. Staff resistance was minimised through a mix of tactics, for 
example, examining staff locations and considering their job role identities. 
Institutional entrepreneurship, power, management accounting information and 
communication, were all intertwined in housing’s reform process. The next 
chapter presents more in-depth discussion of Chapters Five and Six. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN – DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
By addressing the two research questions posed in Chapter One, Section 1.4, 
this chapter explores the complexities and interplay of internal and external jolts 
in a settled and staid Irish local authority during a period of austerity. The existing 
beliefs and practice in Gladiator was to deliver services as fast as possible and 
at any cost. In addition, staff at Gladiator generally assumed that they had a job 
for life. This chapter discusses how the combination of a new CEO and external 
jolts enabled efficiency reforms in Gladiator’s delivery of public services and 
management controls despite initially not having an efficiency logic43. It does this 
by employing insights from the adopted pluralistic theoretical approach (see 
Chapter Three) and extant management control and NPM literatures (see 
Chapter Two).  
Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework helps to place an emphasis on unpacking 
management accounting practices (such as budgeting and BSC) in Gladiator and 
highlights them as unfolding processes over time. NIS theory (e.g. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; 1991; Scott, 2014) facilitates unravelling the relationships between 
Gladiator and its environment (i.e. financial crisis and central government 
austerity measures) Seo and Creed (2002) complement earlier NIS theory by 
highlighting Gladiator’s contradictions, which helps explain “when, how and why” 
Gladiator’s “embedded agents might come to question, and subsequently attempt 
to change, their and others’ taken-for-granted ways and beliefs” (Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.728). Battilana et al.’s (2009) institutional 
entrepreneurship work advances the exploration of the actions of people who 
“have power” (Jack, 2016, p.54), in this case study, Gladiator’s CEO. He initiated 
change and proactively drove its implementation. Why and how he achieved this, 
is discussed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. Nevertheless, despite his strategic actions, 
it is not the intention of this study to celebrate the CEO as an exceptional heroic 
                                            
43 Efficiency logic is to achieve efficiencies in service-delivery. 
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individual, rather he is conceptualised as an institutional entrepreneur who played 
a role in the complex, dynamic processes of reforms in Gladiator. 
That said, while agency is an important part of this thesis, it is not the whole story. 
Therefore, Laughlin’s (1991) model of organisational change aids the tracing of 
environmental jolts (such as a new CEO and a financial crisis) in Gladiator from 
its sub-systems (i.e, Gladiator’s staff) through to its interpretive schemes (i.e. 
Gladiator’s beliefs, values and norms), stressing the importance of context when 
examining organisational change. Finally, this thesis also draws insight from 
Hardy’s (1996) framework of power, highlighting how the CEO utilised different 
sources of power and shaped the reform process in Gladiator as he did. Such 
theoretical pluralism exemplifies the complex why and how of reform processes 
in Gladiator’s delivery of public services and management controls during a 
period of austerity.  
Chapter Seven is structured as follows. Section 7.2 discusses why Gladiator 
reformed its delivery of public services and management controls. The section 
explains how a new CEO questioned the existing ways of delivering and 
managing its services in-conjunction with the role of the external financial crisis 
in its reform process. This is followed, in Section 7.3, by a discussion of how 
Gladiator reformed its delivery of public services and management controls, 
particularly in the context of a forthcoming period of austerity. This section and its 
sub-sections illuminate the dynamic impact of the arrival of a new CEO and a 
period of austerity on shaping the new ways of thinking and doing (i.e. institutional 
change) about public service-delivery and management control in Gladiator. The 
reform process was a complex, continuous process in which strategic actions (for 
example, establishment of DD, EC and SSRGs), power, communication and 
accounting information were all intertwined. Section 7.4 specifically focuses on 
one local authority service in Gladiator, housing. It unpacks how it reformed its 
delivery of housing and management controls in addition to highlighting how staff 
resistance was curtailed. 
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7.2 RQ1: Why did Gladiator reform its delivery of public services and 
management controls? 
The following two subsections tease out the complexities of why Gladiator 
reformed its service delivery and management control practices, thus helping to 
understand the context in which the reforms came to be. 
7.2.1 Internal jolt- new CEO 
Battilana (2006, p.667) argues that an individual who has been exposed to a 
variety of organisational contexts is less likely to take-for-granted their current 
organisation’s operations. This was the case in Gladiator. The new CEO arrived 
with substantial experience having worked at several such organisations across 
Ireland and this inter-organisational mobility44 had him question Gladiator’s 
existing practices and structures. One of the first significant actions taken by him 
was to request management accounting information on how Gladiator was 
resourced and services were delivered. This questioning revealed an uneasiness 
towards the managerial information in Gladiator as a whole, leading him to further 
query its existing technical controls45 (Tessier and Otley, 2012). This questioning 
of technical controls illuminated the previously taken-for-granted assumptions 
(i.e. institutions) about service-delivery as fast as possible and at any cost (i.e. a 
‘technical inefficiency’ contradiction) and “carved the way for a process of 
designing and implementing high-level strategic change” (Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.738). Interestingly, it was management accounting 
information, which revealed such inefficiencies in service deliveries.  
The next action taken by the CEO was to ask senior management to problematise 
what they perceived as being the main issues and problems in service-delivery 
at Gladiator. In so doing, he was coercing his new colleagues to identify and make 
explicit what they perceived to be Gladiator’s management control and service-
delivery imperatives - effectively getting “them to question the taken-for-granted 
assumptions” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.197). This action also formed part of the how in 
                                            
44 Inter-organisational mobility means “the number of different organisations in which institutional 
entrepreneurs worked” (Battilana, 2006, p.666). 
45 Technical controls are defined as “rules, procedures or standards describing how to accomplish 
certain tasks” (Tessier and Otley, 2012, p.777). 
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RQ2. The CEO was getting senior management to slowly realise that reform was 
necessary and legitimate. It also facilitated him in gaining visibility into the existing 
values, beliefs and norms about service-delivery and management control in 
Gladiator (i.e. interpretive schemes, Laughlin, 1991). This is a clear example of 
how the CEO was utilising socio-ideological forms of control over his managers 
and also his power over meaning (Hardy, 1996; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). 
Socio-ideological (i.e. informal) forms of control “attempt to control worker 
mindsets” (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.425) by “persuading people to adapt 
to certain values, norms and ideas about what is good, important, praiseworthy, 
etc in terms of work and organisational life. Ideologies justify certain principles, 
actions and feelings, and discourage others” (Alvesson, 1987; Czarniawska-
Joerges and Joerges, 1988; Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.426). Similar to 
Yazdifar’s (2013, p.197) findings in Omega the CEO was convincing “staff that 
things were not right and that change was necessary, otherwise the company 
would not survive”. The CEO described how many of the senior management 
team knew the existing models of delivering services were inefficient and 
ineffective and he was not necessarily asking senior management to change a 
delivery and management control system all managers were necessarily happy 
with: 
A cohort of people realised that this can’t go on. So I wasn’t really 
coming in and changing what people were necessarily happy with, and 
comfortable with, or going to defend. They realised that something had 
to change (CEO). 
This resonates with Laughlin’s (1991) colonisation mode where he argues one 
could envisage change here as being chosen, “when what Laughlin (1987, p.485) 
calls ‘positive’ inner colonisation is occurring (i.e. where the colonising challenges 
to the interpretive schemes were welcomed, or in some sense deemed to be 
‘good for the organisation’)” (Laughlin, 1991, p.220). It is important to remember 
this as when we next examine the external jolts, that is, the financial crisis, we 
could argue that change was forced. Thus, it will be illuminated how senior 
management can also choose forced change. 
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7.2.2 External jolts - financial crisis and central government austerity 
measures 
As this is a processual approach to reform in an Irish local authority, context is 
significant and reform is “regarded as a continuous process that unfolds through 
the interplay of multiple variables within and outside of organisations” (Yazdifar 
et al., p.53). It is thus appropriate at this point to return to the external factors, 
which emerged, from September 2008, from the financial crisis, as they are part 
of, and, interwoven in the complex reform process at Gladiator. The An Bord Snip 
Nua Report, the LGERG Report and the Croke Park Agreement all 
communicated and legitimated the urgent need for public sector reforms. They 
acted as levers for the Irish central government for imposing austerity measures 
on all Irish local authorities. These levers strengthened the implementation of the 
new austerity rules imposed by central government as they appealed to staff 
members’ logic, being similar to the classical rhetorical category ‘logos’ (Suddaby 
and Greenwood, 2005). Logos covers everything individuals can establish 
“through reason and includes both logical and empirical argumentation” (Nørreklit 
and Mitchell, 2007, p.188). Gladiator’s staff were very much aware from media 
reports of the cash flow problems of central government and of how spending 
cuts seemed to be the only solution to the financial crisis. In Laughlin’s (1991) 
terms, the lower level staff interpretive schemes at Gladiator were altered due to 
the external shock of the financial crisis and central government funding cuts. 
Staff had a traditional belief that their jobs were secure and for life, but when the 
Croke Park Agreement was signed, it was signed in a period of public sector 
salary cuts and staff redundancies. Historical staff norms and beliefs about job 
security were jolted and the implementation was further driven by staff feelings of 
job loss and insecurity. van der Kolk et al., (2015, p.946) found similar job 
insecurity feelings in a local authority in the Netherlands: 
It’s for the first time in the history of [Bluetown] that such vigorous 
measures are being applied, and that job security is no longer assured 
for everyone. That’s not common for the public sector. It’s a situation 
which leads to a lot of stress on the part of the employees (Alderman 
BI). 
Thus, the status quo at Gladiator was ruptured not only by the appointment of a 
new CEO but also by a combination of external factors. The internal and external 
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jolts created and enabled service-delivery and management control reforms in 
Gladiator. This tracing of jolts through an organisation has also been carried out 
in similar studies like Contrafatto and Burns (2013). They traced three exogenous 
factors, mainly comprising of increased regulation, and the impact they had on 
sustainability issues. Gladiator’s external jolts gave further strength to the CEO’s 
vision of an efficient and effective service-delivery structure. They legitimised his 
actions, that is, “they were in accordance with relevant legal or quasi-legal 
requirements” (Scott, 2014, p.74). The importance of the external jolts in 
Gladiator was witnessed when the CFO acknowledged that reforms in its service-
delivery and management control structures would probably not have taken place 
in their absence: 
Would we have restructured and changed if we didn’t have a cut in our 
revenues? I would say absolutely not (CFO). 
This is a very interesting statement revealing how despite the historic embedded 
institution of service-delivery at any cost, not being in agreement with the majority 
of senior management’s interpretive schemes, the CFO believed the external jolts 
were the main reasons for service-delivery reforms at Gladiator and not the 
CEO’s questioning actions and efficiency agenda. 
7.3 RQ2: How did an institutional entrepreneur handle reforms in 
Gladiator’s delivery of public services and management controls, 
particularly in the context of a forthcoming period of austerity? 
While this section focuses on the how, the previous section of why, is also 
interwoven in the reform process. The CEO by questioning management 
accounting information (for example, service revenues and costings) in 
combination with drawing on external factors such as central government 
austerity pressures (i.e. McCarthy Report, LGERG Report and Croke Park 
Agreement) were also part of how Gladiator reformed its delivery of public 
services and management controls. Next, Sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.6 illuminate a 
powerful CEO’s process of institutional entrepreneurship. Again, it is important to 
reiterate, it is not the intention of this research to celebrate the CEO as an 
exceptional heroic individual - rather it offers a process-oriented account of 
purposeful institutional entrepreneurship in Gladiator’s reform processes. 
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7.3.1 Continuous questioning of delivery of services and management 
controls 
The CEO’s continuous questioning of service deliveries and management 
controls was chipping away at, and gradually deinstitutionalising46 the existing 
norms of service-delivery and management control in Gladiator. By questioning 
the historic and existing embedded understandings and beliefs of service-delivery 
as fast as possible and at any cost, he was slowly starting to develop an 
awareness and shift (if not already there) in senior management mind-sets. In an 
effort to “persuade people to adapt to certain values, norms and ideas about what 
is good, important, praiseworthy, etc in terms of work and organisational life” 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004, p.426), the CEO, in terms of the Battilana et al’s., 
(2009) model was slowly creating a vision of the need for divergent change via 
socio-ideological control. This activity epitomised praxis, the doing of change 
(Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 2002). The CEO knew his management needs 
and interests were not being met in the existing service-delivery and management 
control practices.  
Due to the discussions with the CEO about the inadequacies of the existing 
service-delivery and management control practices in Gladiator, senior 
management were bringing into their consciousness the need for reforms (Seo 
and Creed, 2002). This resonates with Hardy and Maguire’s (2008, p.208) review, 
of one body of institutional entrepreneurship work, that argued an “institutional 
entrepreneur’s communication creates shared cognitions (and emotions) that 
support institutional change”. In this research, Gladiator’s CEO is conceptualised 
as an institutional entrepreneur because he initiated reform ideas via his 
questioning and, subsequently actively drove it by leveraging resources such as 
DD, EC and SSR’s to achieve it (see DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al., 2009). He 
was seen to be slowly generating a shift in senior management’s interpretive 
schemes by communicating Gladiator’s inappropriate revenue and expenditure 
service results.  
                                            
46 Deinstitutionalisation is defined as “the process by which the legitimacy of an established 
institutionalised organisational practice erodes or discontinues (Oliver, 1992, p.564). 
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7.3.2 Development Directorate established 
Upon the CEO’s own realisation of a need for reforms in Gladiator, he drew on 
his ‘power over resources’ in establishing a new DD. Consistent with Hardy’s idea 
of ‘power over resources’, the CEO was exercising power “to influence decision 
outcomes and bring about the desired behaviour through the deployment of key 
resources on which others depend, such as information, expertise, political 
access credibility, stature and prestige, access to higher echelon members, the 
controls of money, rewards and sanctions” (Hardy, 1996, p.S7). In addition, in 
terms of Laughlin’s (1991) framework, the DD was a sub-system47, whose sole 
remit was to progress efficiency improvements in Gladiator’s delivery of public 
services. The DD’s purpose echos the essence of NPM as laid out by Hyndman 
and Lapsley (2016). DD was a powerful internal environmental disturbance 
because it was central to Gladiator’s reforms process by carving out improved 
ways of delivering services as it had no allegiance to the old ways of delivering 
services. And, consistent with Laughlin’s (1991, p.219) ideas on organisational 
change, it was as though a revolution occurred in Gladiator "generated by shifts 
and changes in the design archetype48 which designs and leads to its supporting 
interpretive schemes, with little reference to, or concern for, the previous 
interpretive schemes”. The DD became a medium for reform in the service-
delivery and management control structures (i.e. design archetype) at Gladiator 
and subsequently over time in the service-delivery and management control 
institutions.  
7.3.3 Efficiency Committee established 
The EC, another significant tangible organisational element, was introduced by 
the CEO in 2008 after the establishment of the DD. Similar to the DD it resonates 
with what Laughlin (1991) would refer to as a sub-system. The EC was separated 
from Gladiator’s internal control department, which was handed over to internal 
audit, and the EC became a stand-alone committee. This building on, instead of 
disregarding, the old structures, is an example of evolutionary change at 
                                            
47 A sub-system “is a tangible organisational element, for example, buildings, people, machines, 
finance and the behaviours and natures of these elements” (Laughlin, 1991, p.211). 
48 Design archetypes which are defined as “..compositions of structures and (management) 
systems given coherence and orientation by an underlying set of values and beliefs” (Hinings and 
Greenwood, 1988, p.4). 
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Gladiator. Evolutionary change “is incremental with only minor disruption to 
existing routines and institutions” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.20). However, 
despite the restructuring of the EC being evolutionary in nature, the actual impact 
of its actions were revolutionary “involving a fundamental disruption to existing 
routines and institutions” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.20). As described by the 
CFO: 
The target has been to deliver the same with less resources and I think 
that has been achieved except roads. 
In the context of Hardy’s (1996) work, the CEO is viewed as a political mobiliser 
who drew upon his power over resources to create this new EC (and DD, above). 
The skilful entrepreneurship of the CEO is conceptualised here as active agency. 
He was “pursuing certain interests and acting strategically” (Weik, 2011, p.468) 
in influencing how the EC was to be established and run:  
The way the EC is structured is that the committee is cross 
representational, drawing from staff across all the various directorates. 
If the committee is prepared to endorse a report for a particular service, 
with a whole series of recommendations, in effect it's going to be very 
hard for the director of that service to come along and counteract some 
of the recommendations or try to undermine some of the 
recommendations, especially if it has the backing of such a broad 
group of people from across the organisation. Now that is hard to 
argue with. (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
Hence, power over decision-making which “incorporates a variety of procedures 
and political routines that can be invoked by dominant groups to influence 
outcomes” (Hardy, 1996, p. S7), was, in addition to power over resources, also 
being exerted in Gladiator from ‘behind the scenes’ through the CEO’s use of 
political manoeuvring in committee member selections (Yazdifar et al., 2005).   
Furthermore, the EC impacted the communication systems and subsequently the 
decision-making processes in Gladiator by reporting on the economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness (three e’s) of the organisation. The terms economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness all reflect NPM language (see Hood, 1995; Hyndman and 
Lapsley, 2016). In terms of Laughlin’s (1991) work, we can view the 
communication systems and decision-making processes in Gladiator as design 
archetypes that were drawn upon by the CEO to trigger reforms in the existing 
interpretive schemes about service-delivery in Gladiator. The strategic tactics of 
the establishment of the DD and EC by the CEO achieved collective support for 
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Gladiator’s efficiency reforms. Those resisting were fighting a losing battle 
because of the collective activism on the EC supporting efficiency reform. 
7.3.4 Strategic service review groups and strategic service reviews 
In 2009, concurrently and ongoing with the external jolts above (see Section 
7.2.2), the CEO established three new SSRGs. The entrepreneurship of the CEO 
in his calculative choice over who comprised such important decision-making 
groups, was a pertinent illustration of what Hardy (1996) referred to as power 
over resources and mobilisation of power over decision-making. The CEO was 
conscious that staff in Gladiator might be working from different interpretive 
schemes and institutions (which can cause resistance to reform) than “what they 
communicate in public and may also not “mean what they say” (Cornelissen et 
al., 2015, p.12). In this respect, we can refer back to Chapter Five, Section 
5.3.2.1, when it was noted that the CEO was intent on precluding some 
colleagues from having any opportunity to resist his strategic service reform 
plans. The establishment of the SSRGs facilitated the CEO in mobilising allies, 
developing alliances and cooperation for reforms at Gladiator. Thus, revealing 
further activities (like the DD, EC, earlier) of the process of institutional 
entrepreneurship by the CEO (Battilana et al., 2009).  
The CEO instructed the SSRGs to monitor the internal SSRs carried out by DD. 
These service reviews were mainly driven by the down turn in the economy due 
to the financial crisis and central government funding cuts. Battilana et al., (2009) 
contend that jolts such as a financial crisis, create openings for institutional 
entrepreneurship to occur, and in Gladiator it drove the CEO to request SSR’s to 
be carried out. This also resonates with Laughlin (1991, p.218) who illustrates 
how “a financial crisis (an initial kick)” can feed into the design archetype (i.e. 
Gladiator’s service-delivery and management control structures) calling for major 
changes to manage such threats and these in turn, through complex processes, 
colonises the guiding interpretive schemes of the organisation”. This epitomises 
how external and internal change drivers are not static but ongoing and dynamic.  
The SSRs (see Chapter Five, Section 5.3.2.1) highlight how reform was handled 
in Gladiator. They sought to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness in Gladiator’s 
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delivery of public services while also improving service-delivery to its customers. 
These strategic service reviews further reinforced the case for efficiency and 
effectiveness in service delivery and management control. 
So what we've tried to do is look at how we're structured to see are 
there more efficient ways of delivering services with fewer resources. 
So hopefully, I suppose, a double edged sword, where we'll actually 
be able to deliver services with fewer staff but at the same time not just 
sustain the current level of service but improve the level of service to 
the customer at the same time (Senior Executive Officer (1)). 
This comment echoes the ethos of NPM and not austerity management as 
Gladiator sought to “shift the policy focus from crude expenditure cuts to the 
pursuit of enhanced efficiency and value for money” (Bracci et al., 2015, p.879). 
It also exemplifies the complexity of managing multiple demands simultaneously 
and over time. Moreover, being strategic also implied they were future looking, 
“we're looking forward, strategically, so they should be best for the organisation, 
but not just for 2010, or 2011, or 2012” (Senior Executive Officer (1)). The future 
orientation of the SSR’s highlighted the senior managers’ “capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities” (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009, p.47) for Gladiator’s 
service deliveries reflecting agency in action. 
Furthermore, the SSRs were each driven by a project charter document. They 
outlined why the reviews were needed, its objectives and what was within its 
remit. Hence, the project charter summarised the economic factors driving its 
origins, in addition to what its future hopes for service deliveries in Gladiator 
entailed. This project charter document illuminated the future and present 
dimensions of agency, in addition, to being a communication tool. The charter 
document communicated Gladiator’s senior managers’ “future imagination” of a 
better way of delivering services and how the “present” job losses and tight 
budgets were cause for its need (Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009, p.47). Thus, 
drawing on staff fears over job security and, in terms of Laughlin’s (1991) 
organisational concepts, subsequently affecting their interpretive schemes. 
Senior managers in Gladiator knew in the context of an economic crisis, reform 
had to happen and keeping the charter document very simple and user relevant 
was crucial. This concurs with Baldvinsdottir, Burns, Nørreklit, and Scapens’ 
(2010, p.5) findings of “the language test needs to be passed. It needs simple 
language – which 400,000 workers can connect to…...”. Contrafatto and Burns 
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(2013, p.357) agree with this idea, stating, “the change process tends to be 
smoother when there is clear communication about the required new ways”. 
In addition, the CEO wrote a letter in June 2009 to staff outlining how the current 
environmental challenges dictated that further progress be made in enhancing 
efficiency, improving coordination, and maintaining high standards of customer 
service-delivery. Greater use of management accounting information was also 
occcuring to make visible to staff the financial issues faced by Gladiator during a 
time of austerity. Economic vocabulary such as “efficiency, value for money, cost 
effectiveness” (Hopwood, 1990, p.15) were being drawn upon by the CEO to 
reform Gladiator. In so doing, he was drawing on what Hardy (1996) terms power 
of meaning to convince staff that management control and service-delivery 
reform was rational, necessary and legitimate (see also Burns, 2000; Jack, 2016). 
The letter represents the CEO’s push towards NPM style of control. That is “a 
government that works better and costs less” (Pollitt, 2000, p.183). Finally, in 
2010, the strategic service review findings were communicated to Gladiator’s 
staff.  
7.3.5 Strategic service reviews findings  
The findings of the SSRs illuminated service delivery and management control 
inefficiencies. They highlighted how Gladiators service deliveries and 
management controls were nebulous in nature with different reporting structures 
and operational practices in use across the organisation. Additionally, staff were 
holding multiple jobs that were unclear in nature. The SSRs conclusions 
challenged the existing norms, values and beliefs at Gladiator and attempted to 
define new “interpretations and meanings that could become widely understood 
and shared by” (Smircich, 1983, p.161) Gladiators staff. They stressed the need 
for an improved focus on strategic issues, performance management and clear 
staff roles and responsibilities.  
Upon communicating to staff the SSRs findings (as explained in Chapter Five, 
Section 5.3.4), the DD was commanded the task by the CEO to establish a new 
service-delivery and management structure. They had to identify and document 
each of the four services’ (waste, housing, water, and roads) core objectives, staff 
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roles and responsibilities, and establish key performance indicators and targets. 
The DD’s recommendations were firstly, a centralised decision-making function 
(for example, see Chapter Six, Figure 6.1) for each service and secondly, an 
elimination of multi-functional staff roles. The CEO and councillors sanctioned 
these recommendations. However, to be implemented successfully the new 
service structures needed the support of the directors of services and managers. 
Therefore, the CEO using his formal authority as head of the organisation set 
about making the managers manage. He called “the shots” (Burns, 2000, p.580). 
This is interesting and signals the CEO’s coercive use of power by making the 
managers manage which is in contrast to public sector reforms which aim “at 
‘letting managers manage’” (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2000, p.727). The 
CEO instructed the directors of services and senior managers that it was their 
responsibility to ensure that the new service-delivery structures and management 
control practices were implemented. The CEO’s action illuminates what Hardy 
(1996) terms power of resources. Senior Executive Officer (2) recalled how: 
I think that management mind-set, and I suppose, I’m not saying that 
we didn’t have it already, it’s not that, I think we are just becoming 
more aware of it. 
Through the power of rhetoric, the CEO was triggering dormant interpretive 
schemes into action and making service management practices a personal 
reflection of the directors and managers work etiquette. He informed them that 
they needed to manage and were accountable for their actions. This concurs with 
Overmans and Noordegraaf’s (2014, p.99) findings who wrote, “coping with 
austerity is the responsibility of public sector managers”. The CEO’s use of 
rhetoric reflects a new design archetype in Laughlin’s (1991) framework that 
subsequently slowly fed into the interpretive schemes of Gladiator’s staff.  
The directors of services and senior managers were also important change 
agents49 (mobilised by the CEO) to drive the service reforms. In driving the 
reforms to achieve efficiencies, they drew on the external environment, created 
                                            
49 They are change agents and not institutional entrepreneurs because the directors and 
managers did not initiate the change process. 
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a sense of urgency and carried out verbal repetition (see Chapter Five, Section 
5.4.1). They specifically drew on the Croke Park Agreement mandate to legitimise 
and make appear rational the reforms. Effectively, they were emphasising 
“conformity to rules” (Scott, 2014, p.74). The Croke Park Agreement can be 
conceptualised as new central government rules enforced to achieve cost 
savings and efficiencies in the public sector. The CEO and senior managers also 
drew on austerity rhetoric (for example, stating expenditures in services are down 
by 10%50 and our staff numbers are declining) to push service-delivery reforms 
through.  
In addition, they also created a sense of urgency about the reforms, consistent 
with Tessier and Otley’s (2012, p.785) case studies findings where “controls were 
implemented in both companies in a hurry because sources of pressure were 
associated with a sense of urgency”. Dawson (2003, p.12) also argued that:  
although one consequence of the September 2001 terrorist attack in 
New York has been a shake-up and restructuring of the airline 
industry, a number of commentators have suggested that the need for 
change preceded this event that brought into such stark relief the need 
and urgency for change.  
Finally, directors and senior managers kept verbally repeating (i.e. forcing), this 
is “the new way of doing things”. These are the new job roles and there is no 
reverting back to past practices. Again, similar to Tessier and Otley’s (2012, 
p.790) case study findings where change eventually occurred because “the new 
CEO forced Company A to implement new controls”. This highlights how strategic 
management needs to be continually managed and reflects how institutional 
change in service-delivery and management control is being enhanced by the 
verbal repetition of “this is how we now do things around here”. This reform 
approach is on changing staff actions with the expectation that the thinking (i.e. 
interpretive schemes) will follow. Furthermore, the reform is actually forced, but it 
is presented to senior management staff as if they have chosen it from their own 
awareness (i.e. interpretive schemes) of service-delivery inefficiencies.  
                                            
50 Source: Project charter document. 
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In summary, this research conceptualises the new CEO, management 
accounting information, the project charter document, CEO’s letter and the 
service review findings as jolts to the existing design archetypes (Laughlin, 1991). 
They all came about because of the external financial crisis combined with the 
work of the DD, EC and SSRGs, which were all driven by the powerful agency of 
the CEO. The continuous communication of management accounting information 
from the DD, EC and SSRs slowly colonized the interpretive schemes of Gladiator 
eventually resulting in “a totally new underlying ethos for the organisation as a 
whole” (Laughlin, 1991, p.219). Next, the process of reforms in Gladiator’s 
budgets is specifically discussed. Budgets were Gladiator’s financial 
management practice. 
7.3.6 Reform of budgets  
Budgets are conceptualised in this research as part of the management structure 
(i.e. design archetype) in Gladiator (Laughlin, 1991). According to Broadbent 
(1992), the elements of the design archetypes mirror elements of the interpretive 
schemes. Analysing reforms in Gladiator’s budgeting process allows the 
researcher to display how the interpretive schemes developed “in the context of 
a process of change” (Broadbent, 1992, p.347). Budgeting was a statutory 
requirement at Gladiator, budgets were prepared separately at units A, B, and C. 
Budget preparation routines formed part of the taken-for-granted assumptions 
and beliefs concerning service management activities at Gladiator. Incremental 
budgeting was the accepted approach and budgets were akin to budget holder’s 
wish lists. Approved budgets represented legitimised spending activities of the 
budget holders with little or no accountability. These budget practice findings 
resonate with the findings of James (2006, p.18) in an Australian electricity 
corporation: 
….having achieved all that [the budget process], everyone put it in the 
bottom drawer and went ahead and spent and did what they wanted 
to anyway. 
However, when the CEO questioned the budget information presented to him 
upon commencement of his tenure, it “fundamentally jolted” the taken-for-granted 
incremental budgeting practices at A, B and C because the lack of organisation 
clarity and poor budget controls became evident (Burns, 2000, p.574). Because 
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of the CEO’s questioning, in conjunction with the broader societal influences of 
the financial crisis and central government austerity pressures for cutbacks, the 
traditional budgeting process at Gladiator was reformed becoming a centralised 
budget process (i.e. moving away from the individual budget unit (A, B, C) 
approach). In terms of the institutional entrepreneurship literature, the CEO’s 
formal position, being new and his rhetoric ability to draw on the external austerity 
pressures placed on Gladiator, provided him with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
councillors and senior management to implement this new centralised  budget 
setting reform (see Battilana, 2006; Battilana et al., 2009). As Senior Accountant 
(3) explained in Chapter Five, Section 5.5.1, the CEO could actually say, “let’s do 
something different” which an existing CEO wouldn’t even attempt to do. 
This is an interesting finding, clearly reflecting the paradox of embedded agency 
puzzle. That is, “if actors are embedded in an institutional field and subject to 
regulative, normative and cognitive processes that structure their cognitions, 
define their interests and produce their identities, how are they able to envision 
new practices and then subsequently get others to adopt them?” (Garud et al., 
2007, p.961). In Gladiator, it is evident that agency characteristics were already 
active in budgeting practices prior to the CEO’s arrival. The CFO and senior 
accountants had spoken about revising Gladiator’s budget process to a central 
function, but they believed that the councillors would never accept it: 
We said the councillors will never go for a centralized budget (Senior 
Accountant (3)). 
This demonstrates how despite individuals being settled in their ways of 
managing and delivering services had imagined and spoke about alternative 
budget practices, i.e. centralisation of budget preparation as opposed to unit A, 
B and C delivery of budgets. This represents a reflective moment for Gladiator’s 
actors as they critiqued existing patterns and searched for alternatives (Burns 
and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.729). However, their lack of praxis was due to their 
perceived lack of power to mobilise councillors behind the budgeting process 
change idea. Thus, Gladiator’s CFO and senior accountant did not have an active 
moment “involving mobilisation and collective action” (Seo and Creed, 2002, 
p.230). 
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Nevertheless, despite the councillors accepting the new CEO’s centralised 
budgeting process, they still resisted elements of this new approach. They 
demanded budget meetings continue to be held in November in units A, B, C as 
had always been the practice. Despite them having no decision to make about 
service price setting they were still holding onto some of the historic “taken-for-
granted ways of thinking” and managing at Gladiator (Burns and Scapens, 2000, 
p.5). A senior accountant was quoted in Chapter Five as saying he believed the 
reason the councillors wanted to hold on to this legacy budget routine was for 
strategic reasons. The media attended the budget meetings and the councillors 
wanted to use the media to signal to their constituents whether they were in 
favour of the current year’s charges or not, thus achieving an appearance of 
legitimate budget activity and enhancing their own political support; and , thus 
illuminating how “pressures from the press and citizens and the ‘volatility of 
voters’ were regarded as the most important factors” for councillors (ter Bogt, 
2008(a), p.42). This highlights how budgets are as much about politics as they 
are about control. Control is a means of achieving desired outcomes, whereas 
politics is “the practical domain of power in action” (Buchanan and Badham, 1999, 
p.11). 
7.3.6.1 Budgetary control 
The centralisation of the budget setting process now implied that the directors of 
units A, B, and C were given a budget by the support Finance Department that 
they were told they had to operate within. The fundamental budget control rules 
were now being enforced stating that budgets must be met and not overspent. In 
terms of Tessier and Otley’s (2012, p.777) work, these are technical controls 
which are “rules, procedures or standards describing how to accomplish” budget 
control. This enforcement of the first principles of budgets removed the 
decoupling of budget rules from budget practices. Decoupling is an 
“organisational response to external pressure to implement new accounting 
routines” (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005, p.47). That is, to secure external 
legitimacy organisations implement new accounting routines, “but at the same 
time decouples them from day-today operations in order to maintain the technical 
efficiency of the organisation” (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005, p.47).  
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This historic budget practice in Gladiator of preparing the budget (for legitimacy 
purposes) and then not controlling it was removed. Budget practice now had to 
reflect the budget rule, which was, no overspending and according to Simons 
(1995, p.84) a manager is better off telling employees “what not to do”. Also, 
Johansson and Siverbo’s (2014, p.273) argued, that “in economic terms, the 
responsibility of public sector organisations is to try to make sure that the 
difference between budgeted costs and actual costs is zero, that is, to ensure 
that no more or no less than budgeted resources are consumed during the fiscal 
year”. These budget reform actions in Gladiator reflected an increase in technical 
management controls, which were underpinned by the power of the CEO. 
Gladiator’s senior management were now questioning budgets rather than 
accepting incremental budgets while staff were being held accountable for their 
budget spending behaviours. Budgets were no longer viewed as approved wish 
lists for unit spending. Instead, budgets were used to help generate staff self-
awareness of the impact their budget behaviour would likely have on Gladiators 
available funds, in effect, budgets were strategic documents for governing 
services. Senior Staff Officer (3) explained: 
Now it is crucial that the directors of services units stay within their 
budget. We are harping on about budget control the same amount as 
we did before, but now they are getting more and more involved than 
they ever did before and they are getting it. 
Thus, there has been a shift in thinking and doing, as enforcement of budget 
control had now become routine. Burns and Scapens (2000) would conceptualise 
this reform as a change in budget rules and routines that over time became 
institutionalised. The directors of services were taking more responsibility for 
managing their own budgets and their staff, whose activities affected those 
budgets. 
Furthermore, a new ERP system and capital budgets were also implemented 
(see Chapter Five, Section 5.7). These new technical controls reinforced the 
CEO’s power over change. He exerted his power over resources and decision-
making “in the way that he dominated the process of determining what ought to 
be done” (Burns, 2000, p.580) in Gladiator’s budgetary control. He restricted staff 
access to income and expenditure codes on the new ERP system and he said 
capital budgets were to be prepared every three years. This new capital budget 
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preparation rule was subsequently revised during the change process to the 
preparation of annual capital budgets. Thus, showing how new rules can be 
modified during the reform process. 
In summary, a combination of staff awareness of the external socio-political 
factors of the financial crisis and central government austerity measures (i.e. 
external jolts) and the authority of the new CEO enforcing the fundamentals of 
budgetary control (i.e. internal jolt), combined, triggered a kick in the existing 
budgetary control system (i.e. design archetype). This subsequently caused an 
imbalance in Gladiator’s budgeting practices triggering strict enforcement of 
budget control practices where managers’ managed and service-delivery was 
efficient and effective. Beliefs of abundant cash flows were no longer the norm. 
Next, a specific discussion on housing reforms is presented as housing was the 
main service examined. 
7.4 Housing – why and how it was reformed 
Traditionally, housing was delivered independently through each of its units A, B, 
C, and each unit carried out its housing operations and service-delivery in a 
slightly different manner. Having the housing service structured as three 
independent units with three directors of services, resulted in variations in service 
deliveries and management control practices leading to inefficiencies. The 
housing SSR (Chapter Five, Section 5.3.2.1) was ordered by the CEO when the 
economic recession hit and central government austerity measures kicked in. 
The external conditions played “an important enabling role in the institutional 
entrepreneurship” of the CEO (Battilana et al., 2009, p.75). The SSR also made 
the housing service inefficiencies more transparent to staff. It recommended 
centralising the housing function under one director of service of which five 
business units; Policy and Co-ordination, Social Operations, Housing Options, 
Finance and Administration and Technical and Architecture would report directly 
in (see Chapter Six, Section 6.2).  
The CEO throughout housings reform process had been very vocal about how 
he saw his role as being about getting management staff to manage. In terms of 
Hardy’s (1996) work, this resonates with power over resources and processes. 
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Thus, by commissioning the strategic housing report, the CEO via the DD, EC 
and strategic groups de-legitimised the existing housing structures and strove 
towards achieving improved service-delivery and management control (Oliver, 
1992). It was felt that this new housing management structure would ensure staff 
performance resulting in service efficiency and effectiveness.  Reform in housing 
through the DD was being given a new meaning by communicating its benefits: 
 One dedicated service manager with a sole focus on the management of 
housing services on a city/countywide basis. 
 Five core housing business units, resulting in a more streamlined, co-
ordinated and responsive management structure with standardized 
systems, policies and procedures. 
 Policy separate from operations. 
This communication process created shared cognitions (and emotions) that 
supported institutional change (Hardy and Maguire, 2008, p.208). The strategic 
housing report set out the key staff positions in housing and their respective 
duties. It represented Housing’s formal rules (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p.6; 
Tessier and Otley, 2012). Key performance indicators (KPI’s) were also 
established to help reinforce the new housing structure. Senior Executive Officer 
(2) explained how: 
The housing report set out the key positions in housing and what that 
person’s duties should be, who else they would likely be interacting 
with across the other silos, across the structures, so that they would 
have clarity in terms of who they would be liaising and interacting with. 
The review team flagged the priority KPI’s for the individuals so that 
the individual knows what they have to strive towards. KPI’s will be a 
work in progress for a few years I would say in getting all the KPI’s up 
and running. 
These new rules affected housing’s management control structure (i.e. design 
archetype, see Laughlin, 1991) which was used to steer staff behaviours (i.e. sub-
systems, see Laughlin 1991) in a direction coherent with the new management 
ethos of efficiency and effectiveness (i.e. interpretive schemes, see Laughlin 
1991) in service-delivery. This is explained and seen diagrammatically in Chapter 
Eight, Figure 8.1. The KPI’s are new management accounting targets for staff to 
strive towards creating a vision for staff of what housing represents and what they 
are responsible for.  
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7.4.1 Implementing the new housing structure - how 
Continuing to progress reform in housing the CEO strategically selected which 
geographic unit housing would be located at, either A, B or C. The CEO knew 
that he needed to make the allocation decision carefully to avoid any possible 
struggles with councillors and staff. Hence, he allocated roads to A, water to B 
and housing to C. His logic for allocation was driven by where the appointed 
director of service was based.  
The CEO knew that for housing reform to be a success he needed to appoint a 
director who believed in the reform. Therefore, he appointed a director (not the 
incumbent housing director) who would make the implementation happen. He 
initially appointed him for one year only. The CEO’s formal “right to make 
decisions” (Battilana et al., 2009, p.84) is evident here. He felt the new director 
was the “best person to head it up as he had all the thought processes” he wanted 
(CEO). His management report reflected commitment and reform to housing (see 
Chapter Six, Section 6.5 and Appendix C).  
The new director of housing was an important ally and change agent to the CEO. 
He shared the CEO’s vision for reform and had ideas of how to manage and drive 
housing’s implementation. The director, when drawing up his business plan, drew 
from his past Master’s qualifications, his past and present local authority service 
experience as well as his ability to imagine alternative service management 
possibilities (see Battilana and D’Aunno, 2009). He drove housing reform via his 
business plan that was in effect a BSC. The BSC (i.e. a new design archetype) 
allowed the director to communicate clearly with his staff and it “formed a key 
dimension to the discourse activity that was crucial for establishing new ways of 
thinking as well as helping to dismantle old taken-for-granted assumptions” 
(Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005, p.735). The BSC was a new key management 
accounting rule in the housing service (Burns and Scapens, 2000). It outlined in 
simple terms what housing staff must excel at. However, the director never used 
the term BSC when discussing his business plan with his staff because he 
believed that “accounting lingo is the worst thing you could say” (Director of 
Service (1)). This is intriguing; despite management accounting information 
playing an important role in Gladiator’s reforms, it seems accounting language 
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could possibly be a cause of resistance to reform by staff. The business plan over 
the year of the director’s tenure developed efficiencies in housing delivery as the 
performance management information allowed the managers to see any 
backlogs in the business units and consequently take action. 
Furthermore, the CEO, to limit staff resistance to housing reforms acted 
strategically. He mobilised staff behind the reform by showing his conscious 
decision to minimise staff relocations between A, B and C. His power over 
resources being illuminated here (Hardy, 1996; Battilana, 2006). This strategic 
tactic helped lessen internal resistance to the reforms. Yazdifar (2013, p.204) 
illustrated similar findings in his Omega case study:  
motivating people is important for business success, but it doesn’t 
come just by reward, bonuses and pay. There are other psychological 
issues such as security or longevity and these sorts of issues are 
important and people need them.  
Nevertheless, some staff members felt the new staff workloads were unrealistic 
and too much for one individual. However, when they raised their concerns with 
their housing superiors they were told: 
You can look out that front door but there is no bus pulling up with a 
gang of staff in it. It is not going to happen and the longer the work is 
left piled up the more you are going to have to do and the more stress 
you are going to be under. This is the structure. It is written in stone in 
terms of staff numbers. It will be reviewed after one year but it is written 
in stone (Senior Executive Officer (3)). 
Therefore, as the staff requests for less work was rejected, disillusioned staff who 
did not favour the organisational restructuring either took early retirement or left 
Gladiator for alternative employment. This resonates with Laughlin’s (1991) 
colonisation findings, which revealed that when lasting and fundamental change 
was achieved in an organisation, some participants left the organisation when 
they could not live with the changes.  
Housing by its nature is about people - and people in difficulty - and in Gladiator 
housing staff are viewed as being very good at housing issues. They thought 
about housing and social problems from their heart and financial concerns were 
not priority. This is an example of organisational fragmentation at Gladiator where 
different job levels within the housing department hold different perspectives, that 
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is, different interpretive schemes (i.e. different beliefs and values) (see 
Broadbent, 1992; Gurd, 2008). As Broadbent (1992, p.362) outlined, “agreement 
of organisational members at higher levels of the interpretive schemes (e.g. the 
meta-rules) might be contrasted with disagreement at the lower levels (e.g. the 
cultural level)”. To overcome this fragmentation, power over resources was 
exercised and the senior executive officers drew on the new housing staffing rules 
to embed the new staff structures at Gladiator. “Rules are procedures that people 
follow to fulfil their identities” and “an identity is a conception of self-organised 
into rules for matching actions to situations” (March, 1994, p.61). As the housing 
service and management control rules were changed in Gladiator and staff had 
to follow the new rules, subtle and gradual erosion of the former housing values 
and beliefs occured, resulting in a shift in the existing interpretive schemes 
(Laughlin, 1991) which subsequently fed into the settled ways of thinking (Burns 
and Scapens, 2000). The external environment jolts enhanced acceptance of 
these new housing rules. Laughlin (1991) also found this to be true in the case 
study of European Railways carried out by Dent (1986) (see Chapter Five, 
Section 5.3.3). The director of housing also explained how the external 
environment created the urgency for reforms in housing but how that sense of 
urgency also had to be maintained during housings new structure 
implementation. 
However, reform to the level of colonisation in Gladiator was gradual. It took 
perseverance and holding to account for service delivery practices and 
expenditure and income figures. For instance, Lapsley and Pallot (2000) found 
that, over time and due to the persistence of a new chief executive, accounting 
was integrated with its management decisions. Gladiator’s CEO required senior 
management every quarter to present a management report on their service 
activities and performance at the management meeting. This, in terms of Burns 
and Scapens (2000), reflected a new management rule and routine for senior 
management. Management accounting language (i.e. a design archetype) was 
being used to motivate and create competition among senior managers, as no 
managers wanted their performance figures to be poor in the presence of their 
colleagues. By continually repeating what must not be done, that is, no 
overspending, in conjunction with questioning staff budget behaviours, staff 
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actions and thinking slowly started to change and become embedded (Laughlin, 
1991; Burns and Scapens, 2000).  
7.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter drew Chapters Five and Six together by discussing in-depth the 
findings in relation to the two research questions outlined in Chapter One: 
RQ1: Why did an Irish local authority (Gladiator) reform its delivery of 
public services and management controls?  
RQ2: How did an institutional entrepreneur handle reforms in Gladiator’s 
delivery of public services and management controls, particularly in the 
context of a forthcoming period of austerity? 
The findings provide a holistic insight into the dynamic complexity of public 
service reform. Internal and external organisational factors were intertwined in 
Gladiator’s reform process. A process-oriented account of how a new CEO 
delegitimised the existing service-delivery and management control practices 
was presented. His rhetoric skills and transforming ability of senior managements’ 
existing management control beliefs - through his questioning of existing service 
structures and practices - was revealed. The CEO’s skilful use of management 
accounting information combined with his ability to draw on external austerity 
pressures to progress reform was made clear. His power over resources and 
decision-making by establishing the DD, EC and SSRGs was illustrated as well 
as showing the role of these sub-systems in transforming Gladiator’s service-
delivery and management control structures and practices.  
The historic budget practices were challenged and the budget rule of no over 
spending was enforced, in addition, to managers being made manage. Financials 
now mattered and capital budgets and a new ERP system were implemented. It 
was no longer about service-delivery as fast as possible and at any cost. 
Changes in existing interpretive schemes and institutions about service-delivery 
and management control at Gladiator were gradually emerging. The new housing 
structure was examined and staff resistance to its reform were curtailed by a 
number of strategic tactics: staff locations, job identity, a sense of urgency due to 
external austerity pressures and clear communication of how the reforms would 
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be implemented. The findings highlighted how perseverance and continuous 
accountability for actions were required to achieve reforms in Gladiator. The next 
chapter concludes the study by drawing together the major findings in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven. The key contributions of the study are also presented. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the process of public service reforms in an 
Irish local authority with regard to its delivery of public services and management 
controls during a period of austerity. It is divided into five sections: theory, 
literature, practical contributions, limitations and areas for future research. First, 
an overview of this thesis.  
8.2 Overview 
This thesis presented a longitudinal case study of an Irish local authority, where 
reforms in its delivery of public services and management controls were 
implemented during a period of financial crisis. As explained in Chapter One, this 
research was driven by a combination of factors. First, the researcher has a 
personal interest in public service deliveries and management controls, having 
had practical experience in such an organisation as a financial accountant. 
Second, after reviewing the extant literature, it was interesting that “the public 
sector has been criticised during the last two decades for being insufficiently 
effective and efficient” (van Helden et al., 2010, p.83). Third, “little is known yet 
about the effects of austerity measures on the management control in the 
organisations affected” (Bracci et al., 2015; van der Kolk, et al., 2015, p.934) and 
this would certainly seem to warrant further investigation. Fourth, and related, the 
researcher was also inspired by the works of Hopwood (2009, p.801) who argued, 
“management accounting research gives little or no guidance on the modes of 
organisational response to economic crises” and which according to Bracci et al., 
(2015, p.894) “is all the more true in the context of public sector organisations”. 
Fifth, and based again, on a review of the literature, the researcher became 
particularly interested in the ways through which actors affect institutions (Scott, 
2014, p.94); or as Sharma et al., (2014, p.194) argued, “very few studies look at 
individuals acting as institutional entrepreneurs”. Consequently, the research 
questions as per Chapter One were derived: 
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RQ1: Why did an Irish local authority (Gladiator) reform its delivery of 
public services and management controls?  
RQ2: How did an institutional entrepreneur handle reforms in Gladiator’s 
delivery of public services and management controls, particularly in the 
context of a forthcoming period of austerity? 
Thus, in order to understand how the complexities and consequences of service-
delivery and management control reforms in a highly institutionalised Irish local 
authority came about, a more in-depth understanding of the nature of 
organisational contexts and management control practices (i.e. rules and 
routines) was required. In particular, an understanding of how new ways of doing 
and thinking were implemented was essential in this research. Therefore, the next 
section discusses how this research contributes to knowledge, that is, how 
reforms in the existing ways of doing and thinking (i.e. new institutions) came to 
be at Gladiator. 
8.3 Contributions  
This research offers a number of contributions. Primarily, as far as the researcher 
is aware, this study is the first of its kind to be conducted in an Irish local authority 
from a management control perspective, and during a time of austerity. Second, 
the thesis offers new insight into Jack’s (2016) investigation of whether 
accounting has the capacity to change social structures and/or human actions? 
Furthermore, in relation to the latter, the following section summarises how 
structures and actions were reformed through the complex and dynamic 
processes underpinning both external austerity pressures and intra-
organisational entrepreneurship. In particular, both the power of communication 
and management accounting information was seen in the way organisational 
leaders mobilised power over meaning, thereby convincing other staff that reform 
was a rational and legitimate move. More specifc theoretical, literature and 
practical contributions are now outlined. 
8.3.1 Theoretical contributions  
As explained in Chapter Three, the researcher adopted a theoretical approach 
which combined Burns and Scapens (2000) framework of management 
accounting change with other theoretical inputs such as ideas put forward by 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991), Scott, (2014), Seo and Creed (2002), 
Battilana et al., (2009), Laughlin (1991) and Hardy (1996). This pluralistic 
combination of complementary theories enabled the researcher to illuminate the 
complexities and dynamic processes through which service-delivery and 
management control reforms in Gladiator unfolded as they did. Had the analysis 
of the case been carried out using a single framework, the results would have 
likely lacked detail in its conceptualisation of institutional change. The adopted 
pluralistic theoretical approach overcomes some of the limitations for each of the 
individual frameworks thus providing greater and more detailed analysis. This, in 
turn, responds to Burns and Baldvinsdottir’s (2005, p.728) call for institutional 
theorists to further conceptualise and provide empirical evidence for “when, why 
and how actors influence change while embedded within the institutional fabric of 
a particular time and space”.  
8.3.1.1 Contextualist framework 
The theoretical pluralism adopted here sensitises the researcher (and the reader) 
to the holistic, complex, cumulative, interwoven aspects of organisational change. 
Moreover, out of this broad understanding, Figure 8.1 was developed. Its purpose 
is to put forward analytical concepts, which can be used to interpret organisational 
reforms and it will now be discussed in more detail. 
Figure 8.1 clearly has links with Burns and Scapens (2000) framework, but it is 
also influenced by Laughlin’s (1991) model of organisations, Battilana et al’s., 
(2009) process of institutional entrepreneurship and NIS concepts of external 
pressure. The combination of insights provides a rich caption of the relationships 
between: (1) external pressures (see NIS theory); (2) agency (see institutional 
entrepreneurship); (3) organisations (see Laughlin’s 1991 framework); and 
institutions (see Burns and Scapens framework). Other writers previously 
attempted to extend and augment Burns and Scapens (2000) framework; e.g. 
Baker (2006), Lukka (2007), Jabbour and Abdel-Kader (2015), Oliveira and 
Quinn (2015), and Figure 8.1 continues in this stream. 
It also shows the institution within the organisation. The organisation is depicted 
as an amalgam of interpretive schemes, design archetypes and sub-systems. 
229 
 
 
230 
Such conceptualisation helps interpretation of how reform can occur in a highly 
institutionalised organisation. Underpinning an organisation’s interpretive 
schemes are the institutions; whereas underpinning the design archetypes are 
the rules and routines; and finally, underpinning the sub-systems are human 
actions. We can think of such interrelationships as being similar to Russian 
nesting (or stacking) dolls. Each amalgam has the potential to reinforce each 
other and act as complements, and consequently reinforce both the institutional 
realm and the realm of action. 
An organisation is situated in a particular context; the latter being external 
pressures which are shown on the left hand side of Figure 8.1. Moving from left 
to right, the framework depicts a scenario where institutional change unfolds 
through the combined influence of institutional entrepreneurs and external 
environmental factors. The institutional entrepreneur’s actions and external 
factors affect structures and actions. In contrast, the OIE approach adopted in 
Burns and Scapens (2000) emphasises a “reconstitutive downward effect” 
whereby institutions influence the “individual habits of thought and action” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p.7). Figure 8.1 highlights the complex process of how 
institutional entrepreneurs and external factors employ their organisation’s 
‘interpretive schemes’ ‘design archetypes’ and ‘sub-systems’ thereby creating an 
opening for reform, and subsequently to implement that reform.  
Some shortcomings of Burns and Scapens’ (2000) OIE view of management 
accounting change are also brought to the fore in Figure 8.1. For instance, this 
view has said little about how original rules which are not implemented as 
expected, can later become enforced; and also, how new rules and routines can 
then emerge (Oliveira and Quinn, 2015). In addition, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
framework only includes human activity in their ‘realm of action’ (Burns and 
Scapens, 2000, p.6). This research, on the other hand, defined more explicitly 
what is meant by agency (see Chapter Three, Section 3.5), and specifically 
analyses the human activities of an institutional entrepreneur. It also examines 
the processes through how historic budget rules and new management controls 
in general can be enforced and might become institutionalised. Such 
contributions address previous concerns of ter Bogt (2008(b), p.231), who said 
“to more fully understand accounting change in local government, the roles of 
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individuals and groups, the “rationality” of responses to various pressures, as well 
as the role of external institutions, probably deserve more explicit attention than 
they seem to receive in the Burns and Scapens framework”. Thus, in line with ter 
Bogt’s concerns, the extended theorisation here provides a holistic 
‘contextualist51’ framework for understanding service-delivery and management 
control reforms in a highly institutionalised local authority setting. Next, the case 
study findings are recounted in the context of Figure 8.1 - demonstrating its power 
in analysing public service-delivery and management control reforms.  
Gladiator’s existing service-delivery and management control structures were 
first brought into question by the arrival of a newly appointed CEO. The latter is 
conceptualised as an institutional entrepreneur, and represented by the 
institutional entrepreneur box in Figure 8.1. This box is mixed in colour, to reflect 
the relationship between structure and agency. An individual’s beliefs, values and 
norms (i.e. interpretive schemes; or more specifically, the CEO’s internal 
structure) are represented by the colour blue, whereas the colour purple 
symbolises the CEO’s actions/behaviours (e.g. communication). Moreover, in the 
framework (Figure 8.1), the colour blue symbolises intangible or abstract 
elements of peoples’ internal structure, while purple represents the more tangible 
things like actions.  
Upon the CEO’s arrival at Gladiator and drawing on previous local authority works 
experience, he questioned the existing service-delivery and management control 
practices. Arrow 1 represents this questioning action, causing a jolt to both the 
existing interpretive schemes and to the service-delivery and management 
control structures. He asked questions such as what costs, including staff 
resources, were required to deliver Gladiator’s services. Upon receiving 
conflicting information, he then asked senior managers to outline what they 
perceived to be the most pressing issues in terms of the existing service 
deliveries and management controls at Gladiator. This rather strategic tactic 
allowed the CEO to gain insight into the existing beliefs, values and norms (i.e. 
                                            
51 An approach that is able “to combine a processual analysis of change with an inner and outer 
organisational analysis of context” (Alsharari et al., 2015, p.481). According to Yazdifar et al., 
(2012, p.52) “the terms “processual approach” and “contextualist approach” are interchangeable”. 
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interpretive schemes) at Gladiator (Laughlin, 1991) (depicted by arrow 2). It 
exposed that not all senior managers were satisfied with the existing ways of 
delivering the services, thus revealing that there was a difference between 
existing interpretive schemes and existing institutions. The reproduced service 
institution at Gladiator was one of service-delivery as fast as possible and at any 
cost. According to the CEO, “There was a cohort of people who realised that this 
situation can’t go on”. This illuminated a difference between senior managers’ 
beliefs about how services should be delivered and managed, and taken-for-
granted assumptions about the nature of service-delivery and management 
control at Gladiator. Institutions are conveyed in Figure 8.1 by the lighter shade 
of blue colour, (to make a distinction from interpretive schemes). That is, they are 
embedded within interpretive schemes, but for the purpose of analysis, the 
framework (Figure 8.1) shows them underneath the interpretive scheme, thus 
enabling micro level analysis of the interpretive scheme.  
After prompting discussions on Gladiator’s service-delivery and management 
control structures, one of the first actions (arrow 3) taken by the CEO was to 
establish the DD (i.e. sub-system) (see Chapter Seven, Section 7.3.2) (Laughlin, 
1991). Its aim was to progress change in Gladiator. He subsequently set up the 
EC (see Chapter Seven, Section 7.3.3) (i.e. sub-system) (arrow 3) in early 2008 
which was focused on the economy and achieving efficiency and effectiveness in 
Gladiator’s operations. These new sub-systems were helping to communicate 
and enhance staff awareness of the inefficiencies in Gladiator’s service-delivery 
way of doing things and management controls. However, in 2008, when the Irish 
financial crisis occurred, it resulted in a scarcity of financial resources for 
Gladiator. Media reports about the worldwide financial crisis and Ireland’s 
financial difficulties re-enforced the necessity of reforms in Gladiator. Images of 
the troika arriving in Dublin to audit the Department of Finance were familiar to 
Irish citizens. The Irish central government placed external coercive austerity 
pressures on Gladiator to reduce spending indicated by arrow 4 in Figure 8.1. 
The external factors further affected the existing interpretive schemes and sub-
systems in Gladiator. The CEO additionally drew on the external environmental 
factors to effect staff interpretive schemes, shown by arrow 4A. However, he 
explained how staff were already aware of the seriousness of the economic crisis 
from media reports, which further strengthened his position concerning the need 
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for service-delivery and management control reform at Gladiator. The external 
factors were interwoven with the CEO’s strategic actions of allocating resources 
towards establishing the DD, EC, SSRGs (see Chapter Seven, Sections 7.3.2 to 
7.3.4). These new sub-systems enabled the CEO to make visible the 
inefficiencies in Gladiator’s existing delivery of public services and management 
controls (i.e. design archetype) (Laughlin, 1991) and are denoted by arrows 3 
and 552 respectively, in Figure 8.1. Nevertheless, in order to achieve this, and as 
was discussed in Chapter Seven, it was important for the CEO to be able to exert 
power over resources (Hardy, 1996). Indeed, we draw considerably upon Hardy’s 
(1996) framework of power and political mobilisation (see Chapter Three, Section 
3.8) to help in the analysis of the role of an institutional entrepreneur within 
Gladiator.   
The new sub-systems (i.e. DD, EC, SSRGs), which underpinned the CEO’s 
power over resources (Hardy, 1996), then subsequently affected the existing 
design archetypes, (depicted by arrow 6). For instance, new communication 
methods [e.g. via management accounting information, a CEO’s letter, SSR 
findings] revealed the failings of existing service structures as well as the vision 
for new service-delivery and management control structures. These 
communication methods are conceptualised as socio-ideological controls within 
the design archetype, drawn upon by the CEO and other senior managers to 
reinforce a need for greater efficiency in service-delivery and management 
controls (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004). They also helped to mobilise other 
supporters of Gladiator’s reforms. In Figure 8.1, arrow 7 represents the 
disturbance, which this new design archetype has on interpretive schemes.  
Furthermore, the research study findings exposed how despite years of budget 
preparations and established rules of budget control at Gladiator, budget 
efficiencies seeking were not really embedded in the organisation. The historical 
budget rules had been implemented by Gladiator’s senior managers only in so 
far as it would bring some legitimacy to external stakeholders such as the central 
                                            
52 SSRGs is denoted by arrow 5 and not 3 due to timing. SSRGs were set up in 2009 after the 
financial crisis had unravelled. The DD and EC were established before the financial crisis, in 
2007 and 2008 respectively. 
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government (Carruthers, 1995), and thereby assist in ensuring that they received 
sufficient state funding. Thus, in this sense, budgeting practices were rather 
ceremonial (Burns and Scapens, 2000). However, out of the work of the sub-
systems a new service and management control structure was presented. The 
colour green represents the link between the interpretive schemes and sub-
systems and then consequently the institutional realm and realm of action. The 
design archetype in this research is conceptualised as comprising of rules and 
routines. The historic/new rules were continuously (verbally) repeated to 
enforce/encode the technical controls such as the newly designed service 
structure and job roles, the historic budget rules such as “no overspending on 
budget codes”, new capital budgets and a BSC, (arrows E, a, b). As the historic 
and new rules were repeatedly enforced (encoded) arrows c, d, they became 
repeated routines, the process of institutionalisation outlined in Burns and 
Scapens (2000) came into play. This in turn, saw the emergence of new settled 
ways of thinking and/or doing (institutions) about service-delivery and 
management control coming into existence in Gladiator. This framework shows 
how the interpretive schemes were aligned with the new settled ways of thinking 
and/or doing (institutional realm) in Gladiator thus achieving reform. Yang and 
Modell (2012) found that when interpretive schemes, institutional expectations, 
beliefs, and mental attitudes were not aligned, then the change agent lost her 
power and reforms stopped. 
Thus, this contextualist framework provides a holistic view of the complexity of 
public service reforms during a period of austerity and illuminates the effect of 
austerity measures on public service management controls (van der Kolk et al., 
2015, p.934). Furthermore, it also addresses Hopwood (2009) and Bracci et al’s., 
(2015) concern that management accounting research has given little or no 
guidance on the modes of organisational response to economic crises. As 
observed in Gladiator, service-delivery and management control reform was a 
“complex and multi-dimensional process, extending well beyond the purely 
technical” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.240). The study illuminated why and how external 
jolts such as the financial crisis and austerity measures enabled, rather than 
constrained, a powerful institutional entrepreneur in creating an opening for and 
subsequently implementing reform in Gladiator.  
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8.3.1.2 Institutional entrepreneurship activities 
Figure 8.1 illuminates the activities employed by an institutional entrepreneur to 
achieve public service reforms, improving our understanding of the processes of 
institutional entrepreneurship as few studies “using case evidence have noted 
how institutional entrepreneurs enable this change” (Sharma et al., 2014, p.195). 
Gladiator’s CEO through his questioning of the taken-for-granted ways of doing 
things revealed a misalignment between the existing interpretive schemes and 
institutions. The taken-for-granted assumption of service-delivery as fast as 
possible and at any cost was not the shared belief held by all senior managers. 
For example, drawing on the case study in Housing (see Chapter Six), 
fragmentation was evident. Different staff levels held different beliefs, that is, 
different interpretive schemes (Broadbent, 1992; Gurd, 2008). Some managers 
believed housing was about providing good quality houses as efficiently as 
possible (a financial perspective akin to NPM ethos) while lower level staff 
members viewed housing from a social perspective, essentially, how could they 
solve the housing shortages of people in desperate need. Business management 
was not their priority. Furthermore, the incumbent director of housing came from 
a strong housing background where business management was not a settled way 
of thinking. The CEO explained how to effect this difference in thinking (housing 
as a basic right compared to business management) took a lot of perseverance 
and a long time to change. Nevertheless, he achieved it through a combination 
of activities. He held regular senior management team meetings holding 
managers accountable for their service achievements. In addition, management 
accounting information and the external context (economic recession and central 
government austerity measures) formed part of these discussions. He also drew 
on his power over resources, decision-making and meaning (Hardy, 1996) when 
he established new sub-systems (i.e. DD, EC, SSRGs). He used the new sub-
systems to reinforce his vision for public service reforms in Gladiator and to 
mobilise allies behind it. His strategic selection of staff members for these new 
sub-systems was critical to reform achievement. Furthermore, existing staff 
interpretive schemes about budget control were affected by the CEO’s 
enforcement of historic budget rules (which had never been followed) such as “no 
overspending on budget codes”, in addition, to the implementation of new capital 
budgeting practices. These institutional entrepreneurship activities gradually led 
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to the formation of new settled ways of thinking and doing about service-delivery 
and management control at Gladiator.  
8.3.1.3 Power of communication in reform processes 
The framework (Figure 8.1) also emphasises the role of communication in 
institutional theory. In the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework rules are 
something which should be done whereas in Gladiator through communication 
they became what must be done (see Chapter Five, Section 5.6). The researcher 
contributes to the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework by including 
communication especially when implementing historic or new rules and routines. 
Historically, Gladiator’s budget holders did not adhere to budget targets because 
this was what had always been done. The consequence being that strict budget 
control was not enforced or embedded in Gladiator. However, with the downturn 
in the economy and the arrival of a new CEO, this over spending discretion was 
taken away by oral instruction at management meetings. The CEO changed the 
rule from the top and instructed managers that they were no longer allowed to 
overspend. These new management control rules were enforced by the 
management accounting team by communicating to staff the rules must be 
followed as opposed to what should be followed. They were further reinforced 
through consistent monitoring by the management accounting team. 
Furthermore, as staff were now held accountable for their budget spending 
behaviours, their budget practices began to change. Staff had to 
explain/communicate why they were or were not obeying the new budget control 
rules. The findings in Chapters Five and Six presented how communication and 
monitoring were essential to embedding the historic/new rules. Budgets were no 
longer viewed as approved wish lists but they were control rules, which had to be 
followed, and any deviations explained.  
Furthermore, the BSC communicated housing’s “strategic objectives and 
measures into objectives and measures” acceptable and appropriate to 
Gladiator’s housing staff (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007, p.178). Thus, the power of 
communication dominated the reform process by determining “what ought to be 
done, and what outcome should be achieved” (Hardy, 1996; Yazdifar, 2013, 
p.192). 
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8.3.1.4 Environmental disturbance pathways 
The path a disturbance takes through an organisation and the degree of 
transformation it generates differs across organisations and over time. Figure 8.1 
also helps to present the tracks environmental disturbances took through a public 
service organisation. It illuminated how both the internal and external 
environmental jolts eventually contributed to reforming existing staff interpretive 
schemes. Ultimately resulting in reforms in service-deliveries and management 
controls at Gladiator. Budget control and cost efficiencies were now the way of 
doing and thinking about service-delivery. Job for life and service delivery as fast 
as possible and at any cost were no longer taken-for-granted assumptions. 
In summary, all of the above helps to contribute to a theory of action that accounts 
for how embedded agents bring about change in highly institutionalised public 
service organisations. This study through its pluralistic theoretical approach helps 
improve our understanding of the processes of institutional entrepreneurship and 
it shows the importance of power, communication and management accounting 
information in public service reform processes.  
8.3.2 Literature contributions 
The following sub-sections provide contributions to literature on the following 
topics; management accounting, austerity, NPM, methodology and 
communications. 
8.3.2.1 Management control and austerity 
The findings of this research contribute to the literature addressing expectations 
for studies “on the pressures and difficulties of budgeting processes in 
government and public sector organisations facing quite massive levels of 
austerity” (Bracci et al., 2015, p.890). The findings revealed how in times of 
austerity, Gladiator reverted back to enforcing the fundamentals of budgetary 
control and also introduced capital budgets. Thus, resonating with Bracci et al’s., 
(2015, p.891) argument that in times of austerity “a stronger reliance on the 
constraining elements of management controls” is found. 
This research also addressed Hopwood’s (2009) calls for management 
accounting research to illustrate how organisations respond to economic crisis. It 
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is evident from the findings that the new CEO of Gladiator viewed the financial 
crisis as an enabler to enhance his, already initiated, reforms in service-delivery 
and management control use. Chapters Five and Six highlighted how staff 
interpretive schemes were slowly changed through a combination of external and 
internal jolts (see Laughlin, 1991).  
The external environment clearly communicated how the Irish central 
government and the European and International Funding Partners required all 
Irish local authorities to cut public expenditure and public staff numbers. 
Additionally, the McCarthy Report was published in 2009 calling for cuts in public 
sector staff numbers and public spending. This report created further unease 
amongst Gladiator’s staff, as an Administrative Staff Officer explained, “staff are 
now fearful for their jobs because it had always been the case that your job was 
the one thing you didn’t have to worry about”. Their values and beliefs about job 
security for life and Gladiator being a cash rich organisation were jolted by the 
financial crisis (see Laughlin, 1991). The LGERG also called for a reduction in 
senior and middle manager staff numbers, in addition to highlighting areas for 
cost efficiencies. These external pressures all communicated to staff the 
seriousness of the financial crisis. Thus, existing staff interpretive schemes had 
been challenged and a shift in their taken-for-granted ways of thinking about 
service-delivery and management control came about. Their ontological security 
of a job for life had been jolted by the financial crisis. This created a fear in staff 
and as a result created a new belief that their jobs were not for life. Fearful for 
their jobs staff took on board the service structure and management control 
reforms developed by the CEO and senior managers. The economic crisis saw 
Gladiator reverting back to the first principles of budget control. This research 
reveals how the economic crisis assisted rather than constrained reform in 
Gladiator. Further, addressing calls by Modell (2007) and Yazdifar (2013) for 
research on how economic and institutional factors, for example, management 
control, interact in a change process. 
8.3.2.2 Ireland, NPM and austerity pressures 
This research, located in Ireland, also contributes to Broadbent and Guthrie’s 
(2008) call for more studies of public service organisations in a variety of locations 
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throughout the world. They claim this would facilitate contrast and comparison 
and help us learn from the mistakes and successes of others. 
The literature review in Chapter Two presented the idea of NPM and its origins 
being due to a myriad of factors, for example, recessions, party politics and 
English speaking countries. However, drawing from the case study findings in 
Chapters Five and Six, it emerged how an institutional entrepreneur was the initial 
instigator and driver of NPM ideas in Gladiator. Also illuminating how an 
institutional entrepreneur drew on central government austerity measures to 
enforce NPM ideas to improve service-delivery and operational efficiency. An 
interesting finding was to discover the term austerity being used as a way to 
communicate and enforce NPM practices. Despite austerity meaning cost cutting 
and reductions in service levels and quality, compared to NPM meaning to 
maintain service levels and quality during cost cutting. Thus, the two terms 
despite being different were intertwined in the process of public service reform in 
Gladiator. 
In addition, real life examples of NPM practices (for example, BSC, capital 
budgeting, frugality in resource use, hands on top management, performance 
measurement and management) in action were highlighted, which were not 
undertaken under the term NPM. During interviews with Gladiator’s staff, it 
transpired that they were unaware of the term NPM and its meaning. Upon further 
questioning, it emerged BLG was the equivalent of NPM in Gladiator. However, 
some interviewees firmly argued that BLG had come and gone and was a waste 
of money. This is insightful because the case study findings revealed Gladiator 
striving towards achieving efficiency and effectiveness in its service-delivery and 
management control structures. It also revealed how in a time of austerity and 
economic uncertainty Gladiator reverted back to the first principles of budgeting 
and a BSC was also developed. All of these actions could be grouped under the 
NPM umbrella. 
Furthermore, it was revealed contradictions existed between the purpose of BLG 
and the actions on the ground. The aim of BLG was to enhance local democracy, 
serve the customer better, develop efficiency and provide proper resources for 
local authorities (Keogan, 2003, p.88). Thus, it represented efficiency and 
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effectiveness in services delivery and management controls in Irish local 
authorities. However, the case study findings in Chapters Five and Six revealed 
the contradictions of BLG in Ireland. The BLG document was calling for 
efficiencies and better customer service but what was happening on the ground 
was different. Gladiator was at the behest of councillors and customers and the 
internal staff belief was one of give the customer what he wants at any cost. 
Politics were in action. The councillors’ political mind-set was one of happy 
customers’ equals re-elected councillors. Gladiator’s CEO explained how:  
BLG was a bit of a mistake. It kind of came from an academic strategic 
management view. Essentially, we ended up with someone writing 
structures long before anyone decided what they wanted local 
government to do. In my view again, the department of the 
environment had a view as to what local government was about, but it 
didn’t convince other departments that local government was going to 
deliver services. So a document was written on the basis the other 
departments would get behind the programme, they built the structure 
but it was never enforced. It’s a simple description of BLG in my mind, 
it started at the centre, it was a good theoretical strategic document, 
but it wasn’t grounded in negotiations. I think negotiations should take 
place before you build the structure.  
The CEO’s comments re-enforce the importance of negotiations and follow-
through in progressing public service reforms. 
8.3.2.3 Methodology 
Suddaby’s (2010) calls for research based on the interpretivist methods as 
opposed to the dominant positivist methods were also met. The researcher 
adopted a case study design because case studies are typically suited for when, 
how and why-type questions (Yin, 2009, p.13) as was the case in this research, 
and “when a theoretical framework is informing data compilation and, 
interpretation” (Yazdifar, 2013, p.113). According to Lowndes (2005, p.306) 
“researching the ongoing process of institutional emergence is dirty work”. 
Therefore, in order to reveal the real rules that shape local government behaviour 
it is necessary to speak with local government actors themselves (Lowndes, 
2005) as was achieved and revealed in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.  
Furthermore, Langley et al., (2013, p.4) called for researchers to acknowledge 
the “centrality of time” arguing “process conceptualisations offer an essential 
contribution to organisation and management knowledge that is not available 
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from most variance-based generalizations”. This thesis researched the service-
delivery and management control reforms in an Irish local authority during a time 
of austerity. Thus, providing evidence of how an Irish public sector organisation 
responded to a financial crisis and how service-delivery and management control 
reforms were achieved during a time of huge economic uncertainty.  
8.3.2.4 Internal organisation communication processes 
This research addresses Parker’s (2013) concern for the neglect of research on 
internal organisational communication processes. The case study findings 
illuminate how communication was an essential part of Gladiator’s reform 
process. Upon his arrival, the new CEO verbally questioned Gladiators 
managers’ ways of thinking and doing of service-delivery and management 
control. He held management meetings to verbally question management 
information. Out of that process, he then asked them to document what they 
believed to be the strategic issues of service-delivery and management control 
at Gladiator. He kept their written thoughts and suggestions in his cupboard and 
commented that it will die with him. The CEO subsequently established the DD, 
EC and SSRGs, which all further communicated to staff the seriousness of the 
funding crisis and how reform was needed. Much of the communication 
comprised of top down and bottom up methods. For example, meetings, e-mail 
and surveys were all methods of communication used in Gladiator. The project 
charter was a top down document, which clearly outlined to staff the reasons for 
the service reforms. Meetings were held with staff when new staff job roles were 
being designed in housing. Staff input was essential to the redesign process. In 
addition, the BSC was used by the director of housing to clarify strategy, to 
motivate staff and to appraise staff (see Clarke et al., 2013). Thus, all of the 
aforementioned illuminated the importance of internal communication processes, 
of which accounting was interwoven, in an Irish local authority in a time of reform 
and austerity. 
This research also reiterates Nørreklit and Mitchell’s (2007) argument that it is 
critical employees can understand and interpret the performance measures 
designed to reflect the organisation’s strategy. Essentially, it is important that a 
BSC be rooted in a language and comprehension that is understandable to all 
employees (Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007). The director of housing in Chapter Six 
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explained how he never referred to the BSC as the BSC. Staff would have just 
thought it was more accounting lingo. He referred to the BSC as their business 
plan. This language was what they understood and they accepted the business 
plan as their strategy document. Thus, indicating that accounting language could 
be cause for reform resistance. 
8.3.3 Practical contributions 
The theoretical framework (Figure 8.1) developed from the case study findings 
facilitates a depth of insight into a theory of action highlighting a number of 
important practical issues for institutional entrepreneurs. 
8.3.3.1 Institutions matter 
An understanding of how “symbols and language, of myths and ceremony, of 
decoupling, of the interplay of social and cognitive processes, of the impact of 
organisational fields, of the potential for individuals and groups to shape their 
environments, and of the processes through which those environments shape 
individual and collective behaviour and belief” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p.2) are 
essential to those working in organisations. However, it still appears that these 
organisational issues remain largely within academic confines rather than within 
the domain of the everyday organisational worker (Lawrence et al., 2009). By 
illuminating the practical work of the CEO and his change agents (i.e. directors 
and senior managers), in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, it is hoped this will lead 
to integrating institutional ideas into the everyday organisational practices of 
workers in an organisation. 
8.3.3.2 Change as a process  
Moreover, this research, illustrates how institutional entrepreneurs and change 
agents in public sector organisations should understand that change is not a 
linear process. In fact, public sector organisations are inherently complex and 
require knowledgeable agents who understand the external environment and the 
organisation’s business/service. The institutional entrepreneur(s) and (or) change 
agent(s) need to be aware of the existing ways of thinking and doing things within 
their organisation before introducing reforms and to avoid resistance. This 
concept of the significance of the past is in line with Kuhn’s (1962) writings that 
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state that an old norm will not vanish immediately. Reform also requires power 
and to be skilled in effective communication methods (including accounting 
communication) to implement divergent change.  
8.3.3.3 Role of good communication and management accounting 
information 
Communication skills were illuminated as an essential part of the public sector 
reform process. Institutional entrepreneurs/change agents need to be strategic 
communicators, they need to be able to contextualise past habits and future 
projects within the contingences of the moment. The power of communication 
and accounting was seen in the CEO’s record “if you cannot measure it, you 
cannot manage it”. Management accounting information was used to affect 
existing staff interpretive schemes (i.e. beliefs, values, norms) and subsequently 
rupture settled assumptions (ways of thinking and/or doing) of management 
control and service-delivery. Thus, change agents need to be good 
communicators and have an understanding of the power of accounting in their 
communications. 
8.3.3.4 Institutional entrepreneurship – process and power 
This research also provided an empirical example to demonstrate the robustness 
of Battilana et al’s., (2009) process of institutional entrepreneurship model 
through its specific empirical case study (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven). It 
displayed how a new CEO with vast local authority experience from outside the 
organisation was able to initiate and push reform implementation. Other public 
sector organisations looking to make reforms within their organisations might 
consider this approach. That is, an outsider, with vast previous experience in the 
services being reformed. 
Furthermore, it also revealed how an institutional entrepreneur/change agent 
requires power. Power over resources, decision-making and meaning are 
required to drive reform in public sector organisations. By having power over 
resources, institutional entrepreneurs/change agents can establish departments 
and committees that will strengthen their push for reform. This study showed 
strategic intent by the CEO in his selection of individuals for the DD, EC and 
SSRGs (see Chapter Five). He comprised these groups with people who were in 
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strong favour of reform with those who were not (i.e. power over decision-making 
and meaning). The purpose was that advocates of service-delivery and 
management control reform would pull the opponents along with them, as 
happened, in Gladiator.  
8.4 Limitations  
Despite this research providing an increased understanding of the dynamic 
process of reforms in the delivery of public services and management controls in 
an Irish local authority during a period of austerity, more research needs to be 
done. The key findings, contributions and conclusions of this thesis come from a 
qualitative, interpretive case study. Therefore, they can only be interpreted by 
acknowledging the limitations of the study. 
First, this research was carried out in a single Irish local authority organisation. 
Therefore, it is not possible to generalise from this specific case study to general 
populations (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). However, this research was not 
motivated by a desire to offer generalisations, but rather to seek insights into the 
dynamic processes and complexities of public service reforms, notwithstanding, 
the difficulties of trying to capture unfolding processes over time, particularly, 
given the limitation of interviews data gathering available.  Thus, the findings and 
contributions of this research need to be read within the financial crisis context 
and Irish local authority sector in which it was conducted. However, this may help 
our understanding of similar processes in other contexts. Additionally, this study 
was carried out in Ireland, a small nation on the west of Europe. The findings 
cannot claim to be representative of other countries’ public sector organisations 
reactions to the worldwide financial crisis.  
Second, this study focuses on how managers influenced staff behaviour by 
drawing on technical and socio-ideological controls. However, OIE also requires 
examination of how these influential activities become embedded in the 
organizational members – staff, but this has not been discussed, since 
interviewees are all (senior and other) managers. 
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Third, qualitative research may result in some researcher bias and subjectivity. 
Data collection methods such as semi-structured interviews and documentary 
evidence were used in this study. These methods have been challenged for being 
time consuming and possibly resulting in interviewer and interviewee bias in 
interpreting social reality (Creswell 2014). It is impossible to eliminate these 
limitations but they were addressed in Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven by the 
researcher who made every effort to minimise these limitations. 
Fourth, Figure 8.1 needs further empirical examples to amplify our understanding 
of organisational reforms. Through such research, managers will be better able 
to anticipate issues and challenges involved in service delivery and management 
control reforms, thus, also advancing and and refining Figure 8.1. 
8.5 Future research 
The role of public sector change agents has not been widely researched and is 
underdeveloped theoretically. One of this study’s most significant contributions is 
the presentation of a theoretical framework (Figure 8.1) through which to examine 
the process of institutional entrepreneurship (agency) in organisational reforms. 
Similar research could be carried out in other sectors of the public sector, for 
example, health services, police services and non-profit agencies. This type of 
research would expand our existing body of knowledge and understanding of the 
role of change agents and service-delivery and management control reforms in a 
variety of public sector organisations. Personal traits and emotions of institutional 
entrepreneurs could also be explored.  
The findings also suggest that reform in public sector organisations can be 
enhanced by a new CEO (or equivalent leadership role) coming from outside the 
organisation and bringing vast relevant past local authority experience. This could 
be explored in other public service organisations. One such organisation could 
be An Garda Siochana53, where there were many calls in recent years for a 
commissioner from outside the force to implement a successful reform agenda. 
It would be interesting to delve into An Garda Siochana’s senior management’s 
                                            
53 An Garda Siochana is Ireland’s national police force, headed up by a commissioner.  
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beliefs, values and norms about its management controls (i.e. interpretive 
schemes) and see how they differ from the frontline staff’s existing ways of doing 
and thinking about management controls (i.e. institutions). Given the recent 
appointment of an external commissioner, this would be an opportune time to 
carry out this research. 
Further research could also be carried out at a different Irish local authority. It 
would be interesting to see how other local authority leaders responded to the 
Irish financial crisis. Did they introduce service-delivery and management control 
reforms or alternatively, did they reinforce current governance patterns due to the 
strength of existing governance practices (i.e. institutions).  
The findings disclosed how in a time of austerity Gladiator reverted back to 
enforcing the first principles of budgeting. Johansson and Siverbo (2014, p.271) 
wrote “it is surprising how little research has been devoted to the design, use and 
effectiveness of public sector budget control systems in controlling budgets and 
budget behaviour”. Thus, another area for potential future research might be to 
explore why in times of austerity a public sector organisation would (or not) revert 
back to the first principles of tight budget control.  
The extant institutional literature has been criticised for its lack of understanding 
of how individuals experience institutions (Barley, 2008; Voronov and Vince, 
2012). Voronov and Vince (2012) argue the emotional aspects of institutional 
work needs attention from researchers. In this research, emotional issues were 
evident in staff job insecurity and changes in housing staff job roles. It would be 
interesting to explore how emotions drive decision-making and reforms in other 
public service organisations. Scott (2014, p.63) argues, “emotions are among the 
most important motivational elements in social life”.   
The findings also revealed a new ERP system was implemented in Gladiator. 
However, due to timing restrictions this was not explored in detail. Further 
research could explore the dynamic processes of change in implementing a new 
ERP system.  
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Finally, scholars could also explore the effect of language in institutional 
processes (Suddaby, 2010). As well as how different types of communications 
are employed to create and discard interpretive schemes. This has the potential 
to feed directly back to practice. 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
This thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the reform processes in the 
delivery of public services and management controls in an Irish local authority 
during a period of austerity. It particularly, illuminates how structures and actions 
were reformed through the complex and dynamic processes underpinning both 
external austerity pressures and intra-organisational entrepreneurship. Figure 8.1 
presents a pluralistic theoretical framework combining Burns and Scapens (2000) 
framework of management accounting change with other theoretical inputs, such 
as ideas put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Scott, (2014), Seo and 
Creed (2002), Battilana et al., (2009), Laughlin (1991) and Hardy (1996). This 
theoretical combination offered a holistic insight into the role of internal and 
external environmental pressures in public service-delivery and management 
control reform during a time of austerity. It displayed the activities carried out by 
the new CEO and how they drove reform.  
Questioning and feedback from senior managers helped the CEO develop an 
understanding of the existing ways of working and managing at Gladiator. 
Communication of management accounting information outlining budget control 
issues in combination with the external financial crisis and austerity measures 
further strengthened the CEO’s argument of the need for reform. Similarly, the 
skillful strategic tactics applied by the CEO in developing a new DD, EC  and 
SSRGs to progress and communicate a new vision of efficiency and effectiveness 
in service-delivery all slowly affected the existing interpretive schemes at 
Gladiator. Upon the completion of new service-delivery and management control 
structures by the DD, they were subsequently enforced and encoded by 
consistent repetition and monitoring. These new service-delivery and 
management control rules and routines became institutionalised, thus achieving 
reform in the historic ways of delivering and controlling services at Gladiator.  
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Appendix A – Outline of general interview questions guide 
1) Describe your role in the organisation?  
a. How long have you been here?  
b. Where are you situated in the organisation structure? 
c. Previous experience 
2) Tell me about the organisation 
3) Describe your historical costing system before the implementation of ABC.  
Would you consider this costing system to be embedded in the routines of 
staff? 
4) Describe your new costing system (ABC) and discuss how it is different from 
your old costing system. Is there a change in staff thinking and behaviours 
with this new system? 
5) Why did you implement a new costing system?  
Was it in order to acquire legitimacy and guarantee the resources required 
for the survival of the organ? 
6) How did you implement the new ABC system – describe the implementation 
process. Was there a powerful actor/member in advocating ABC both 
external and internal to the organisation? 
7) Explain how the new cost system facilitates better budgeting and 
management control (if it does). 
8) How does the new cost system allow easier identification of costs and 
understanding of cost structures? 
9) Does central government policy dictate most of this organisation’s 
management accounting practices such as costing and budgeting? Can you 
explain how formalized management accounting practices are here? Are 
there formal rules and are these documented, do you create informal rules? 
10) Does a documented/written manual of costing rules exist here (both before 
and after the new cost system).  
If yes, where did this manual come from? Is the manual open to human 
interpretation of the rules i.e informal rules? (Summary: do written rules 
exist? When did they come into effect? Are the rules at national or local level 
or both?) 
11) What is your interpretation of the term rules in management accounting?  
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12) Did the introduction of new cost accounting rules lead to a change in 
daily/weekly/monthly/ yearly costing routines of staff? 
13) Was there resistance by staff to the new cost accounting rules, if yes, did 
they create their own new costing routines or stay with the old costing 
routines? 
14) Did the cost accounting process (i.e. costing routines) change or remain the 
same in here after the implementation of ABC?. 
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Appendix B – Phase two – organisational and management 
control change - outline of revised interview questions guide 
1) Describe your role in the organisation?  
i. How long have you been here?  
ii. Where are you situated in the organisation structure? 
iii. Previous experience 
2) Why did this local authority decide to restructure its organisation?  
i. Who was the driving force behind this restructuring and 
organisational change?  
ii. What was the real push? 
3) What/Who is the efficiency committee? What is their role? Who set this 
group up? 
4) Can you please describe how you have restructured the organisation? Who 
choose a new strategy for the local authority?  
5) Who is managing all of this restructuring? Are there specific rules to be 
followed? 
6) How did they change the organisational goals and how did they 
communicate them to staff?  
7) In your opinion did management accounting practice (i.e. costing, budgeting 
etc) play a role in this organisational change? 
8) Was management accounting used by certain individual’s as a means of 
giving legitimacy to new ways of ‘thinking’ and as a means of clarifying and 
strengthening existing perceptions about what organisational staff are 
supposed to do or not do?.  
9) Did staff workers want to remain the same, tied to their historical ways of 
doing things/working?  
10) Has this organisational change been met with some resistance from staff. If 
yes, how was this resistance overcome? 
11) New key performance indicators (KPI’s) for water, housing, roads and 
waste. Were you involved in establishing the KPI’s? 
12) Are KPI’s actually being used today? 
13) How do you view the role of KPI’s in Housing? 
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14) How have staff responded to the use of KPI’s? With KPI’s is there a target 
measure?  
15) Was performance measurement a priority for this local authority before the 
arrival of the new CEO? 
16) Had the elected council members any role in the organisational 
restructuring? 
17) Due to this restructuring were there job cuts? 
18) Have the proposed changes been implemented?  
19) How do you feel about all these organisational changes, do you think the 
organisational staff have got behind the changes? 
20) Any other points you consider relevant about organisational and 
management control change? 
282 
Appendix C – Extracts from Housing business plan 
E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Customer C1 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: C1: “Provide us with good 
community services” 
We will assure that our communities have the best services we can affordably provide 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: (Insert) ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
(Insert) 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
 
Target 
 
Risk 
 
Initiative(s)  
 
(S) and (F) 
 R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 Evaluation 
Mid-Yr End-Yr 
I L I 
x 
L 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/A/T M/E/A/T 
Freedom of 
Information 
Requests 
 
A) Number of 
FOI requests 
received dealt 
within statutory 
time limit of 20 
working days L 
 
B) Percentage 
of FOI requests 
received which 
are dealt with 
within statutory 
time limit of 20 
working days L 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Timely liaison 
with Section 
Head. 
 
 
 
 
Timely liaison 
with Section 
Head. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Ombudsman’s 
Complaints 
A) Number of 
cases referred 
by Ombudsman 
dealt within 20 
working days L 
 
B) Percentage 
of 
Ombudsman’s 
complaints 
received which 
are dealt with 
within 20 
working days L 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Timely liaison 
with Section 
Head. 
 
 
 
Timely liaison 
with Section 
Head. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
283 
Elected 
Members’ 
Representations 
A) Percentage of 
Members’ 
Representations 
acknowledged 
within 5 working 
days L 
 
B) Percentage of 
Members’ 
Representations 
dealt with by 
way of full 
response within 
10 working days 
of receipt of 
representation L 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
100% 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Timely inputting 
of 
representations 
into the 
Customer 
Contact System 
(CCS). 
 
Timely inputting 
of 
representations 
into the 
Customer 
Contact System 
(CCS). 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Internal Process IP02 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: IP02: Provide housing where 
needed 
We will work to ensure that necessary housing is provided to support a comfortable 
lifestyle and the continued development of Gladiator 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: Number of 
Households on Waiting List  
ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: 
Reduction from 8,000 (April 2011) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factors below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
 
Target 
 
Risk 
 
Initiative(s)  
 
(S) and 
(F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr. 
End-
Yr. 
I L I 
xL 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/ 
A/T 
M/E/ 
A/T 
Housing 
Vacancies 
(H1) 
 
 
A) The total number of 
dwellings in local 
authority stock N 
 
 
B) The total number of 
dwellings, excluding 
those subject to major 
refurbishment projects N 
 
C) The overall 
percentage of dwellings 
that are empty 
(excluding those subject 
to major refurbishment 
projects) N 
 
D) The percentage of 
empty dwellings 
unavailable for letting N 
 
E) The percentage of 
empty dwellings  
available for letting N 
Increase on 
2010 number of 
4,928 
(Gladiator) to 
5,035 
 
Increase on 
2010 number of 
4,928 
(Gladiator) to 
5,035 
 
Maintain 2010 
level of 3% 
(Gladiator) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Review with 
Architects Team 
to monitor 
progress. 
 
 
Review with 
Architects Team 
to monitor 
progress. 
 
 
Review with 
Housing 
Maintenance 
and Architects 
Team to 
monitor 
progress. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
  
Average Time 
Taken to Re-
Let Available 
Dwellings 
(H2) 
 
 
A) The average time 
taken from the date of 
vacation of dwelling to 
the date when all 
necessary repairs are 
carried out which are 
deemed necessary to re-
let the dwelling N 
 
B) The average time 
taken from the works 
(above) being completed 
to the date of the first 
rent debit N  
Maintain 2010 
time of 13 
weeks 
(Gladiator) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintain 2010 
time of 10 
weeks 
(Gladiator) 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Regular team 
meetings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Review 
processing 
procedures 
between Social 
Operations (A, 
B, C) and 
Processing 
Units. 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
  F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
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Housing 
Repairs (H3)  
 
A) Number of repairs 
completed as a 
percentage of the 
number of valid repair 
requests received N 
Maintain 2010 
level of 87% 
(Gladiator) 
 
2 3 6 Review 
progress at end 
of each quarter. 
  S F    
Traveller 
Accommodatio
n (H4) 
A) Total number of 
Traveller families 
accommodated as a 
percentage of the targets 
set in the local Traveller 
accommodation 
programme N 
Maintain 2010 
level of 66% 
(Gladiator) 
 
2 3 6 Ensure linkages 
between 
Travellers Unit 
and Social 
Operations (A, 
B, C). 
S   F    
Enforcement 
of Standards in 
Private Rented 
Sector (H5)  
 
A) Total number of 
registered tenancies N 
 
B) Number of dwelling 
units inspected N 
 
C) Number of 
inspections carried out N 
 
D) Number of dwellings 
inspected as percentage 
of registered tenancies 
(i.e. B as percentage of 
A)N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintain 2010 
level of 9.27% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regular team 
meetings in 
RAS and liaison 
with ACFO’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Grants to 
Adapt Housing 
for the Needs 
of People with 
a Disability 
(H6) 
A) Average time taken 
(in weeks) to process 
applications under the 
Mobility Aids Grant 
Scheme, including any 
necessary inspection(s), 
from the date of receipt 
of a valid application to 
the date of decision on 
the application N 
 
B) Average time taken 
(in weeks) to process 
applications under 
Housing Adaptation 
Grant for People with a 
Disability, including any 
necessary inspection(s), 
from the date of receipt 
of a valid application, to 
the date of decision on 
the application N 
Maintain 2010 
level of 9.7 
weeks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintain 2010 
level of 20.92 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Establishment 
of team and 
regular 
meetings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establishment 
of team and 
regular 
meetings. 
 
  S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
   
Pre-Tenancy 
Familiarisation 
Courses (H7) 
A) Total number of new 
local authority tenants N 
 
 
 
 
B) Percentage of new 
local authority tenants 
who have been offered 
pre-tenancy 
familiarisation courses N 
Reduction on 
2010 number of 
399 to 250 (due 
to reduced 
numbers of 
newly 
constructed 
units coming 
on-stream) 
 
100% 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Liaison with 
Architects for 
106 new units. 
(No control over 
number of 
casual 
vacancies). 
 
 
Training to be 
provided for 
newly appointed 
staff. 
S   
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
   
Affordable 
Housing 
 
A) The total number of 
units leased under the 
short-term letting 
initiative L 
190 units 
(approximately) 
to be delivered 
4 1 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Agree schemes 
take-up with 
Approved 
Housing 
Bodies.  
Agree and 
execute leasing 
agreements. 
S F 
 
 
S 
  
 
 
F 
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Tenant 
Purchase 
Scheme 
A) The average time 
taken to process an 
application from date of 
receipt of fully 
completed application L 
20 weeks 2 2 4 Review existing 
procedures and 
agree new 
procedures. 
S   F    
Sale of 
Serviced Sites 
A) The number of sites 
sold/developed/planned 
for development L 
All sites on 
hands –
designated for 
one of the 
options selected    
1 1 1 Develop and 
implement 
programme of 
work.  
S   F    
Social Leasing 
Scheme/Long-
term Leasing  
A) The number of 
units//leases 
Delivered L 
Value of Leases 
completed to 
equal 
2011 allocation 
 
4  8 Develop/imple
ment and 
market 
programme. 
S   F    
Rental 
Accommodatio
n Scheme  
The number of new 
contracts as a 
percentage of the 
number of contracts set 
by DoEC&LG L 
Increase over 
2010 level of 
60% (i.e. 181 
actual/300 
target) 
4 2 8 Develop and 
implement new 
processes. 
  S F    
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Internal Process 
IP10 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: IP10: Liaise with government, local 
development agencies & external agencies  
We will assure effective liaison between our plans and activities and the plans and 
activities of other government, local development and external agencies whose 
activities impact Gladiator; this will include the Environmental Protection Agency, 
educational institutions and others 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: (Insert) ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factor below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
T
a
rg
et
 
 
Risk 
 
Initiative(
s)  
 
(S) and (F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr. 
End-
Yr. 
I L I x 
L 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/ 
A/T 
M/E 
/A/T 
Return of 
Information to 
the Department 
of the 
Environment, 
Community 
and Local 
Government 
A) The number of 
returns sent the 
required date as a 
percentage of 
returns received 
from the 
DoEC&LG L 
100% 2 2 4 Establish and 
implement 
work 
programmes. 
 S  F    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
288 
E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Internal Process 
IP15 
 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: IP15: Establish shared services 
where appropriate 
We will identify areas where a shared service approach can be implemented with 
improved service delivery 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: (Insert) ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factor below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
 
Target 
 
Risk 
 
Initiative(s)  
 
(S) and (F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr. 
End-
Yr. 
I L I 
x 
L 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/ 
A/T 
M/E 
/A/T 
Integrated 
Housing 
Service 
A) Overlap in 
system L 
Reduce 
overlap across 
Divisions and  
Directorates 
using structure 
proposed to 
come into 
force in April 
2011 
3 1 3 Implement 
New  
Housing 
Structure. 
 
 
 
 
Develop new 
processes. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Learning & 
Growth L2 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: L2: Manage technology resources 
& develop management information systems 
We will ensure that we manage the technology resources available to us and that we 
have the management information systems we need, and that these systems work 
together in an integrated and effective fashion 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: (Insert) ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factor below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
T
a
rg
et
 
 
Risk 
 In
it
ia
ti
v
e(
s)
  
 
(S) and (F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr. 
End-
Yr. 
I L I 
x 
L 
Q
1 
Q
2 
Q
3 
Q
4 
M/E/
A/T 
M/E/
A/T 
Management 
Information 
Systems 
 
 
A) The number 
of 
representations 
processed as a 
percentage of the 
number of 
representations 
processed 
through the 
Customer 
Contact System 
(CCS)L 
 
B) The number 
of rent accounts 
on ERP system 
as a percentage 
of the total 
number of rent 
accounts L 
100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T.B.A. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Implement 
CCS system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commence 
implement-
ation of ERP 
system. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Learning & 
Growth L4 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: L4: Manage and enhance team & 
individual performance 
We will implement an effective performance management system that will allow us to 
measure performance and to enhance the performance of each individual and team in 
the organisation 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: (Insert) ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factor below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
 
Target 
 
Risk 
 In
it
ia
ti
v
e(
s)
   
(S) and (F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr. 
End-
Yr. 
I L I 
x 
L 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/ 
A/T 
M/E 
/A/T 
Working 
Days Lost 
to Sickness 
(C1) 
 
 
 
A) 
Percentage 
of working 
days lost to 
sickness 
absence 
through 
certified 
leave N 
 
 
B) 
Percentage 
of working 
days lost to 
sickness 
absence 
through 
uncertified 
leave N 
Reduction 
from 2010 
rate of 
4.45% 
(Gladiator) 
to 4% 
 
 
 
Reduction 
from 2010 
rate of 
0.89% 
(Gladiator) 
to 0.7% 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Monitor 
absenteeism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monitor 
absenteeism. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Financial F2 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: F2: Maximize income collection 
We will continue to collect income for services provided, where appropriate, while 
identifying additional areas where fees would be appropriate and ensure that fees 
fully reflect the cost of services 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: (Insert) ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factors below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
 
Target 
 
Risk 
In
it
ia
ti
v
e(
s)
  
(S) and (F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr 
End-
Yr 
I L I x 
L 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/
A/T 
M/E/
A/T 
House 
Rent 
(Rev 1) 
 
 
A) Amount 
collected at year 
end as a 
percentage of 
amount due from 
Housing Rent N 
 
B) Percentage of 
Housing Rent 
arrears that are 
less than 4 weeks 
old N 
 
C) Percentage of 
Housing Rent 
arrears that are 4 
weeks old or 
more, but less 
than 6 weeks old 
N 
 
D) Percentage of 
Housing Rent 
arrears that are 6 
weeks old or 
more, but less 
than 12 weeks 
old N 
 
E) Percentage of 
Housing Rent 
arrears that are 
more than 12 
weeks old N 
Retain 2010 
level of 
90.58% 
(Gladiator 
units) 
 
 
Reduce 
arrears on 
2010 level 
 
 
 
Reduce 
arrears on 
2010 level 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduce 
arrears on 
2010 level 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduce 
arrears on 
2010 level 
of 52.25% 
to 50% 
(Gladiator 
units) 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Monitor 
arrears 
continuously. 
 
 
 
Monitor 
arrears 
continuously. 
 
 
Monitor 
arrears 
continuously. 
 
 
 
 
Monitor 
arrears 
continuously. 
 
 
 
 
Monitor 
arrears 
continuously. 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
  F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
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Govern-
ment 
Funding 
 
A) Amount of 
funding claimed 
as a percentage 
of amount 
allocated by 
DoEC&LG 
under SHIP and 
Other Grants L 
100% 3 1 3 Prepare full 
work 
programmes 
e.g. energy 
efficiency, 
housing 
adaptation 
grants 
(private), 
DPG’s, 
IWILS. 
 S  F    
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E. Strategic Objectives for 2011 – Financial F3 
 
DIRECTORATE: Housing Services 
ORGANISATIONAL STRATEGY MAP OBJECTIVE: F3: Control expenditure 
We will continue to control all expenditure and will work to provide the required 
levels of services 
ORGANISATIONAL MEASURE: 
(Insert) 
ORGANISATIONAL TARGET: (Insert) 
CONTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORATE TO THIS ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVE: (To 
achieve this Objective, what must we do well?): 
See Success Factors below. 
TOP 10 ORGANISATIONAL RISKS LINKED TO THIS OBJECTIVE: No. 2 Loss of Key 
Staff; No. 10 Leave Schemes 
 
Success 
Factor 
 
Measure(s) 
T
a
rg
et
 
 
Risk 
 
Initiative(s)  
 
(S) and (F) 
R
e
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
Evaluation 
Mid-
Yr. 
End-
Yr. 
I L I 
x 
L 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 M/E/A/T M/E/A/T 
Budget 
Control 
 
A) Actual 
expenditure 
as a 
percentage of 
budget 
expenditure L 
100% 3 2 6 Monitor 
expenditure 
continuously. 
 S  F    
Procure-
ment 
 
 
A) Level of 
compliance 
with 
Gladiator 
procurement 
thresholds L 
100% 3 2 6 Continuous 
monitoring. 
 
 
 
Refresher 
training of 
personnel. 
 S 
 
 
 
 
S 
 F 
 
 
 
 
F 
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F. Terms Used (1) 
 
 
Term 
 
Explanation 
 
Business Unit(s) 
 
Section(s) run by direct report to Director/Head. 
 
Strategy Map 
 
 
A one-page graphical representation of the broad priorities of 
Gladiator. A Strategy Map comprises of objectives spanning 
four perspectives that link to tell the organisation’s strategic 
story. 
 
Organisational Strategy Map 
Objective 
To be agreed with CEO prior to 
writing the Business Plan 
 
Organisational Strategic Objectives describe important 
medium- and long-term goals that Gladiator is striving to 
achieve.  These Objectives appear on the Organisational 
Strategy Map 2010.  Each Directorate will be responsible for 
contributing to several of these Objectives (exact Objectives 
for each Directorate to be agreed with Gladiator).  Example: 
“IP01: Build & maintain Roads”.  
 
Organisational Measure 
To be agreed by Gladiator 
Management Team prior to Business 
Plan exercise 
 
The Measure Gladiator will use to determine whether or not it 
is meeting its Strategic Objective. 
 
Organisational Target 
To be agreed by Gladiator 
Management Team prior to Business 
Plan exercise. 
 
The Target Gladiator is trying to achieve:  equal to successful 
accomplishment of the Strategic Objective in 2010. 
 
Success Factor 
 
This is the element which the Directorate must complete to 
achieve the Strategic Objective.   It is derived by asking “To 
achieve this Strategic Objective, what must we do well?” 
 
Measure(s) 
 
 
This is how we measure performance for success. 
 
 
Target 
Set only one Target per Measure. 
 
 
This is the required level of performance to ensure success by 
closing the gap between current and expected performance. 
  
Initiative(s) 
Also known as Task(s), Key 
Action(s), or Programmes 
These are actions the Directorate must take to achieve success, 
and, thus, Gladiator’s Strategic Objectives. Please include 
initiatives that will assist in off-setting some or all of the Risk 
that may otherwise hamper success. 
Responsibility The named person(s) reporting directly to the Director/Head 
with lead responsibility for the Initiative (Key Action).  
Start (S) and Finish (F) The Quarter during which the Initiative will be Started and 
Finished. 
Evaluation To assess performance (Mid-Year and End-of-Year)): 
‘Met Target (M)’,  
‘Exceeded Target (E)’,  
‘Action to Get Back on Track (A)’,  
‘On Target (T)’ (if Mid-Year). 
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F. Terms Used (2) 
 
Term and Explanation 
 
Top 10 Organisational Risks (Risk Register December 2006 as Reviewed in December 2009) 
This should reflect how a Strategic Objective may be affected by giving the relevant risks from the 
Top 10 Corporate Risks which are: 
1. Reduction in income and impact on services and staff (new risk) 
2. Loss of key staff 
3. Reorganisation of public bodies by government leads to loss of funding and / or provision of 
services / functions / areas 
4. Staff / industrial unrest / industrial action 
5. Inability to recruit and retain suitable skilled and experienced staff / high staff turnover (internal) 
6. Lack of adequately skilled mid management 
7. Lack of cross function understanding/communication 
8. Failure to meet statutory requirements 
9. Poor financial management would result in ineffective use of available resources / Inadequate 
budget management, including increases or decreases in funding 
10. Leave schemes staff impact 
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Operational Risk 
Risk is regarded as a possible loss or other adverse consequence that has the potential to impact on 
Gladiator’s ability to achieve its objectives and fulfil its mission. 
The Risk Score is found by multiplying Impact by Likelihood, i.e.  (I x L). 
I = Impact  
What would be the impact on the organisation of not achieving this Objective? Apply a value of 1, 2, 
3, or 4. 
 
IMPACT 
1. MINOR 
 
2. 
MODERATE 
3. MAJOR 4. SEVERE 
Impact on: CUSTOMERS 
e.g. Affects only one 
group of stakeholders 
with minimum impact 
on performance 
e.g. Affects more than 
one group of 
stakeholders but only 
short-term impact on 
reputation 
e.g. Affects more than 
one group of 
stakeholders with 
widespread medium 
term impact on 
reputation 
e.g. Affects all major 
stakeholders with 
long-term impact on 
public memory 
causing damage to 
reputation 
Impact on: INTERNAL PROCESS (SERVICE) 
e.g. Small fall in 
service levels, some 
minor quality 
standards are not met 
e.g. Moderate fall in 
service levels, major 
partnership 
relationships strained 
e.g. Significant fall in 
service levels, project 
deadlines not 
achieved, serious 
disruption in service 
standards 
e.g. Catastrophic fall 
in service levels, 
failure of major 
partnership, complete 
failure in service 
standards 
Impact on: LEARNING & GROWTH (STAFF) 
e.g. Limited staff lost, 
on-going absenteeism 
e.g. Loss of a number 
of key staff, 
health/illness 
epidemic, shrinking 
skilled labour market 
e.g. Significant loss of 
key staff, defection to 
other local authority, 
strike action, drop in 
morale due to new 
delivery issues 
e.g. Loss of key staff, 
mass defection to 
other local authority, 
lengthy strike action, 
drop in morale due to 
loss of key staff 
Impact on: FINANCE 
Additional 
expenditure/Loss of 
service income inc. 
associated costs of 
<€2m 
Additional 
expenditure/Loss of 
service income inc. 
associated costs of 
between €2m<€5m 
Additional 
expenditure/Loss of 
service income inc. 
associated costs of 
between €5m<€10m 
Additional 
expenditure/Loss of 
service income inc. 
associated costs of 
>€10m 
 
L = Likelihood 
What is the likelihood that this Objective will not be achieved? Apply a value of 1, 2, 3, or 4. 
 
LIKELIHOOD 1. LOW 
 
2. MEDIUM 3. HIGH 4. VERY 
HIGH 
Extremely 
Unlikely  
(0%-25%) 
Unlikely  
(25%-50%) 
Likely  
(50%-75%) 
Very Likely  
(75%-100%) 
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